I have the honor, for the second time, to address this august body to present my report, which is mainly based on my last visit to the Sudan, Kenya and Egypt in September-October 2002. As part of the visit, I also traveled to El-Fasher, northern Darfur, to look into the issue of Special Courts. 

I wish to welcome the Machakos Protocol, as well as the resumption of the peace talks on 14 October 2002. This is the first real chance for peace in a long time. Since the beginning, I stressed the important role that the United States could play. The Danforth's initiative was a good preparation for this process. In my view, peace negotiations are not compatible with on-going hostilities. A comprehensive cease-fire is a pre-condition for the peace process to continue. Similarly, human rights abuses must be stopped, too. Indeed, human rights must be central to the peace process.

Accordingly, Machakos should be built on specific mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights. These must include the creation of independent internal institutions (1) as well as the establishment of an effective monitoring system from the outside. In the same vein, I noted with appreciation that the civil society is playing an increasingly active role. Human rights NGOs are more visible, organised and keen to participate actively in the peace process. 

The country needs increased assistance to build up civil society, to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance. This includes civil administration and education. Specific human rights benchmarks should be envisaged in the peace process, within an established timeframe. To this end, I prepared a list, which is attached herewith as an Annex. 

Mr. Chairman,

During my last visit, I had noted a number of new elements mainly focussing on the building up and/or strengthening of institutions and training activities. I took note of the new CEAWC structure, the on-going discussions relating to the creation of a national human rights institution; the training activities organised by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights within its technical co-operation program and, in rebel-held southern Sudan, the initial steps taken towards the strengthening of the civil society. 

In my report, I provided an overview of the situation, by comparing the commitments made by the Government during the last year and action taken. Most of the commitments have not been sufficiently implemented. In some other important human rights areas, no commitments were made. I conclude therefore that, overall, the human rights situation has not yet changed significantly. However, some positive areas need to be highlighted. 

I. The civil society

In general, political opposition parties, politically active students, and representatives of independent newspapers or human rights NGOs have continued to be subjected to different forms of harassment. Daily or periodic summoning to the security as well as torture, in both physical and subtler psychological forms, have continued to take place. It was reported that prisoners are often moved away from their community of origin, which deprives them of their family's support and assistance. Overall, individual cases have continued to occur and it remains difficult to identify perpetrators. Some sources referred to recent cases of students being subjected to torture in the past 2-3 months. I met with one of these students who had 13 cigarette burns on his arms and forearms. 

I was informed that students who are involved in human rights and/or political activities as well as political opposition party members – particularly from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Popular National Congress (PNC) - have continued to be harassed. PNC leader Hassan al-Turabi's detention has been further renewed by Presidential Emergency Order .

I am particularly concerned at information received regarding students riots taking place at the Khartoum University during the last week of October. Reportedly, the immediate cause of the demonstrations was the cancellation of a political rally, although restrictions to the freedoms of association and assembly seem to be part of the problem (2). According to information received demonstrating students were attacked by Anti-riot police. The operation resulted in two students being seriously injured by gunfire and/or beating and some 100 students detained. I appeal to both parties to seek peaceful solutions to this situation and refrain from resorting to violence. 

Since my first visit, I encouraged Government authorities as well as representatives of the civil society to consider the establishment of an independent human rights national institution. I was glad to report that the civil society had followed up on my proposal and that discussions were being held to this end, including in the presence of Government officials. I learnt, however, that on 19 February, a meeting had been scheduled to discuss the issue and security officers prevented some participants from attending. I raised this incident with the Minister of Justice, who assured me that the President had no objection to the creation of such an institution. In view of the Minister's above-mentioned position, I call upon him to follow closely the situation with a view to avoiding similar incidents. In addition, I heard rumors whereby the Advisory Council itself could be "upgraded" into a national institution. In this connection, I wish to recall that the Advisory Council is a governmental body dealing with human rights within the Ministry of Justice. I also wish to refer to the Paris principles on national institutions with a view to highlighting their independent and participatory character.

Regarding NGOs, I am glad to report that there has been some progress. A network of NGOs working on human rights has been established following the first training organized by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Network has not been harassed by security so far, although single organizations have experienced difficulties at times in the discharge of their mandates. 

II. Role of police and security officers

The state of emergency has remained in force since December 1999, which has provided the basis for the imposition of security measure, often arbitrarily implemented. I already referred to the amendment to the National Security Forces Act, as well as the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act of 1991. Overall, the role of the security apparatus, as the main responsible for the occurrence of human rights abuses as well as impunity of security officers, remains an issue of serious concern. The state of emergency should be lifted, together with the amendments to the above-mentioned acts.

III. Freedom of the press

I acknowledge the plurality of publications existing in the Sudan. However, in spite of a temporary lifting of censorship in late November 2001, and contrary to information received from the National Press Council, independent newspapers have continued, from time to time, to be targeted through the imposition of direct and indirect forms of censorship and restrictive measures such as high fines, 

IV. Freedom of religion and belief

While sources reported that it was difficult to give specific cases of abuses in the past 6 months, discrimination against/harassment of Christians, i.e. denial of visas, permissions to build new churches and equal participation in the educational system, have continued to be reported. Confiscation of properties remains a problem that has not yet been addressed in a satisfactory manner; in this connection, reference was made to the Catholic Club case.

Sources lamented that the Council of Christians has not been appointed in a democratic, participatory manner and that its members were appointed by the Government. As a result, the Churches seem to have no trust in the Council.

V. Human rights and humanitarian law in the context of the conflict

The month of October has been a challenging, but also rewarding month, on the humanitarian front. The flight restrictions over Eastern and Western Equatoria and the suspension of humanitarian activities for over a week made it particularly difficult for humanitarian operations to work effectively. In terms of impact, it was reported that some 500,000 people were denied access. During my visit, I stressed in no uncertain terms that the humanitarian access should be fully respected as a principle and cannot be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.

I also strongly condemn the bombing of civilians and civilian installations during the last months. I believe that investigations of war crimes should be undertaken as soon as conditions permit.

In this connection, I welcome the developments occurred as from mid-October, notably the Memorandum of Understanding, signed on 15 October between the Government and the SPLM/A to cease hostilities for the duration of talks, as well as the signing, on 26 October, of what has been defined a "landmark aid deal", between the Government, the SPLM/A and the United Nations allowing unimpeded humanitarian access. 

VI. The situation of internally displaced

The situation of IDPs has remained an issue of concern. Sources refer to it as "exasperating". 

During my last visit, I inquired about future prospects, in view of the magnitude of Sudan's IDP population, in case of a positive outcome of the peace talks. It seems likely that there might be new waves of movements and that therefore a number of issues will have to be considered, including in terms of protection and creation of new opportunities in the south in order to provide people with attractive options.

It was reported that the Government has received support for its IDP policy following the first mission of the IDP Inter-Agency Unit last summer. All sources stressed the importance to follow up on this issue. I am therefore glad that the Unit has planned a further mission, currently on-going, aimed at mapping out a UN system strategy for supporting the Government and regional authorities in conceptualizing, resourcing and implementing durable solutions for IDPs, with a main focus on community-based interventions. 

VII. The situation of women 

During my last visit, I was informed that some, though still limited, progress was made in the field of abductions, following the restructuring of CEAWC on the one hand, and further to the fact that the train from Babanusa to Wau has not been running lately, on the other. It was not clear, though, whether this was due to a political decision or not. 

I was informed that the Government has finally followed up on its pledges and given CEAWC 200,000 USD. CEAWC considered that this was a satisfactory amount of money, while lamenting decreasing funding from donors.

I was also informed of a new rule whereby any new cases of abductions will be prosecuted and won't benefit from the current procedure, as described in my previous reports. As I reported, after one year since CEAWC's restructuring, also old cases will be referred to prosecution. The new rule falls within the CEAWC rules of cooperation and its nature is legally binding. It should be noted however, that so far not much has been done in terms of prosecuting responsible people.

Also, some sources reported as a positive development that it was now possible to reunify former abductees with their families in SPLM/A areas. 

In view of information received, I paid particular attention to the issue of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). I encourage the Government to play a more active role including in terms of awareness-raising, with a view to eradicating such a traditional harmful practice. 

During my last visit, I received further information on discrimination against women: dismissal from public offices is continuous, women cannot travel unless they get a travel permit from their "guardian", women living alone are reportedly often harassed by the security, including sexually. 

Since my appointment, I have been urging the Government to continue discussions and awareness-raising with a view to acceding the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). I am pleased to report that OHCHR will address this issue in the framework of its technical cooperation program and that an activity has been foreseen for the beginning of 2003. 

Regarding the situation of women in SPLM/A-held territories, I was informed of the limited involvement of women in development projects, due to the fact that the local society is totally man-dominated. Women are generally not educated and when they reach the age of 10 or 12, most of them are reportedly taken as wives by local leaders or commanders. It seems that the situation varies only slightly from region to region.

VIII. The situation of children

No progress was recorded on the situation of children; street children and juvenile justice remain areas of concern. Only two reformatories exist and children are very often detained with adults and subjected to inhumane treatment. 

I was informed that child exploitation continues to take place particularly in the agricultural and pastoral sectors. Networks are reportedly flourishing to exploit them, including sexually. A stronger Government involvement is necessary.

I was also informed that forced recruitment of children in war areas has continued. 

IX. The SPLM/A-controlled territories

In view of the flight ban affecting Eastern and Western Equatoria, regrettably I was unable to travel to southern Sudan. 

As for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law occurring within the framework of the conflict, I condemn disregard for international standards and appeal to the SPLM/A and allied militias to do their utmost to prevent human rights abuses.

Overall, the human rights situation remains of concern. Problems remain in terms of what has been defined as "enormous power of the security", severe restrictions to freedom of opinion and expression, speech, assembly and association. There continues to be no political opposition in southern Sudan, nor any newspaper, in short, no alternative to the SPLM/A. It should be taken into account, however, that reports from different sources continue to refer to the mounting of an internal opposition and to the fact that the SPLM/A is to some extent confronted by the civil society when it fails to deliver. This would seem to confirm that the SPLM/A is not yet taking full responsibility as a ruling party.

While in Nairobi, I met with representatives of the SPLM/A with whom I discussed my main concern, notably the building up and/or strengthening of the civil society and democratization. I was informed that relevant initiatives sponsored by the New Sudan Council of Churches and bilateral donors are continuing. I welcome the outcome of the Chukudum Crisis Peace Conference. I wish to hereby reiterate my unconditional support to grass-roots, people to people initiatives which help pave the way for peace.

