IGAD went from mediator to arbitrator after announcing its global peace plan.
While the SPLA/M had declared that it would only negotiate in reference to the document in question, the Sudanese government much to the dismay of most Southern Sudanese organisations and the Church, uncouthly refused it. Indignation was also expected from the international community. Nothing came but a deafening silence. The government seemed to have forgotten that the roots of the conflict lie in injustice and oppression and still believes that each party must respond to the compromises of the other in kind. Nonetheless, the parties agreed to meet again in September for more talks. Was this a tactical maneuver? 

Ironically, both sides continued to prepare for further hostilities. In East Equatoria, the government intensified its military activities with accompanying Anatov bombers flights, a psychological tactic, one to further intimidate a terrified population. It was feared that a military offensive from Juba was in the making in order to retake Kaya and Yei and to cut off access routes on the western banks of the Nile to and from Uganda. Such action would have spelled catastrophe for humanitarian aid deliveries and the embryonic free market economies developing there. Furthermore, it would seem that a military buildup was occurring in Upper Nile East and that Khartoum had sent 8 barges stocked with military equipment to Juba. All this in spite of the addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding it had signed with the SPLA.

Sudanese both from the North and the South worry that peace will not lead to a democratic regime. This is of great concern to the Southerners as there are many political parties and factions on the outside of the SPLA/M who wish to be represented in the democratic process. And it is of even greater concern to Northerners, whose major preoccupation is not the war, but the fact that they live under the heel of a military dictatorship, and worse still, under constant threat from the Security Services, the state of emergency and a fundamentalist Islamic interpretation of the Koran which is not shared by the majority of Sudanese Muslims. If the Northern Sudanese are to support the peace process that demands major concessions from the North, they have at least the right to find solutions to these problems and to be kept informed of what is going on.
After the Security agreement was signed, Garang addressed the people promising that power would be shared, a promise that included all political groups.