Peace negotiators had their first breakthrough since July 2002 with the signing of an Accord on matters of Security. Until now, Security has remained one of the five contentious issues on the table, the others being the status of the capitol, power-sharing, the division of resources, and the three marginalized regions in the North.
After Khartoum’s refusal to ratify IGAD’s arbitration proposals, which occurred after serious mediation efforts, shillyshallying prevailed from July to September. It was then agreed that John Garang, Commander of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLA/M) and Sudanese vice president Ali Osman Mohamed Taha take charge of the discussions. This initiative came as somewhat of a surprise as Garang covets Taha’s leadership position in a future government, and on his side, Taha has the reputation of a hard-liner. One would have thought that Beshir’s aim might have been to have Taha make it a point of honour and obtain an agreement. However, an accord was concluded with such rapidity that Khartoum hastily sent the Defense Minister to Kenya to verify the details. 

The agreement states that during the interim period preceding the referendum on self-determination, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA will remain separate but equal. The SAF will withdraw from the South during a two and a half period following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and redeployed North of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 abandoning Juba, Wau and Malakal as well as the oil zone entirely. The SPLA will in turn withdraw to the area below the said border, leaving the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei as soon as Joint/Integrated Units are formed. The two-armed bodies agree to proportional downsizing in a suitable time frame. The SPLM undertakes that the demobilized Southern Sudanese from those currently serving in SAF in Southern Sudan shall be absorbed into various institutions of the Government of Sudan along with demobilized SPLA soldiers. Programs, with the assistance of the international community will be established for all SAF and SPLA soldiers affected by troop reduction and demobilization. The great novelty has been the formation of “Joint/Integrated Units” as a symbol of national unity. They will be composed of equal numbers of combatants drawn from the SAF and the SPLA, amounting to some 40,000 men. (The current number of SAF forces serving in the South is allegedly 50,000). The Joint/Integrated Units will be deployed in South-Sudan; in Khartoum in order protect members of the SPLM; along the Red Sea area of eastern Sudan currently occupied by the SPLA; in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. They will not be sent to Abyei, where, as rumor has it, a referendum will be called. The integrated units will be under presidency command with two chiefs of staff and decisions will be taken in mutual consensus. All armed groups and militias will be disbanded. Certain members will  be incorporated into organized forces of either party (army, police, prisons, wildlife patrol) and others integrated into administrative postings or civil society organisations.

The Accord stipulates that if the referendum results are in favor of national unity, the two armies will be an integral part of the Joint/Integrated Units. If the referendum is against unity, the SAF and SPLA will reincorporate their men respectively; basic logic, but better to say it than not say it.

The application of the agreement will certainly be difficult at times, if one considers that a necessary consensus will have to come from the Chiefs of Staff of the Joint Defense Board and the problems posed by the integration of SAF Southerners in Southern administrations.
The agreement is as yet incomplete. Nowhere does it state who will oversee the dismantling of the militias, nor if pro governmental Southern militia members are to get a job in the North or in the South, nor if the SPLA will be paid for by the Central Government, nor when  the reduction of contingents in both armies will take place. The exact details of a comprehensive cease-fire agreement have been left to a later date, as have the fine points of the Joint/Integrated Units organization. The crucial point concerning the fate of the terrifying Security Forces will be resolved during power sharing negotiations.

The Agreement nearly designed without IGAD intervention, demanded dedication and imagination: the Sudanese government was determined only one army would exist, while all the Southerners strongly believed that only the existence of the SPLA would guarantee a referendum. Praise without reservation is due for  this success. 

President Beshir has given a little rope. Was it because of a heated phone call from Collin Powell? Or tried and true advice from the likes of Tallyrand who said, “ The purpose of diplomacy is not to outwit the adversary, but to avoid humiliating him”. Maybe Beshir’s change of heart had something to do with Darfur. The rebels there are calling for massive development projects and these can only happen as part of the peace dividend.  
More talks between Taha and Garang are scheduled for mid October.