I also inquired about the holding of elections for the so-called National Congress, which, though supposed to be held every 4 years, have been repeatedly postponed. This was again the case this year, owing to the on-going fighting. I wish to note however, that some sources point to very high portions of war-free areas in southern Sudan, which would allow for the undertaking of initiatives aimed at fostering democratization, as is proven by the numerous programs of assistance on-going in southern Sudan. Some of my counterparts working in southern Sudan lamented the absence of a civil society, thus the difficulties to establish partnerships and formulate exit strategies. Opinions on this issue, however, differ to a certain extent. Reference was also made to more stable areas (notably Western Equatoria), where the development of the civil society has been defined as "remarkable" and some success has been reported in the separation of military and civilian structures. 

On the issue of child soldiers, in spite of some progress made on their demobilization, as previously reported, some sources reported that forced recruitment of children around 15 years of age continues to take place in conflict areas. Sources also reported that demobilized children are sometimes recruited again.

Forced recruitment is also reportedly on-going. 

VIII. International conventions

I wish to once again encourage the Government to accede to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and ratify the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which the Government promised to do last year, on the occasion of my first visit.

In this connection, I welcome the training seminar organised by OHCHR in the framework of its technical cooperation program, on ratification of CAT and CEDAW, with the participation of international experts from the Committees. 

Regarding the status of reporting obligations, I noted that the Government has presented all the reports due under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 

IX. Individual cases

In my interim report, I referred to the fact that I had received no reply nor any information on action taken on most of urgent appeals sent. More specifically, I received 1 reply, from the Permanent Mission in Geneva, on 1 out of 11 urgent actions sent. I reiterate my appeal to the Sudanese authorities to follow up on any individual cases received and inform me and my thematic colleagues of any action taken, as appropriate. 

X. Darfur

During my last mission I travelled to El-Fashir, northern Darfur, to look into the issue of special courts. I held extensive discussions with the Heads of the Judiciary of southern and northern Darfur. I visited the local prison where I met with representatives of the Rizeigat tribe, who had been arrested and sentenced to death followed an incident occurred in April-May, which had opposed them to the Mahlia in tribal clashes. I also raised the case of the presence of at least 1 prisoner who was underage, reportedly 14. 

From my discussions it clearly appeared that there was no time allowed for individual cross-examination; that the trial targeted the group for three weeks; that some of the prisoners had not been given any reasons for being sentenced to death; that most of the others were sentenced for carrying out an armed attack and murder. All have appealed. I noted that all prisoners were held in shackles, which, I was told, is customary for prisoners sentenced to death. Due to the heat, the shackles had to be wrapped in paper and/or plastic to avoid contact with the skin.

In the course of my discussions, I repeatedly asked my counterparts what was the reason for establishing Special Courts. I was informed that 8 Special Courts were established in North and South Darfur (3) in May 2001 and that they are composed of 3 judges, 1 civilian and 2 military. All those tried by the Special Courts were given legal representation and the right to appeal. However, accused are represented by "a lawyer as a friend", meaning that the "accused has the right to speak for himself and the lawyers do not speak for the accused"; rather " the lawyer indicates to the accused what he should say". Defendants also reportedly have the right to withdraw their confessions. However, that confession would be considered as evidence if corroborated by other evidence.

As for the right to appeal, normally the decision of the Head of the Judiciary is final, with the exception of death sentences and amputations, whereby the accused can appeal, including through a lawyer. In these cases, judgement is referred to the High Court in Khartoum. Reportedly, it takes months for the High Court to decide on appeal cases. None of the participants to the meeting could say how many.

I appeal to the Sudanese authorities to abolish the Special Court and focus on alternative means to settle tribal conflicts, notably by resorting to traditional conflict-resolution means, as has been done successfully in other areas. I also appeal to the Constitutional Court to play its role in all pending cases.

XI. The oil issue within the context of the right to development

I repeatedly stated that oil is exacerbating the conflict, insofar as the war is the result of a fight for the control of power and resources. I refer to last year's debate on the use of oil revenues. I took note of the Government's stand whereby the use of oil revenues is a sovereign decision, not to be covered by my mandate. I responded by focusing on the oil issue in connection with the right to development, and more specifically the use of oil revenues and the need to develop a wealth-sharing arrangement with the South. 

I recalled the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, as well as relevant Commission on Human Rights resolutions. In view of the latest report issued by UNDP on Arab Human Development, I wish to highlight once again the link between development and governance, defined as "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. […] Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable and it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources" (4).

XII. The role of the United Nations

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I already referred to the role of the United Nations, particularly in the framework of the peace process. I believe that Machakos should be the starting point for a stronger involvement of the UN in the Sudan. Accordingly, while the existing humanitarian structure should continue to look at humanitarian issues, including access, a new political structure, under the direction of a UN political office should be envisaged to tackle more political issues, including those linked to the peace process and its outcome, in terms of a post-conflict scenario. Naturally, such a structure should include a human rights component, entrusted with the monitoring of the implementation of the peace process. 

As for my recommendations on the need to support the civil society, I reiterate my appreciation for the technical co-operation activities carried out in the past 1 and a half years by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Khartoum, which aim at building and/or strengthening national capacities in the field of human rights through the provision of training on the promotion and protection of human rights. I appreciated the opening of the authorities in Khartoum in the first phases of co-operation, however, besides the establishment of new institutions, more specific action should be taken which has an impact on the overall human rights situation, within a specific timeframe.

Conclusions and recommendations

Once again, I had the opportunity to visit the Sudan at a very interesting time, a time of uncertainty, due to the vicissitudes on the battlefields, as well as in the peace negotiations, but also a time of hope, due to a progressive change in the international context following, among other things, the events of 11 September 2001. 

I heard the view that the Government seemed to be satisfied with the outcome of the first round of the peace talks and that therefore there was no need to continue to focus on human rights issues. In my view, human rights do not belong to the post-conflict scenario, but must be an integral part, indeed be put at the heart, of the peace talks, because with no consideration of human rights today there will never be a sustainable and just peace tomorrow.

Once again, I refer to those benchmarks that I mentioned at the beginning, which should be fully integrated in the peace negotiations as further guarantees for the post-conflict scenario. I also wish to reiterate that the peace talks should be a forum for all the parties in the conflict and as such cannot be exclusively linked to the Government and the SPLM/A, which has the further disadvantage of potentially crystallizing the country into two parts, besides making the resolution of the conflict itself more difficult. 

I noted that assistance continues to be directed mainly to emergencies. More energies and resources should be devoted to prepare the population for peace and democracy. Assistance should be community-based, focusing on developing a sense of ownership by the local communities, thus ensuring their sustainability. Traditional means of conflict resolution, healing and reconciliation should be encouraged. Assistance should be targeted at developing coping mechanisms. The civil society as a whole, and women in particular, should be empowered to play an active role not only in the negotiations but also in the post-conflict scenario. Also, development aid should be closely linked to tangible progress in the field of human rights.

The link between peace, democracy and human rights should always be kept into account, with equal emphasis on civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. In this connection, relevant recommendations contained in the concluding observations of the Treaty Bodies should be the starting point for action, at both the national and international levels. Also, relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and Program of Action stemming from the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance should be referred to as further guidance.

A long-term, comprehensive, unified approach is the only way for any peace initiative to succeed. A political follow-up by the United Nations is therefore urgently needed to preserve the momentum. 

Annex I

Human rights benchmarks for the peace process

1. Lifting of the state of emergency;

2. Reduce the role of the security apparatus by lifting immunities for security officers who should be held accountable for their actions as well as revision of the National Security Forces Act; 

3. Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Acts of torture should be considered as offences under criminal law, accordingly perpetrators of similar acts should be held accountable for their actions and be brought to justice to be subject to criminal, disciplinary or other appropriate proceedings. Any statements which is established to have been made as a result of torture or other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment may not be invoked as evidence against the person concerned or against any other person in any proceedings (5). The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which was signed in 1986 should be ratified.

4. Discrimination against women, denying or limiting as it does their equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust and constitutes an offence against human dignity. Accordingly, appropriate measures should be taken to abolish laws and practice, which are discriminatory against women, including harmful traditional practices, and specific provisions should be envisaged to ensure adequate legal protection of women (6). Also, women should be empowered to play an active role in the peace process and post-conflict management. To this end, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women should be signed and ratified; 

5. Freedom of expression (7): effective lifting of all forms of direct and indirect censorship. Everyone should be free to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, through any media of his/her choice;

6. Independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. Every one shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process should not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals (8). More specifically, special courts should be abolished. Traditional mechanisms of conflict settlement should be looked into to solve the problem of tribal clashes. Similar grass-roots, people-to-people initiatives, like the ones used to settle conflicts between Dinka and Nuer or between Dinka and Didinga as well as between Rizeigat and Mahlia could provide useful guidance to this end.

7. Freedom of movement should be ensured both within and outside the country. Lengthy procedures for visa requirements should be speeded up and should not be used as instruments of discrimination against human rights activists, political opponents, including students, or religious representatives;

8. Freedom of assembly and association (9):representatives of the civil society, including non-governmental organizations, students, churches, etc. should be allowed to assemble peacefully and including to form and join trade unions for the protection of their interests, with a view to playing their role under no constraints other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health and morals or the protection of the rights and freedom of others. All restrictions on political activities should be lifted for political parties to play their role. Political prisoners should be released;

9. The building up and/or strengthening of the civil society, particularly in southern Sudan, should be further encouraged. The SPLM/A in particular should do more to replace existing military structures with civil ones. The international community should support efforts aimed to this end.

10. IDPs: While responsibility for the protection and promotion of IDPs rests first and foremost with the national government and local authorities, it is important for the international community to see how best it can contribute to enhancing the protection of IDPs in conflict and post-conflict scenarios. In this connection, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement issued by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs are an invaluable tool to guide action on assisting and protecting IDPs.

11. Specific mechanisms of protection should be envisaged for children. In this connection, the concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC/C/15/Add.190) should be taken into account.

12. Right to development: wealth sharing is inextricably linked to a sustainable peace process. Accordingly, specific provisions have to be put in place to ensure that development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom. Specific provisions, relevant to the right to development, including CHR res. 2001/19 should be kept into account.

Notes

1. In accordance with the Paris Principles relating to the status of national institutions

2. Some sources referred to the fact that there has been no students union for the past 7 years and that elections were repeatedly postponed pending the return of those students who had been sent to war. Some sources also claimed that assistance for lodging for university students had also been cancelled except for those students belonging to the ruling party. It should also be noted that security is reportedly present and active within the campus limits, sometimes called by the University administration itself.

