In 1999, events developed tragically. Sudan exported oil for the first time and the evaluations of the oil reserves in South Sudan have recently increased. Egypt and Libya have embarked upon a national reconciliation process that runs contrary or parallel to the IGAD mediation,  which makes one wonder whether it was rather meant for the Northern opposition rather than the whole of the country. In December, President Al Bashir dissolved Parliament, to  Chairman Al Turabi's great dispeasure, declared a three-month state of emergency and appointed new governors. Quite clearly, the Constitution did not allow for any of these decisions. However, the Constitutional Court upheld the President's decision since he is in charge and those actions were deemed necessary.  In their subsequent statements, al Bashir and al Turabi have been vying with each other in favour of an Islamic state. The Vice-president's unexpected declarations in favour of a secular state are quite surprising but have soon been swept under the carpet while the former Parliament's Chairman is still the leader of the party in office, the National Congress, even though he has recently been prohibited from speaking in public.

What is the internal logic of all this? The IGAD's declaration of principle in an attempt at mediation between Khartoum and the SPLA recommended a united, democratic and secular state or this failing a referendum on self-determination in the South that could end up in independence. As the implementation of a secular state would be political suicide, Khartoum has not rejected the idea of an independent South.  However its oil resources are considerable, and Bashir is now totally reluctant to losing them. As he refuses all kind of compromise, he has no choice but win the war. Ten years in office have taught him that he cannot both win the war and support terrorist activities in neighbouring countries which avenge themselves by allowing the rebels to use their territory as base camps. He will have to do things one after the other. As a result, he closed the Khartoum Islamic People's Conference headquarters whose Chairman was Al Turabi and whose meetings brought together a good collection of the world's terrorists. Having dealt with  Al Turabi, Al Bashir toured the region and reconciled himself with Egypt, Uganda, Ethiopia, Erytrea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria. Algeria that had for years blamed Sudan for supporting terrorist guerrilla warfare will now get Sudan's support to crush it within its own territory. The European Union is delighted to see that the relations between Sudan and its neighbours are becoming normalised and that the attitude towards terrorism is also changing. Those are two out of the five positive measures the European Union had demanded of Sudan.

Some other face-lifting operations have failed though. Riek Mashar, the main signatory of the so-called 1997 peace agreement, considered he had been cheated and resigned (See the article With Riek Mashar's resignation.p 5). Others have succeeded. Saddiq Al Mahdi and Umma parted from the NDA, no longer trusting Garang, leader of the SPLA and commander of the opposition joint forces (See article: Return of Saddiq Al Mahdi to Khartoum? p 1), and announced a ceasefire in their struggle against the government.

As expected, the IGAD peace talks session brought no result. The SPLA agreement on the coordination between the Libyan and Egyptian efforts and the IGAD has had no impact either. Moreover, Egypt is strongly opposed to a secession of Southern Sudan which would create a new State along the Nile river and therefore a reconsideration of the water sharing policies. The United States supports that view. Al Bashir can be satisfied. According to the rebel military command, the Khartoum government has launched a multi-front offensive in the South, but also in the Nuba Mountains, the South of the Blue Nile valley and the Kassala region in the East. Khartoum only mentions the latter front and the rebels' offensive.