3. According to the Advisory Council, 5 Courts were established in North Darfur and 3 in South Darfur. However, Nyala Special Court No. 1 was reconstituted in May 2002 following the transfer of the President of the Court. It should be noted that the latter was an officer of the Army, who has now been replaced by a civilian judge. 96 people were brought in front of the Court, 10 of whom were aquitted; 86 convicted. All of them appealed to the Appeal Court, constituted of 1 judge, the Head of the judicial organ in Darfur. Their case was further transferred to the High Court and the Supreme/High Court in Khartoum, comprised of 5 judges. They also have the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court.

4. UNDP Arab Human Development Report 2002, Chapter 7, page 105.

5. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by GA res. 3452 (XXX) of 9 December, 1975 

6. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

7. ICCPR, art. 19

8. Basic principles on the Independence of the judiciary

9. ICCPR, art. 21, 22; ICESCR, art. 8
 

The situation of human rights in the Sudan

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that all Member States have an obligation to promote and protect human right and fundamental freedoms as started in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , the International Covenants on Human Rights  and other applicable human rights instruments and the duty to fulfil the obligations that they have undertaken under the various international instruments in this field,

Mindful that the Sudan is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2, the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2, the Convention on the Rights of the Child  the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights  and the Geneva Conventions of 12.August 1949 on the protection of victims of war 

Recalling its previous resolution on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, and taking note of Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/18 of 20 April 2001 .

Deeply concerned at the impact of the continuing conflict in the Sudan between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement on the situation of human rights and at the disregard by all parties to the conflict of relevant rules of international humanitarian law,

Expressing its deep concern at the lack of progress in the peace process, the repeated offensives of the Sudanese army and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement, the general upsurge in fighting and the continued and recently even increased aerial bombings by the Government of the Sudan,

Aware if the urgent need for the Government of the Sudan to implement effective additional measures in the field of human rights and humanitarian relief in order to protect the civilian population from the effects of armed conflict,

Expressing its firm belief that progress towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict in southern Sudan within the context of the peace initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development will contribute greatly to the creation of a better environment for the respect of human rights in the Sudan,

Taking note of the Initiative by Egypt and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya aiming at a negotiated and lasting peace in the country, and encouraging close coordination with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 

1. Welcomes:
(a) the appointment of a new Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights and the interim report he has submitted on the situation of human rights in the Sudan ;

(b) The good cooperation extended by the Government of the Sudan to the former Special Rapporteur and to the new Special Rapporteur during his visits to the Sudan in March and October 2001, as well as the cooperation extended to other United Nations mandate holders in the field of human rights;

© The expressed commitment of the Government of the Sudan to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law and its expressed commitment to a process of democratisation with a view to establishing a representative and accountable government, reflecting the aspirations of the people of the Sudan;

(d) The stipulation of basic human rights and freedoms in the Constitution of the Sudan and the establishment of the Constitution Court, which has been in operation since April 1999;

(e) The repeated statements by the Government of the Sudan in favour of a comprehensive, lasting and effectively monitored ceasefire in southern Sudan;

(f) The proposal to create a broad-based national council to evaluate foreign peace initiatives to end the conflict and make relevant recommendations;

(g) Recent additional efforts by the Government of the Sudan to improve freedom of association and assembly, in particular the adoption of the Associations and Political Parties Act of 2000 and the announcement of the creation of high commission to review the law on public order;
(h) The recent visit, upon the invitation of the Government of the Sudan, of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, as well as the commitment of the Government to continue its efforts to address the problem of internally displaced persons and to effectively follow up the visit of the Representative, including by holding a conference on the subject of internal displacement in the near future;

(i) The people-to-people peace process at the grass-roots level, in particular the Nuer conference, held in Kisumu, Kenya, from 16 to 22 June 2001, leading to the Kisumu Declaration for Nuer Unity and Peace, which, like other conferences held at the local level, should contribute to a comprehensive peace settlement in the context of the existing peace initiatives; 

(j) Recent measures to drop lawsuits against some political detainees and the liberation of some political detainees, while expressing its deep concern at the fact that at least some of the detainees were re-arrested shortly thereafter under the National Security Forces Act, thereby perpetuating their detention;

(k) The reconvening of the National Assembly in April 2001;

(l) The improved role of the National Press Council in Monitoring complaints about the press;

(m) Technical cooperation agreement signed by the Government of the Sudan and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 29 March 2000 and the posting of an expert from the Office to the Sudan with the task of advising the Government on the development of national capacity to promote and protect human rights;

(n) The demobilization and repatriation of more than 3,500 child soldiers in close cooperation between the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement and the United Nations Children’s Fund;

(0) The recent signature by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement of an agreement to prohibit the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines throughout the territories under its control, while at the same time encouraging the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement to swiftly implement the agreement;

(p) The efforts to implement the right to education; 

2. Expresses its deep concern:

(a) At the impact of the ongoing armed conflict on the situation of human rights and its adverse effects on the civilian population, in particular women and children, and at the continuing serious violations of human rights, fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict, in particular;

(i) The occurrence of cases of extra judicial summary or arbitrary execution resulting from armed conflict between members of the armed forces and their allies and armed insurgent groups within the country, including the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement;

(ii) The retention of the state of emergency until the end of 2001;

(iii) The occurrence, within the framework of the conflict in southern Sudan, of the use of children as soldiers and combatants, forced conscription, forced displacement, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of civilians and still-unresolved cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances; 

(iv) The plight of internally displaced persons in the Sudan, whose numbers are among the highest in the world, in particular for women and children, and the harassment of such persons;

(v) The forced displacement of populations, in particular in areas surrounding the oilfields, and notes the invitation extended by the Government of the Sudan to the Special Rapporteur to visit the oil-producing areas;

(vi) The continued abduction of women and children by Murahaleen groups and other government militias and their subjection to forced labour or similar conditions;

(vii) The lack of efforts to restrain the establishment by certain groups directly sponsored by the Government, including the Murahaleen, of militias that commit serious human rights abuses such as killings, torture, rape, abduction and the destruction of shelter and livelihood; 

(viii) The negative role of undisciplined southern militias, armed by the Sudanese army and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement, which are responsible for killings, torture, rape, the burning of villages, the destruction of crops and the theft of cattle;

(ix) The continuation of indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civil targets by the Government of the Sudan, in particular the bombing of schools, hospitals, churches, food distribution areas and market places, which seriously and repeatedly affects the civilian population and civilian installations;

(x) The use by both the Sudanese army and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement of civilian premises for military purposes;

(xi) The use of weapons, including landmines, and indiscriminate artillery shelling against the civilian population;

(xii) The conditions imposed in contravention of humanitarian principles, by both the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement on humanitarian organizations working in the Sudan, especially the denial of access to them, which have seriously affected their safety and led to the withdrawal of many such organizations, with grave consequences on the already precarious situation of thousands of people living in areas under its control: 

(xiii) The difficulties encountered by United Nations and humanitarian staff in carrying out their mandate because of abductions and harassment by both parties to the conflict, indiscriminate aerial bombings and the reopening of hostilities; 

(xiv) The attacks on and use of force against United Nations as well as humanitarian personnel by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement;

(xv) The measures taken by the leadership of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement to prevent tribal elders, women and youths from participating in civil society gatherings such as the Nuer conference; 

(b) At continuing violations of human rights in areas under the control of the Government of the Sudan, in particular; 

(i) Restrictions on the freedom of religion, freedom of expression, in particular significant censorship of the press, freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly; 

(ii) The restriction of political freedom, in spite of the replacement, in March 2000, of the Political Associations Act of 1998 by the Associations and Political Parties Act and the increased activity by some opposition parties;

(iii) Arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, in particular of political opponents, human rights defenders and journalists, as well as acts of intimidation and harassment against the population by the security organs;

((iv) The new amendment to the National Security Forces Act, approved by Parliament and endorsed by the President, which allows the security forces to arrest and detain individuals for a period of up to six months and three days without proper judicial review and to renew the detention as a preventive measure, practically without limits; 

(v) Precarious conditions of detention, the use of torture and violations of human rights by security organs, intelligence agencies and the police, while encouraging the judiclary  to exercise more control over such agencies;

(vi) The extent of the use of the most cruel forms of corporal punishment in contravention of human rights norms and standards;

(vii) The use of the death penalty in disregard of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United Nations safeguards; 

3. Urges all parties to the continuing conflict in the Sudan:

(a) To respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, to respect fully
international humanitarian law, in particular the need to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian premises, thereby facilitating the voluntary return, repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, and to ensure that those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice;

(b) To work immediately to put in place a global, lasting and effectively monitored ceasefire as a necessary first step to a negotiated settlement to the conflict; 

© To take immediate steps to implement the Declaration of Principles for resolving the conflict in the Sudan, in particular to take all necessary steps to negotiate a ceasefire agreement as agreed upon in point 6 of the Declaration;

(d) To resume the peace talks immediately and to continue to cooperate fully with the peace efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development;

(e) To stop immediately the use of weapons, including landmines and indiscriminate artillery shelling, against the civilian population, which runs counter to principles of international humanitarian law;

(f) To stop the use of tribal militias that commit serious human rights abuses;

(g) In particular the Government of the Sudan, to cease immediately and unconditionally all indiscriminate aerial bombardment of the civilian population and civilian installations, including schools, hospitals, churches, food distribution area and market places, which runs counter to fundamental principles of human rights and humanitarian law;

(h) In particular the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement, to stop using civilian premise for military purposes, misappropriating humanitarian assistance and diverting relief supplies, including food, from their civilian recipients;

(i) To grant full, safe and unhindered access to all international agencies and humanitarian organizations in order to facilitate by all possible means the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in conformity with international humanitarian law, to all civilians in need of protection and assistance in particular in the Nuba Mountains, the Western Upper Nile, Blue Nile State, Bahr-el-Ghazal and other areas in need throughout the country, to continues to cooperate with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Operation Lifeline Sudan to deliver such assistance, to take measures against those who are responsible for the abduction of United Nations and humanitarian staff, urges in particular the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement to lift as soon as possible the conditions in has imposed on the work of international agencies and humanitarian organizations, and urges in particular the Government of the Sudan to stop using the denial of humanitarian assistance flights for political purposes;

(j) Not to use or recruit children under the age of eighteen as soldiers, encourages continuation of the demobilization of child solders currently being undertaken by the United Nations Children’s Fund with the cooperation of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement, and urges both parties to the conflict not to use or recruit children under the age of eighteen as soldiers and to refrain from the practice of forced conscription; 

(k) To fulfil their commitments concerning the protection of children affected by the conflict, such as to cease the use of anti-personnel landmines and attacks on sites where there is usually a significant presence of children as well as the abduction and exploitation of children and the recruitment of children as soldiers, to advance the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and to ensure access to displaced and unaccompanied minors and reunify them with their families;

(l) To allow an independent investigation of the case of the four Sudanese nationals who were abducted on 18 February 1999;

4. Calls upon the Government of the Sudan:

(a) To comply fully with its obligations under international human rights instruments to which the Sudan is a party and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to respect its obligations under international humanitarian law;

(b) To ratify the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 

© To sign and ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; 

(d) To ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction; 

(e) To undertake efforts towards creating an environment that is more conducive to democratisation and to improvements in the field on human rights; 

(f) To continue to strengthen its efforts to ensure the rule of law by bringing legislation more into line with the Constitution and into conformity with the application international human rights instruments to which the Sudan is a party, and to ensure that all individuals in its territory enjoy fully the rights recognized in those instruments;

(g) To liberalize the legal provisions on public order and to continue assimilation into a regular criminal justice system;

(h) To ensure full respect for freedom of religion and, in this respect, to consult fully with religious leaders and other parties concerned when considering any new legislation on religious activities, to remove obstacles to obtaining permission to construct religious building, to respect the sanctity of religious Buildings and to resolve church property issues;

(i) To fully implement existing legislation, including the appeals procedures, that safeguards human rights and democracy, in particular the Associations and Political Parties Act;

(j) To raise the age of the criminal responsibility for children in order to take into account the observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child;

(k) To implement the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
and to continue to give special consideration to imprisoned women and juveniles;

(l) To take all effective measures to end and to prevent all acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, to take into account extenuating circumstances to the maximum extent possible, to ensure that all accused persons are held in ordinary custody and receive prompt, just and fair trials under Internationally recognized standards, to investigate all reported human rights violations, including acts of torture, brought to its attention and to bring to justice those responsible for such violations;

(m) To ensure that capital punishment will not be imposed for crimes other than the most serious and will not be pronounced in disregard of the obligations assumed under the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the provisions of United Nations safeguards;
(n) To take concrete action to prevent and stop the abduction of women and children taking place within the framework of the conflict in southern Sudan, to bring to trial any persons suspected of supporting or participating in such activities, to support more strongly and more effectively the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children and to facilitate the safe return of affected children to their families as a matter of priority, in particular through the Committee, with which all concerned have the responsibility and the duty to cooperate;

(o) To make a concerted effort to restrain the activities of the Murahaleen and to end the grave human rights abuses against civilians associated with their activities, to refrain from integrating them in the Sudanese army’s military action and to stop financing and equipping them;

(p) To ensure full respect for the freedom of expression, opinion, thought conscience and religion, as well as the freedom of association and assembly, throughout the territory of the Sudan;

(q) To continue to implement fully its commitment to the democratisation process and the rule of law and to create, in this context, conditions that would allow for a democratisation process that is genuine and that wholly reflects the aspirations of the people of the country and ensures their full participation;

(r )To make further efforts to implement the commitment made to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict not to recruit children under the age of eighteen as soldiers;

(s) To make further efforts to address effectively the problem of internally displaced persons, including ensuring their access to effective protection and assistance; 

(t) To consider the establishment of an independent national institution on human rights;

5. Encourages:
(a) The Government of the Sudan to continue its cooperation with the United Nations in the field of human rights through the Special Rapporteur and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and its expert in Khartoum entrusted with the task of advising the Government on the development of national capacity to promote and protect human rights, and to consider how to expand the Office to include a monitoring role;

(b) The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement to allow the people-to-people peace process to develop freely and unhindered, and to consider it an important contribution to the peace process, in particular as a preliminary stage in the implementation of the Declaration of Principles in the framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace process;

6. Calls upon the international community to expand its support for activities, in particular those of the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children, aimed at improving respect for human rights and humanitarian law, and to consider how to expand the Office of the High Commissioner to include a monitoring role; 

7. Decides to continue its consideration of the situation of human rights in the Sudan at its fifty-seventh session, under the item entitled “Human rights questions” in the light of further elements provided by the Commission on Human Rights.
 

The Committee approved texts, after lengthy debates, on the human rights situation in Iran and Sudan.

The next draft was a proposal on the situation of human rights in Sudan (document A/C.3/56/L.58/Rev.1).

The delegate of Belgium, speaking on behalf of the European Union, asked which delegation asked for the vote.

The Chairman said the vote was requested by the United States and Sudan.

Explaining his delegation's position before the vote, the delegate of the United States said evidence showed the tragic situation of human rights in Sudan.  The resolution called for action to end abductions of women and children.  The United States made it clear to Sudan that ending slavery was imperative to find a peaceful end to the civil war.  The United States believed the resolution did not describe the true tragic position of the human rights situation in Sudan.  Thus, the United States would abstain.

Explaining his delegation's position before the vote, the representative of Sudan said he reserved his right to make a general statement in plenary.  He went on to say the European Union should be thanked for negotiating the resolution.  Sudan demonstrated a considerable flexibility on the draft, despite clear-cut reservations about paragraphs, and inaccuracies in more than one paragraph.  The resolution this year was marked by complexity, and the delving into details.  The resolution was nine pages long -- last year, the resolution was not more than six pages.  Sudan hoped to downsize the resolution to avoid confusion and distortion.  Regrettably, that proposal was not taken into consideration.  On the substantive side, Sudan believed the resolution was prejudiced against the Sudanese Government, and was scandalously biased in favour of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).  It compromised the sovereignty of the country.  One paragraph contained references that the utilization of oil led to coercive displacements.  That was a fallacy and the situation had been verified by international observers who had visited the region.  Sudan had every right to utilize the natural resources of its country.

He said the SPLA was known for its terrorist activities.  It carried out bombings; had killed humanitarián workers; and took innocent civilians as human shields.  That was reflected in the records of the United Nations.  The SPLA wanted to prolong the conflict and it was regrettable the draft resolution blessed the activities of that terrorist movement.

The resolution continually invoked the use of the death penalty, he continued.  The international community itself was not of a single opinion on this matter.  The draft resolution showed flagrant selectivity.  Sudan did not claim it was infallible in the field of human rights.  No State was.  If there was progress in human rights, there should be progress in the resolution.  Sudan believed the main reasons for the failure to reach consensus was that the resolution was not objective.  It was drafted in a way which the sponsors knew Sudan could not accepted.  The resolution should not be accepted.

Explaining his delegation's position before the vote, the delegate of China said Sudan had made efforts to promote and protect human rights.  Sudan should be commended for this.  Therefore, China would vote against the resolution.

Explaining her delegation's position before the vote, the delegate of Egypt said the debate on human rights should not be politicized, and human rights should not be used to interfere with the internal affairs of States.  There were different cultures, and the plurality of cultures had to be respected.  Each State had a sovereign right to adopt its own domestic laws.  Egypt would vote against the draft.

Explaining his delegation's position before the vote, the delegate of Libya said Libya wished human rights were not exploited in a political way.  The negotiations and consultations between the European Union and Sudan should have resulted in an agreement.  That not being the case, however, Libya felt the resolution was not neutral or politically-balanced.  It was not a reflection of the facts. 

Explaining his delegation's position before the vote, the delegate of Cuba said human rights should be impartial.  This draft was not partial.  It did not show any of the progress that had been made in Sudan.  It also infringed on the sovereignty of States.  Cuba could not support the resolution.

By a recorded vote of 82 in favour, 34 against with 45 abstaining, the resolution was adopted (Annex IV).

Following the vote, the representative of Suriname said that her delegation had abstained in acknowledgement of the current improvement in the situation of human rights in Sudan and to encourage the country to continue those positive efforts.

 The representative of the Bahamas said that her country fully supported the protection and promotion of human rights, and for that reason the delegation had voted in favour of the draft.  International action outlined in the resolution genuinely sought to improve the situation of human rights in the Sudan.  While the Bahamas supported the draft, it did so without prejudice to its own belief that decisions on the death penalty should be left to States. 

The representative of Canada said his delegation had co-sponsored the resolution because of its concern at the continued violation of human rights in the Sudan, including the indiscriminate bombing of civilians and denial of humanitarian access.  At the same time, Canada believed that the draft should have emphasized the need for the parties to the conflict to seek peace through the framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace process. 

The situation in the Sudan proved that unilateral peace agreements were ineffective, and therefore language ‘welcoming’ or ‘recognizing’ such commitments was empty, he said.  Canada also remained deeply concerned by restrictions on freedom of association and the right to demonstrate in Sudan.  He urged the Government to ensure that the country’s policies on those rights conformed to Sudan’s international obligations.

On a point of order, the representative of Sudan asked if the co-sponsor of a draft could make a statement in explanation of vote after the vote.

The Chairman, Fuad Mubarak Al-Hinai, said it was his understanding that Canada had made a general statement on the draft.
Vote on human rights in Sudan 

The draft resolution on the situation of human rights in the Sudan (document A/C.3/56/L.58/Rev.1) was adopted by a recorded vote of 82 in favour to 34 against, with 45 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Algeria, Bahrain, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Comoros, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Viet Nam.

Abstaining:  Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Zambia.

Absent:  Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Grenada, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Yemen.
 

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have the honour to address this august body to present some findings and observations on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, further to my recent mission, from 2 through 14 October 2001, during which I visited Khartoum, Bentiu, Rubkona, Paryang (Unity State), Rumbek (Lakes) in  the Sudan and Nairobi. I appreciated the frank and open discussions I had with the Government of the Sudan and I wish to express my gratitude for the cooperation that was extended to me during my visit. I also wish to thank the Office of the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator in Khartoum and UN-OLS in Nairobi for their support.

Mr. Chairman,

The aftermath of September 11 may offer an opportunity for increased solidarity within the international community, which may lead in turn to important developments. On September 28, the United Nations Security Council decided to lift sanctions against the Sudan. Whether and to what extent these circumstances may have an impact on the situation of human rights in the Sudan remains to be seen.

The situation of human rights in the Sudan continues to be a matter of serious concern, in spite of the efforts towards democratization which were put in place in 1999 and 2000 and which marked a relative improvement in comparison to other countries, including in the region. Unfortunately, however, human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law have continued to occur - partly related to the on-going conflict, which features northerners against southerners and southerners against southerners alike, with regular armies and allied militias, frequently shifting allegiance, thus contributing to the perpetuation of a climate of insecurity.  I am particularly concerned at the recurrence of bombing of civilians, particularly in the Nuba Mountains and in Blue Nile State, which has continued unabated, thus severely hampering access to humanitarian aid. During my visit, on 5 and 6 October, the village of Mangayath, in Bahr al-Ghazal, was repeatedly bombed during a World Food Program (WFP) food distribution aimed at assisting some 20,000 civilians seeking refuge from Raga town.

Denial of humanitarian access remains a major problem. The Nuba Mountains and the whole of southern Blue Nile remain unaccessible and access to Eastern Equatoria has been denied since 1997.

I also received information of instances of serious disregards of international humanitarian and human rights law by SPLM/A and allied militias, particularly in oil-rich Western Upper Nile, where both parties resort to practices which leave people with no other option than fleeing. In addition, SPLM/A military installations are often amidst civilian infrastructures, which affects the rate of civilian casualties during government bombing incidents.

As far as the oil issue is concerned, I extensively discussed with representatives of the Government and of the oil companies. While in Khartoum, I visited two IDP camps - Waad al-Bashir and Dar es-Salaam. I also visited Bentiu, Rubkona and Paryang and, while in southern Sudan, I visited two IDP camps in Rumbek - Deng Nhial and interviewed displaced coming from Upper Nile. Their situation is appalling, families are split, their means merely allow them to survive.  None of them seem to have benefited from any kind of compensation for being relocated, in spite of information to the contrary, as provided by the Government in March. In spite of the infrastructures provided by the oil companies to the local population in oil-rich areas, oil exploitation has continued to have a negative impact on the human rights situation. In addition, there is no concrete evidence of oil revenues being spent for the development of the south, in spite of the fact that 40% of the national budget comes from oil, as the Minister of Finance informed me.

During my visit I continued to gather information on the heinous practice of abduction and the work carried out by the Committee for the Eradication of Abductions of Women and Children (CEAWC). I was informed that - while the phenomenon has continued to take place - the number of abductions seem to have decreased in the last 6 months. However this improvement seems to be more directly related to the SPLM/A's increased ability to defend villages along the railways.

I was pleased to learn, however, that some progress was made on the issue of abducted children by the Ugandan Lord's resistance Army (LRA), and that the Government of the Sudan has been actively engaged in the location and retrieval of LRA escapees, in coordination with international organizations, also contributing to a smooth return and reintegration in Uganda.

While in Khartoum, I also collected information on the process of transition to democracy. More specifically, I discussed with a number of government representatives (including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Justice, the State Minister of Interior, the Humanitarian Aid Commission), the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Head of the Human Rights Committee, representatives of the civil society and the political opposition. I also visited the Constitutional Court and the Head of the Judiciary, with whom I discussed my major concerns, namely the role of the security, the recent amendment to the National Security Forces Act and the prolongation of the state of emergency as well as the restrictions imposed on NGOs and the media. I believe that the path towards democratization that had characterized the year 2000 was discontinued in 2001. More specifically, the amendment to the National Security Forces Act allows for an extensive period of detention. Judicial review is weak and not really effective. The Constitutional Court being the only instance seized with such cases, no possibility of appeal has been foreseen. I was informed that the Constitutional Court has not played a major role in this respect so far and that cases submitted to it have not yet been acted upon.

During my first visit in March, while noting that there are a number of newspapers in the Sudan, I had criticized the fact that they are subject to censorship. I was informed that preventive censorship takes place daily and that journalists are often instructed on how to do their work and summoned by the security forces. I was disturbed to learn that the Khartoum Monitor was once again targeted and banned for the second time in a month and that Mr. Alfred Taban - whom I met while in Khartoum - was arrested once again on 24 October. Although I learnt that he was released on bail of about 4,000 US$ later on, I remain concerned at the seriousness of the charges that were raised against him, which include "waging war against the state", "provoking hatred against or amongst the sexes" and "defamation".

Representatives of the opposition - particularly but not only the Popular National Congress - have continued to be harassed by security agents, despite the President's decision to drop charges against National Democratic Alliance (NDA) members, who had been arrested in 2000 and again in 2001, and to drop criminal charges against the former Speaker of the National Assembly, Hassan al-Turabi, who remains under house arrest for security reasons. In addition, I recently learned of a crackdown against representatives of NGOs whom I personally met during my visit to Khartoum.

Finally, although all counterparts I met concurred with the view that there is no religious persecution as such, Churches do face some difficulties, and are often harassed with lengthy and cumbersome procedures, particularly hampering their freedom of movement within and outside the country.

Mr. Chairman,

During my stay in Nairobi, I met with representatives of the SPLM. For the first time, I was also able to visit southern Sudan. While in Rumbek, I had a number of discussions with the Sudan Relief and rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the humanitarian wing of the SPLM and a number of high court judges. I noted that civil structures, the administration of law and law enforcement - particularly the police -  need  strengthening. I was informed that existing judiciary structures are very weak, with less than 100 trained lawyers in the whole southern Sudan. I was also informed of some progress made in this field by the local administration.

In the course of my discussions with the SPLM representatives, I also raised the issue of elections, which I referred to in my report. I was informed that "national" elections for southern Sudan - expected to take place in June 2001 - will now take place before the end of the dry season, between December and January 2002. However, such a process cannot be described as democratic yet, since most of it is based on appointments, at all levels.

In my report, I referred to progress made on the issue of child soldiers. Since February 2001 some 3,500 children (out of an overall 9,000)  have been demobilized. While in Rumbek, I was briefed extensively by UNICEF  on the demobilization program and was able to visit a number of children who would be demobilised in the coming weeks. I was encouraged to learn of the constructive engagement of some SPLM/A commanders.

I was informed that the SPLM adhered to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti‑Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty) but on the other hand, I also received corroborated information pointing out to the use of landmines by both parties to the conflict.

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The conflict in the Sudan, although it includes a religious component, does not have religious roots, but is based instead on competing and conflicting claims by different ethnic groups for the control of and access to resources and, ultimately, power. I am not convinced that there is serious commitment to peace by the belligerant parties, under conditions which can be truly acceptable by both sides. The stagnant peace initiatives  seem to prove this assumption and appear to be producing an increasing tendency towards secession in southern Sudan.

I continued to collect information on the people-to-people peace process at the grass-roots level and I was pleased to receive information whereby the positive trend is continuing and the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)-brokered initiatives are still holding. In this connection, I continued to monitor the situation in Eastern Equatoria and was informed that the NSCC has facilitated a reconciliation process which has resulted in an assessment of the current situation (finalised by the local Didinga population in August-September 2001), pointing out to a new window of opportunities for the reconciliation between Dinka and Didinga. 

Mr. Chairman, 

I am fully aware that numerous human rights violations in the Sudan are linked to the war and I wish to reiterate once again my concern at the recurrence of flight denials for those locations where people are most in need of assistance and at the plight of the civilian population. I share the view of the Secretary-General that it is paramount to guarantee "humanitarian access, safety and protection of civilians" and that all signatories of the OLS agreements should ensure unrestricted humanitarian access to the needy population. While I strongly believe that all possible efforts must be made to bring about a peaceful solution between the warring parties, I concur with the Secretary-General that "short of a peace settlement and for the sake of the civilian population, the parties to the conflict must work at reinstating humanitarian ceasefires".

In this connection, I wish to draw your attention to the plight of the IDPs, who reach the highest number in the world in the Sudan. While I am convinced that responsibility for the protection of IDPs rests first and foremost with national governments concerned, I wish to call upon the international community to see how best it can contribute to this end, in line with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement issued by the Secretary General's Representative on IDPs.

The issue of abduction should be seriously addressed. In this connection, I wish to reiterate the importance that the Government, while distancing itself from this practice also take concrete measures to prevent new abductions. To this end, I encourage the highest officials to take a clear public stand and provide local mechanisms such as CEAWC with the necessary authority and means to carry out their work in a more efficient fashion.

I believe that the Government should also concentrate on economic, social and cultural rights. Oil revenues should be used as a means to this end throughout the country, but particularly in the south. However, as I mentioned in my report, while I ãan appreciate the increased importance of oil exploitation for the development of the country, I strongly believe that the right to development cannot justify the disregard of other human rights. So far, the exploitation of the oil reserves has led to a worsening of the conflict which has also turned into a war for oil.

I also wish to once again stress the importance that the transition to democracy be resumed and that the state of emergency be lifted once and for all. I urge the Government to revise its policy aimed at strengthening the role of the security, particularly the new amendment to the National Security Forces Act, to ensure the independence of powers for the judiciary to be able to play its role in a more effective way.

It is also important that harmonization between domestic  legislation and international human rights standards be carried out. In particular, while I regret that conditions do not seem conducive as of yet for accession to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), I wish to encourage the Government to ratify the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

I noted with interest that discussions are on-going on the creation of an independent human rights national institution and I will continue to follow the debate.

On the other hand, I also encourage the SPLM to develop genuine  democratic structures, independent from the SPLM hierarchy and demilitarised, based on the fact that a genuine civil society is a crucial condition for the implementation of the right to self-determination. I also   under its control, including in terms of health and education, particularly where peace has been established. In this connection, I wish to note that the political opposition within the south should be given a chance to organize itself properly and I reject the view that there cannot be a multiparty system in times of war since most of southern Sudan is now out of war.

More specifically, in view of the fact that some 80% of southern Sudan is at peace,  more should be done, to allow for instance for freedom of expression or freedom of association, since there are no media in southern Sudan, nor any organized political opposition, which remains forbidden for security reasons. The Church can play an important role and so can women, who are often seen as key partners in conflict management.

I wish to hereby encourage donors to invest in the development of the civil society in the Sudan, through bilateral and multilateral assistance, multiplying their efforts in the field of education in particular.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that national reconciliation aimed at reaching a just and durable peace settlement should be a priority for both the Government and the SPLM. In this connection, issues relating to sharing of power and wealth should be addressed. Community groups and women in particular should be more actively involved in the peace building efforts.  Also, the element of diversity - be it cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious, which so strongly characterizes the Sudan - should be seen as an enriching factor to promote peaceful coexistance and mutual respect. It is my belief that the strengthening of existing Sudanese institutions as well as the civil society is a key element in the process of democratization both in the north and in the south. Good governance and a participatory approach remain paramount for the establishment of a sustainable peace.

Internal opportunities for dialogue should be promoted at the grass-roots level and international bodies should play a decisive role to strengthen the peace process from the outside, in a combined, more effective action, which would also help restore their credibility as partners for peace vis-୶is the Sudanese population.  I hope that the forthcoming visit to the Sudan of the US Presidential Envoy Mr. Danforth will lead to some progress.

Finally, I wish to praise the work that indigenous women NGOs are carrying out in the field of peace. These organizations should be supported so that women can receive the necessary training – particularly in the judicial and para-legal sector - so as to be more effective in their important work for an end to the conflict and justice in Sudan.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.

I. - Introduction
1.- Following the presentation of his report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session (see A/55/374), Leonardo Franco resigned. By letter dated 28 December 2000, the Chairman of the fifty-sixth session of the Commission on Human Rights appointed Gerhart Baum (Germany) as the new Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan.
2.- Upon accepting his appointment, the Special Rapporteur proceeded to inform himself about the general situation in the Sudan and, in particular, on the situation of human rights and the humanitarian crisis in the country.
3.- On 31 January and 1 October 2001, the Special Rapporteur undertook a mission to Geneva for consultations with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the staff of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as with diplomatic missions and independent experts.
4.- While in Geneva, the Special Rapporteur had a meeting with the Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Sudan on 31 January 2001 and stated his wish to visit the country at the earliest opportunity.
5.- On 13 February 2001, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan addressed a letter to the Special Rapporteur inviting him to visit the country, from 9 through 17 March, as suggested by the Special Rapporteur.
6.- Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur travelled to Khartoum on 9 March and proceeded to Nairobi on 14 March, concluding his visit on 17 March. 
7.- The Special Rapporteur acknowledges the very good cooperation he received from the Government of the Sudan throughout his visit. Particular thanks go to the First Vice-President, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, the ministers met and the Rapporteur of the Advisory Council for Human Rights, who was instrumental in organizing the programme, as well as to the Office of the Resident Coordinator in Khartoum, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).
8.- The present report includes the findings of the mission as well as an updating on the overall situation based on information collected since then.
9.- The Special Rapporteur will conduct his second visit to the Sudan during the first half of the month of October 2001, tentatively. His findings will be reflected in his oral presentation to the General Assembly and will be the basis of his next report to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-eighth session. The Special Rapporteur intends to visit the Sudan once again in February-March 2002 to update the Commission further on his findings.
II. - Respect for human rights and humanitarian law in the conflict
A. - The peace talks
10.- Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)-led peace negotiations have failed so far to produce the expected results, owing to the stumbling block issues of the relation between religion and State and self-determination. Regional players have not yet succeeded in reconciling the parties on these two long-standing issues. Following the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in Rome in March, some scepticism was perceived regarding the chances of success of the initiative.
11.- In its Statement by the Presidency of 11 April 2001 on behalf of the European Union on the IGAD peace process, the European Union, while supporting the IGAD peace initiative, expressed concern about the lack of progress made. It stressed that the active involvement of IGAD at a high political level is crucial in order to achieve substantial progress towards the end of the war, as is the firm political determination of both the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Liberation Army (SPLM/A) to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.
12.- On 2 June, the first IGAD-brokered peace summit between the Sudanese Government and SPLA since 1997 took place in Nairobi but registered little progress towards a ceasefire or direct negotiations between the parties, owing to a lack of agreement on core issues such as the determination of the boundaries of southern Sudan; State and religion; the kind of government to cover the interim; and the sharing of wealth, which is a particularly relevant issue in view of the current developments in the field of oil exploitation. All IGAD leaders, except the Eritrean President, attended the summit. Another summit scheduled for July, which both President Omar el-Bashir and John Garang were expected to attend, did not take place.
13.- In addition, an Arab African summit is scheduled to be held in September, sponsored by the Governments of Egypt and Libya. The Special Rapporteur will report on any relevant developments in this respect.
14.- At the regional level, Nigeria and South Africa manifested their wish to contribute actively to the IGAD peace process, including by creating an African version of IPF, which would be comprised of Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa.
15.- On 3 May, the Nigerian Government sought to bring the Sudanese opposition Umma Party and SPLM/A closer to a common platform. The initiative, however, did not result in the resumption of cooperation between the northern and southern opposition movements, mostly owing to the unwillingness of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Liberation Army to consider peace initiatives other than IGAD and its refusal to accept the mediation of the Umma Party in this regard.
16.- The Egyptian-Libyan initiative, an expanded version of the one first offered by Cairo and Tripoli two years ago, included the formation of a transitional Government that would hold a national conference aimed at adopting vital constitutional reforms and organize genuine general elections. The initiative emphasized the need for separating authorities, adopting constitutional reforms, respecting human rights and establishing a decentralized Government while preserving the unity of the Sudan and guaranteeing balanced and equitable development for the whole country. It pointed to the Sudanese Army as a national institution of all the Sudanese people, stressed the need for adopting a foreign policy that protects national interests and recognized party, religious and cultural diversities. However, in line with the previous version, the memorandum made no reference to the referendum on self-determination, which is foreseen in the IGAD initiative.
17.- On 29 June, President Omar el-Bashir announced the creation of a national council to evaluate foreign peace initiatives to end the conflict and make relevant recommendations. On 4 July, the Government announced its formal acceptance of the Egyptian-Libyan initiative. Following acceptance by all counterparts of the nine-point memorandum, the Government of Egypt initiated plans to convene a conference to have more detailed discussions on the implementation of such a proposal.
18.- It remains to be noted that despite broad acceptance of the nine-point plan, large differences continue to exist between the opposition and the Government, notably on the issue of religion and State and self-determination, on the one hand, and the creation of a transitional Government to replace the current one, on the other. In addition, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) strongly criticized the initiative in the name of self-determination, reiterating its support to the IGAD-sponsored peace process.
19.- The Special Rapporteur was pleased to learn of the latest developments in the people-to-people peace process at the grass-roots level, particularly the Nuer conference, held in Kisumu, Kenya, from 16 to 22 June 2001, leading to the Kisumu Declaration for Nuer Unity and Peace, dated 23 June 2001, whereby 72 Nuer traditional leaders, women and youth representatives, church leaders and representatives of the Sudan Popular Defence Forces and SSLM declared their wish to create unified leadership structures for the whole Nuerland, the area inhabited by the Nuer tribe in western Upper Nile. Considering the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the oil-rich state and the rate of displacement deriving from the fighting around the oilfields, such an initiative is most encouraging. The Special Rapporteur will therefore follow it closely, particularly in view of the holding of the New Sudan Council of Churches-sponsored Nuer Peace Conference.
B.- Intensification of military activities
20.- During his mission, the Special Rapporteur held numerous consultations with government officials, national and international organizations, SPLM/A and individual experts. He received well-documented information, often from first-hand sources, pointing to the perpetration by all parties to the conflict of numerous serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, of which innocent civilians continue to be the principal target. More specifically, indiscriminate bombing of civilians, particularly in the Nuba Mountains and in Blue Nile State, has continued to occur, thus severely hampering access to humanitarian aid.
21.- More specifically, on 16 April, a plane carrying relief for the Nuba Mountains was bombed at Kawda airstrip. Reportedly, a total of about 14 bombs were dropped in three attacks, killing one person and injuring two. The first attack took place when hundreds of civilians had gathered at the airstrip around a humanitarian relief plane on the ground. 
22.- The Special Rapporteur, in his previous reports to the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, had repeatedly condemned the heinous practice of bombing civilians as they gather for food distribution and reiterates his serious concern in this regard. 
23.- On 17 April, bombs fell near a school in Chauri (southern Kordufan), wounding one child.
24.- On 22 April, 16 bombs were reportedly dropped in and around Narus, eastern Equatoria. Two landed in the Narus marketplace and another two hit the church school, destroying the buildings nearby, including a school. According to the sources, one child was evacuated to a Kenyan hospital in critical condition, where he eventually died, and four to seven people were injured. 
25.- Following an attack in early May which resulted in the death of one of its pilots, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) decided to suspend all its flights to southern Sudan. The aircraft was hit between Lokichoggio, in north-western Kenya, and Juba in western Equatoria, over the Didinga Hills, in southern Sudan. 
26.- Overall, during the month of May, 13 bomb attacks were reported in Equatoria, southern Blue Nile, southern Kordofan and Upper Nile. In three separate instances, bombs were reportedly dropped near an NGO compound in Akuem and a dispensary in Tonj, and caused damages to a health centre in Acumcum, all in Bahr al-Ghazal. 
27.- The second half of May was described as recording the biggest government offensive in the Nuba Mountains since 1992. Allegedly, more than 7,500 government and allied militia troops launched an offensive on 17 May, closing all the airstrips that had been used to bring food and medical supplies into the area. Soldiers reportedly äestroyed almost 2,500 homes and systematically burned food stores. It was reported that thousands of Nuba were forced to flee to avoid being taken into government “peace villages”. 
28.- On 24 May, the Government of the Sudan announced that it would halt all air attacks in the country’s south and in the Nuba Mountains with effect from 25 May. However, on 25 May, the Sudanese Catholic Information Office reported that 14 bombs had been dropped in Tonj in two attacks. On 26 May, eight bombs were dropped on the Limon Hills, west of Kawda.
29.- On 29 May, SPLM/A claimed capture of the garrison town of Daym Zubayr in western Bahr al-Ghazal. On 2 June, it announced the capture of Raga, also in Bahr al-Ghazal, 1,050 kilometres south-west of Khartoum.1 The SPLA offensive coincided with a resumption of government bombings on 2 June. As a result, a hospital was hit in Raga and some patients were injured.
30.- On the morning of 3 June, a Russian Antonov bomber reportedly dropped six to eight bombs on the town, hitting a secondary school run by the Combonians. A day later, another Antonov bomber hit the city, apparently aiming for the bridge on Raga River. Two days later, on the morning of June 6, three more bombs were reportedly dropped, in Bararud, Bahr al-Ghazal, while an Operation Lifeline Sudan C-130 aircraft was about carrying out food drops. The aeroplane was almost hit and the food drop aborted as a result. Unconfirmed reports spoke of two women dead and one man injured.
31.- On 7 June, a plane with its lights off reportedly bombed a heavily populated part of Raga near the airstrip, killing at least four civilians, including the wife and child of a church community leader. Several others were injured, including children.
32.- It was estimated that such military activities by both sides in western Bahr al-Ghazal have displaced at least 30,000 people. In mid-June, some estimations referred to around 50,000 people in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. Internally displaced persons headed northwards to drought-hit neighbouring Darfur, one group in the direction of Al-Daein, some 350 km from Raga, and the other north-north-west towards Nyala, about 400 km away. Over 10,000 of them concentrated around the village of Timsahah, 144 km north of Raga, where the resident population was just a few thousand persons in normal times. In addition, humanitarian aid came to a halt, since locations from Tonj northwards were declared no-go areas, forcing both church and humanitarian agencies to suspend their flights to the region. The combination of the above-mentioned factors led to a further deterioration of the living conditions of the internally displaced persons.
33.- On 8 June, World Food Programme officials confirmed that on 6 June, an Antonov bomber attack on Barurud in north-western Bahr al-Ghazal had narrowly missed one of its aircraft about to make an emergency humanitarian food drop.
34.- On 9 June, SPLM/A captured the town of Boro, near the border separating Darfur from the Central African Republic.
35.- On 11 June, the Sudanese Government officially announced its intention to resume air strikes in southern Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains, in spite of the breaches that had occurred since the declaration of the moratorium in May.
36.- In mid-June, the United Nations concluded its two-phase evacuation process, thus leaving the government garrison town of Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal, owing to an expected advance on the town by SPLA. United Nations staff were redeployed to Al-Daein to provide assistance to internally displaced persons who had moved there until 7 July, when they returned to Wau.
37.- On 23 June, an NGO clinic was bombed in Mundari-Bura, Equatoria, killing one person and injuring two. At the time of the attack, food distribution was taking place. On the next day, six persons were killed during an afternoon attack on Raga, including a mother and a baby, and several were injured. Bombs reportedly fell in a straight line across a strictly civilian area of the town. 
38.- On 27 June, in a further bombing attack on Raga, six persons, including a mother and two of her children, were reportedly killed and several wounded when a plane dropped between seven and nine bombs.
39.- On 6 July, Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed deep concern about the plight of civilians following the military offensive in Bahr al-Ghazal and called upon the warring parties to seek a peaceful settlement.
40.- A number of incidents took place towards the end of July in Equatoria. More specifically, on 22 July, an attack on the Ngaluma displaced persons camp resulted in one civilian dead and two injured. On the same day, Ikotos was bombed and three civilians were reportedly killed. Also, six more bombs were reportedly dropped in Magwi. As a result, three children and one woman were killed and three civilians were injured. On 24 July, a total of eight bombs were reportedly dropped in Parajok. Two of them fell in an Operation Lifeline Sudan NGO compound, destroying a building and a storage container and injuring one civilian.
41.- The Special Rapporteur also received information on serious disregard for international humanitarian and human rights law by SPLM/A, according to which it continued to loot food (including relief provisions) from the population, sometimes with civilian casualties, recruit child soldiers and commit rape. In addition, the Special Rapporteur was informed that SPLM/A is allegedly responsible for burning down villages in oil-rich western Upper Nile.
42.- The Special Rapporteur reflected information received in Nairobi in this respect in the relevant section of the present report dealing with SPLM/A (see paras. 57-71 below).
C. - The oil issue: the situation in western Upper Nile
43.- The Special Rapporteur met with representatives of the Swedish Lundin Oil Company, who provided him with first-hand information on their activities in the region, informed him of steps taken to address their corporate responsibilities and invited him to visit its oil installations in block 5A.
44.- The Special Rapporteur also met with representatives of the Canadian Talisman Company and took note of the company’s stand whereby at the time when oil extraction began, perspectives seemed to be more encouraging.
45.- The Special Rapporteur repeatedly discussed the issue of oil exploitation with representatives of the Sudanese Government both in Geneva and during his mission to Khartoum, including allegations regarding the forced displacement of the Nuer population, with a view to gaining control of the oil zone.
46.- In his oral statement to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-seventh session, the Special Rapporteur reflected the Government’s stand on this issue, whereby people forced to move away from their settlements would be adequately compensated. 
47.- In this connection, the Special Rapporteur noted that the Government rejected all accusations that oil revenues would be used to fuel the war and claimed that they were instead invested for the development of the south. So far, the Government has not provided sufficient evidence supporting this claim. Nonetheless, the Special Rapporteur remains interested in receiving evidence on how oil revenues are spent and will investigate this matter further during his next visit.
48.- The Special Rapporteur stated his intention to visit the oil area during his next mission, which has been tentatively scheduled for the first half of October. The Government of the Sudan extended an invitation to him in this respect.
D. - The issue of abduction of women and children
49.- The Special Rapporteur was extensively briefed on the nature and work of the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC).
50.- While in Khartoum, he had discussions with the Rapporteur of the Advisory Council for Human Rights and Chairman of CEAWC and with the Chairman of the CEAWC Dinka Committee, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Save the Children Fund-UK on the issue of abductions.
51.- While he welcomes the creation of such a body, he noticed that the progress recorded has been quite slow. Between May 1999 — when it was created, following a resolution by the Commission on Human Rights — and mid-2000, CEAWC identified 1,230 cases of abductions in southern Darfur and western Kordofan. However, by the beginning of mid-2001, CEAWC had only facilitated the return of approximately 550 abductees to their homes out of the total number waiting to be released, which is generally considered to be between 5,000 as a minimum, although figures differ significantly, some reports referring to much higher ones. This is partly explained by the resumption of fighting, which put an end to the safe corridor between government-controlled Aweil to SPLM/A-controlled Bahr al-Ghazal. 
52.- The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned about the negative role of the nomadic Arab tribes, the so-called Murahaleen, from which militias are formed, who are armed, funded and militarily deployed by the Sudanese army, especially in Bahr al-Ghazal and western Kordufan. Information received seems to confirm that the Murahaleen do not only target rebel camps or armed individuals, but also civilians, in a very intensive manner. Usually, food crops are destroyed, men are killed and women and children are abducted.
53.- The Special Rapporteur will continue to give priority to monitoring the role of the Murahaleen and the Government’s action to address this issue.
54.- Moreover, the Special Rapporteur received information whereby Dinka representatives continue to face difficulties in the discharge of their tasks. At the grass-roots level, local officials very often do not offer any assistance to CEAWC representatives on the ground. Baggara tribes, usually held responsible for abductions, continue flatly to deny the mere existence of the phenomenon. 
55.- In addition, the Government, while distancing itself from the practice, has not yet taken concrete measures to prevent new abductions and its inaction has the effect of encouraging the recurrence of the phenomenon. Reliable sources in Khartoum confirmed that in early January 2001, Government-supported militia again carried out raids in northern Bahr al-Ghazal, abducting 122 women and children. 
56.- During his mission, the Special Rapporteur met with First Vice-President Taha and raised this issue with him, encouraging him to take positive steps to address the situation. The First Vice-President expressed his personal commitment to this cause and promised to take a public stand to this end, although so far there has been no public announcement in this sense. Recently, however, the First Vice-President pledged 10 million Sudanese dinars (roughly $40,000) to cover local requirements for forthcoming CEAWC activities.
E.-  SPLM/A
57.- While in Nairobi, the Special Rapporteur collected information on the situation of human rights in the SPLM/A-held territories. Credible sources reported that, although some basic institutions have gradually been established, they remain extremely weak and there is no serious policy aiming at developing the civil society. The Special Rapporteur was informed that some judiciary structures had been put in place, including military and civil courts at the regional and county levels. Provisions have been made whereby an accused person would always be provided with legal and paralegal aid. However, he was also informed that only officials at the junior level have been taken to court and punished, while senior officials often enjoy impunity.
58.- The Special Rapporteur was also informed that there are no public media within southern Sudan or any organized opposition. In fact, it appeared that nobody is allowed to organize political activities not in line with SPLM/A, for security reasons.
59.- As for the use of child soldiers in the conflict, the Special Rapporteur was briefed about the demobilization programme conducted by UNICEF. He was informed that there are some 9,000 child soldiers still bearing arms in southern Sudan within the different rebel groups. As many as 3,500 children have been demobilized since the beginning of the programme, although 8.5 per cent of them fall within the category of unaccompanied minors rather than child soldiers as such. SPLM/A declared itself profoundly committed to the demobilization. UNICEF expressed satisfaction at the cooperative attitude of SPLM/A.
60.- However, the Special Rapporteur received information that forced recruitment has allegedly continued together with the recurrence of cases of rape, particularly in Mundri and Chukudum, eastern Equatoria.
61.- As for allegations regarding landmines, the SPLM/A representatives rejected them as groundless and assured the Special Rapporteur that the use of landmines has been banned and that landmines are not removed but exploded instead. However, the Special Rapporteur has received information confirming that both parties to the conflict have resorted to the use of landmines. In this connection, he noted that the Sudan has signed, but not yet ratified, the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.
62.- The SPLM/A representatives also denied allegations referring to the use of civilian installations for military purposes and declared that there are no civilian installations close to the military area.
63.- Sources also pointed out that among most of SPLM/A leaders there is no serious commitment to peace and that SPLM/A, far from being a genuine liberation movement for the southern tribes, only represents the Bor Dinka and has imposed its presence in the south thanks to the support of external actors. In addition, misuse of the religious factor by SPLM/A has reportedly resulted in the misleading superposition of Christianity and the Movement, which is often seen as representing Christianity vis-à-vis the Muslim north.
64.- During his mission, the Special Rapporteur met with representatives of SPLM/A in Nairobi and raised a number of issues with them. He will continue to monitor any new developments in his next visit and remains keen to receive any evidence of what was stated by the SPLM/A representatives.
65.- Concerning the human rights situation in the SPLM/A territories, the representatives of the Movement informed the Special Rapporteur that a civil society is being built up which is responsible for the provision of basic services such as health and education. In addition, a civil administration has reportedly been established and the judiciary is independent. SPLM/A representatives stated that no human rights violations occur, nor are there any political detainees, only prisoners of war to whom ICRC has access.
66.- Political dialogue with other liberation movements within southern Sudan is reportedly allowed. However, the SPLM/A representatives specified that, although different views can be expressed, the creation of proper political parties in the context of war would not be advisable since there cannot be a multiparty system in times of war.
67.- The SPLM/A representatives briefed the Special Rapporteur on the role and structure of the National Liberation Council, whereby each delegate is the representative of one of the five regions in southern Sudan.
68.- The National Liberation Council reportedly includes no militia but only regular SPLM/A army. Political forces represented include SPLA, SPLM, youth, women from every county (who enjoy special seats), farmers and representatives of SPLM abroad, totalling 188 delegates. They are not represented on the basis of ethnicity.
69.- Such delegates are designated and elections only take place at the local level, for the time being. However, the Special Rapporteur was informed that elections would take place before June 2001 and that a National Congress would be held every five years.
70.- The Special Rapporteur has not received any follow-up information and would appreciate receiving any further information in this regard to be reflected in his next report to the Commission on Human Rights.
71.- The Special Rapporteur inquired about the situation in eastern Equatoria, which had been the object of close scrutiny in the report of a former Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session. The SPLM/A representatives informed him that the situation had improved. More specifically, they reported that a reconciliation workshop had been foreseen in Chukudum for 8 through 11 April. The Special Rapporteur would appreciate receiving any further details about the outcome of such an initiative.
III.- Constitution and transition to democracy
72.- While the adoption of a new law on political parties in 1999 had raised some expectations of a more dynamic political interaction, the latest information received seems to indicate that political freedom has actually been restricted. 
73.- The Special Rapporteur took note with concern of the fact that the state of emergency has been renewed until the end of the year, thus continuing to give the President the power to overrule any law by presidential decree, hence weakening the role of the Parliament.
74.- The strengthened role of the security forces and the question of their impunity were very often referred to by the Special Rapporteur in the course of his discussions with government officials.
75.- The Special Rapporteur finds it alarming that security forces continued a campaign of harassment, intimidation and persecution, targeting political opponents such as representatives of the Popular National Congress (PNC) and human rights defenders, particularly members of the Sudanese Victims of Torture Group, by means of arbitrary arrests, followed by their detention incommunicado and protracted arbitrary detention without judicial review. Security organs have continued to resort to the practice of reporting, whereby an individual is forced to report to the police on a regular basis. This constitutes an obvious form of harassment which totally disrupts the daily life of the individual concerned. 
76.- During his visit, the Special Rapporteur expressed most serious concerns vis-à-vis the new amendment to the National Security Forces Act, established by presidential decree, which further extended detention without judicial review to an overall period of six months.
77.- In his discussions with the State Minister of Justice, the Special Rapporteur was informed that such an amendment was just a provisional order which had resulted from a specific incident, that the Parliament, once in place, would have to ratify it and that it could be taken up to the Constitutional Court at any time. 
78.- The Special Rapporteur was informed that on 20 June 2001 the Parliament approved an amendment to the National Security Forces Act, endorsed by the President on 4 July 2001, which allows security forces to arrest and detain individuals for a period of several months without judicial review, depending on the crime. Human rights organizations lamented that such an amendment further restricts the rights of the detainee, in comparison with the previous text. 
79.- The Special Rapporteur will examine the new text and its impact following its implementation and will reflect his views in his next report to the Commission on Human Rights.
80.- The Sudanese media scene is characterized by an impressive number of daily newspapers. Political views are to some extent reflected publicly. The Special Rapporteur, however, has received an increasing number of reports pointing to restrictions on the freedom of the press. In addition, censorship has reportedly increased since December 2000. 
81.- In this connection, the Special Rapporteur received information whereby all press articles are subject to preliminary censorship by the security organs. Reports on human rights issues, on the views of the political opposition as well as any criticism of State organs are said to be especially targeted. In addition, the Special Rapporteur was informed that journalists are threatened with imprisonment, their freedom of movement is restricted and they are instructed on how to reflect information. 
82.- Restrictions on freedom of assembly and association have also increased. Gatherings involving more than five individuals require prior approval. If such approval is not obtained, the crime of breach of the public peace may have been committed (Criminal Procedure Act, section 66). 
83.- The establishment of political organizations or associations requires State permission. Unregistered associations face government sanctions such as the imprisonment of their members and the confiscation of their property.
84.- All trade unions are subject to government control. Elections of leaders of trade unions and professional associations are organized and controlled by government organs. Controls over national NGOs have reportedly been tightened, particularly those focusing on human rights.
85.- Representatives of Christian churches in Khartoum and Nairobi and in other countries voiced their concern about discrimination, harassment and restrictions on freedom of religion to which they are subject. Recently, the Government has seemed somewhat more willing to discuss issues of freedom of religion. However, the Special Rapporteur remains concerned about the increasing religious characterization of educational institutions and public life in general. Since the church interlocutors almost unanimously share the general opinion that the war has no religious motivation, their complaints should be taken particularly seriously. 
86.- In this connection, the Special Rapporteur was repeatedly referred to the opinion of the Comboni missionaries of 19 January 2001 that religion is distorted and misused as a means for other interests. The Special Rapporteur will pay particular attention to the above-mentioned complaints during his next visit.
IV. - Other reported violations of human rights
Individual cases
87.- The Special Rapporteur continued to receive individual cases of human rights violations and expressed his concern in this respect.
88.- During a wrap-up session with the Rapporteur of the Advisory Council for Human Rights in Khartoum, the Special Rapporteur handed out a list of selected cases for the Government’s follow-up action. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the fact that some of the cases, such as that of Nagib Nageem al-Din, could be at least partially solved with the help of the Government.
89.- Since his visit, the Special Rapporteur has continued to receive information relating to individual cases of human rights abuses. In the present report he wishes to refer to the following selected cases:
(a).- On 12 June, Hassan Omar Abul Reish, aged 27, PNC Officer for General Education in the province of Kosti, White Nile state, passed away at the Central Police Saihiroun Specialized Hospital owing to complications from wounds sustained while detained. Sources informed the Special Rapporteur that he was arrested together with his brother by security agents on 16 March 2001 from his home in Block 29, Kosti. Allegedly, both of them were initially beaten up in front of their family, then taken to the state security offices in Kosti where they continued to be mistreated. It was reported that in view of the deterioration of Abul Reish’s health conditions, the security officers tried to return him home, where his family refused to receive him in such a state. He was taken to Kosti Hospital the next day, where it became apparent that he was bleeding internally. On 18 March, an emergency operation revealed that his spleen had ruptured, and it was therefore removed. Nonetheless, Abul Reish never recovered. In fact, his health deteriorated further due to the large loss of blood and the poor medical facilities in Kosti. The development of jaundice and liver failure provoked a fatal coma;
(b).- Two Gezira University students were reportedly shot dead and 16 others injured during a political debate that was disrupted by militant students, policemen and security officers on Thursday, 16 August 2001, in Gezira. Reportedly, non-Gezira University National Congress student militants wearing military uniforms and chanting Islamic Jihad slogans marched onto the campus and interrupted a political debate, which included several political opposition student groups, held by the Gezira University opposition Arab Nassrist Socialist Party student group. Members of the police and security officers allegedly joined forces with the NC militants as the students that were engaged in the political debate attempted to fend off the militants’ assault. A police car reportedly ran over one student, Jihan Atif. Gunfire erupted against the angered students, leading to the deaths of two of them — Hamad Altayeb and Mutasim Mohamed el Hassan — and injuring a further 16, in some cases critically. The two men who were fatally wounded were reportedly shot in the head and chest and died instantly. Another student, Al Nazeer Ahmed Abdullah, was taken unconscious to hospital, where his kidney and spleen had to be removed as a result of his injuries. The other injured students include: Hafiz Osman; Mohamed El Tayeb; Imad Abdel Raheem; Ali Abdel Kareem; Salah Gasmelsaid; Farouq Abdel Raziq; Murtadah Ali Mahmoud; Nargis Sid Ahmed; Leemya Abdellah; Nidal Abdel Aziz and Zubeyda Abdel Raheem. Two militant NC students from a university in Khartoum — Hashim Abdel Raheem and Hoseyfa Ali Aklheir — were also reportedly injured;
(c).- Hassan al-Turabi and other senior members of his party were arrested on 21 February after PNC signed a memorandum of understanding with SPLM. On 2 May, Khartoum Criminal Court Judge Mu’tasim Taj el-Sirr, based on a request received by the State prosecutor, ordered a two-week extension of al-Turabi’s detention and that of three of his colleagues on the grounds that the detainees’ interrogation had not yet been completed. On 15 May, Khartoum North Court turned down the prosecution request since it was not convinced by prosecution arguments that it needed more time to interrogate al-Turabi, particularly since he had not been interrogated since March, and set a trial date for 27 May. On 29 May, al-Turabi was moved from prison, where he had been held in solitary confinement, and placed under house arrest in a government “guesthouse”, in Kafuri suburb, north Khartoum;
(d).- On 7 April, Muhammad al-Hasan al-Amin, Secretary for Legal Affairs of PNC, was released from detention, after charges against him were reduced;
(e).- On 5 June, at 2.30 p.m., Mustafa Abdel Gadir, 61, the principal defence lawyer for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) members (see below), was arrested from his office in Khartoum by security officers who confiscated documents, some of which belonged to his clients. Family and colleagues were prevented from knowing his whereabouts. He was released at 8.30 p.m. the same evening without valid charges. He was ordered to report to the Political Section of the security offices in Khartoum on Wednesday, 6 June, and Saturday, 10 June. On both occasions he was held for over four hours and interrogated. The trial for the NDA members was scheduled to begin on Monday, 11 June and Thursday, 14 June 2001;
(f).- Between 10 and 11 May 2001 security forces re-arrested five members of the NDA political leadership secretariat from their homes in Khartoum and took them to local police stations. Those arrested included: Ali al-Sayyid, Democratic Unionist Party, Mohammed Mahjoub, Sudanese Communist Party, Joseph Ukello, Union of Sudanese African Parties, Mohammed Wida Ala, NDA, and Mohammed Suleiman, Trade Union Alliance. The men had already been arrested on 6 December 2000, following a meeting with an American diplomat in Khartoum, on the grounds that they were plotting against the Government, disrupting national security and supporting the rebel movement with American logistical support. They had been released on bail in late April, following an appeal by their lawyers to the Court of Appeals. However, the Government appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court, which took the decision to re-arrest them on 10 May. While in Khartoum, the Special Rapporteur obtained permission to visit them in Kober Prison, where he learned that they had been detained for 97 days (75 of which were in solitary confinement) and could see a lawyer only after 75 days;
(g).- The Special Rapporteur was informed that 41-year-old Faisal el Bagir Mohamed, a member of the Sudan Victims of Torture Group network inside the Sudan and a freelance journalist, was arrested on 13 June 2001 at 6 p.m. from his house in Khartoum. Security officers reportedly searched his house for hours in front of his wife and child. His personal computer, printer, fax machine and all the documents in his house were confiscated. He was released at midnight and ordered to report again on Thursday, 14 June, at 10 a.m. to the security offices in Khartoum. When he returned on Thursday, he was again arrested. Sources believed that his arrest might have been linked to his involvement in the possible organization of a rally to commemorate the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, on 26 June. He was released on 26 June without ever being charged. His equipment was not returned to him;
(h).- On 12 April, Alfred Taban, publisher of the dail