Elias

In spite of the December 2007 agreement enabling the SPLM to join the Government of National Unity (GNU), several contentious issues remain to be solved for a full implementation of the CPA: the Abyei status, the demarcation of the North-South border, the implementation of the census, the deployment of troops and widespread insecurity.

Census

After being delayed several times, the fifth census should at last take place from 15 to 30 April. It would provide much needed data necessary to set up services and development across the country, determine electoral constituencies with a view to next year's election, the 2011 referendum and give an accurate assessment of the population for an appropriate representation of North and South at the national level with fair power and wealth-sharing. One of the SPLM's major complaints was that the NCP was dragging its feet on releasing the funds necessary for the census, feeding suspicions that it was seeking to delay the elections. As part of the December 2007 agreement, the NCP agreed to release the money and it has reportedly now done so. However, several obstacles include the border demarcation, security problems in Southern Kordofan , Unity and Jonglei states, training of the census-takers and a solution to logistical problems such as lack of roads in many areas, distribution of materials and the start of the rainy season. The northern census commission has thrown out out of the country some of their staff for questioning its decisions. The southern census commission considers its budget has been undervalued and claims an additional 6 million US$ necessary to travel to remote places either by plane or by boat. The delays in the census and other preparations, such as passage of the national election law, mean that the electoral timetable is severely behind schedule. Difficulties lie ahead: the Governor of Lakes State has warned he would boycott the fifth census to protest against the omission of ethnicity in the forms containing the questionnaire for the census. Daniel Awet Akot said that the data on ethnicity are very important to determine who is a south sudanese entitled to vote during the 2011 referendum.

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and Refugees.

Thousands of them are eager to get to Southern Sudan in order to take part in the census. The land of their ancestors is sacred territory towards which both IDPs and refugees naturally return for this is where their roots are and noone can deny them : land belongs to the community that takes care of it and allots it to returnees according to custom. Land cannot be sold or given out to anybody because it belongs to the clan. For the people of Southern Sudan , land is their life. Take away their land from them and you become their number one enemy: if you threaten their land, you threaten their life. After tough discussions on land ownership prior to Naivasha's Wealth Sharing Protocol, the SPLM made it clear that the land should belong to the community and not to the government while the GoS position was that the land should belong to the government and the government have the authority to evict any settlers out from any land in any part of the country. It was a deadlock for some weeks until the resolution was reached stating that the SPLM position was agreed to be applied to Southern Sudan while the GoS position would remain operative in Northern Sudan.(ST, Community Land, 08/03/08).

Since the CPA was signed in January 2005, UNHCR says that more than 169,000 refugees and an estimated 1.9 million IDPs have returned home. 260,000 refugees remain outside Sudan 's borders. The areas of return suffer from a lack of basic services, particularly in health and education. UNHCR launched an appeal for US$ 63 million to fund its 2008 operations in Southern Sudan , including organising the voluntary return and reintegration of 80,000 refugees now in neighbouring countries.

North-South Border Demarcation

This should have been carried out immediately after the CPA was signed but the first reconnaissance survey of the North-South Technical Border Committee took place only in 2007. The lack of demarcation impacts on nearly every other issue, including the national unity government's capacity to calculate a fair share of oil revenues since the majority of oil fields lie along the border, but the problem is to determine on which side. The Committee's funds, which come from the Oil Stabilisation Fund, have reportedly just been released by the NCP in the wake of the December 2007 agreement allowing the committee to proceed with its initial work. However, its first report, on the basis of which the NSTB Committee is to receive the go-ahead from the presidency to start the actual demarcation, was not submitted in February as planned. The question remains whether the demarcation will be done in time for the census in April and what the implications will be if it is not. The demarcation work also risks being hampered by the insecurity around the military redeployment zones, particularly along the border. In any case, the committee's findings are expected to be hotly contested owing to its far-reaching impact on wealth and power-sharing. The NCP is unlikely to agree since it has a significant interest in keeping as much oil and other natural ressources as possible in the North: it considers it has already lost once, on the Abyei Boundary Commission report, due to international experts.

Redeployment of forces

The SPLA and SAF (Sudan Armed Forces) should have completed their redeployment by 9 July 2007, with security assured in border areas by the Joint Integrated Units (JUIs). After several deadlines were missed, the Joint Defence Board on 5 January 2008 issued a final deadline on 9 January and agreed to deploy JIUs in the oil production areas. Both sides reportedly complied with the deadline but in mid-January, the SPLA claimed that there were still SAF troops south of the border and many of those that had moved north had not gone the required 10- 20 km from the border. The SAF allegedly told the SPLA it needed to move even further south of the Kiir river towards Aweil. (ST,21/01/08). Indeed, both sides are reluctant to leave their positions because they doubt the JIUs' capacity to maintain security in the oil-producing areas, both SPLA and SAF have not yet been integrated within the JIUs which lacks a unified chain of command and a common military doctrine. Insecurity remains along the border, mostly around Abyei and Southern Kordofan . With North-South border demarcation still pending, there is space for both sides to argue over how far each should redeploy.

Insecurity

The Abyei region remains quite unstable : it is a volatile buffer zone nicknamed «  Sudan 's Kashmir  » at the core of tensions between North and South. The Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) - established to determine the geographic boundaries in the Abyei Protocol - staffed with international experts, presented its report to the presidency on 14 july 2005. The SPLM endorsed the findings while the NCP rejected them. Because of this deadlock, Abyei's status remains undetermined and no formal administrative structures have been put in place. The U.S. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice proposed a set of "confidence-building measures" to SPLM leader Salva Kiir during his visit to Washington last year. One of the proposals was that China , Saudi Arabia and the US would mediate between the NCP and SPLM to formulate a "package deal" to solve the impasse around Abyei and north-south border demarcation. To fill this vacuuum, the SPLM appointed Edward Lino as SPLM administrator of Abyei in January 2008 which the NCP rejected on 30 March and demanded the removal of his administration. The NCP said SPLM unilateral administration transgresses the authority of the presidency which owns alone the decision to appoint the administration of Abyei under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution. Lino allegedly deployed SPLA forces north of Abyei town. The Misseriya blocked the North-South roads through Abyei and founded the Abyei Liberation Front in mid-February and announced the creation of a new state, the Grand Bahr al-Arab, with Abyei as its capital, headed by Mohamed Omer al-Ansari. This was the response to the SPLM's appointment of Lino. Clashes in Meirum, in northern Bahr al-Ghazal in December between SPLA and Misseriya saw at least 70 people killed which led Salva Kiir to warn of a possible return to war (Gurtong/IRIN/04/03/08). The Misseriya stressed that the NCP did not respond to the Lino appointment and believe the NCP is stymied by international criticism and pressure. They believe the NCP wants them to fight the war on its behalf to hamper CPA implementation. The issue at the local level is directly tied to Misseriya grazing rights. The first clashes broke out in November 2007 between armed Misseriya herdsmen moving South with their cattle and the SPLA which promised safe passage but insisted on disarming them first. The Misseriya consider they have to defend their rights of passage south of Bahr al-Arab (River Kir),- particularly if Abyei becomes independent in 2011 – and argue that the ABC report cannot be implemented. Two local antagonistic communities are bound to live together: the Ngok Dinka who are largely represented within the SPLM and who get SPLA support and the Misseriya who are backed by the NCP. Southern President Salva Kiir ordered the SLPA to respect the Misseriya's rights of passage. NCP intransigence is fuelled by huge oil resources in the region. The majority of Sudan 's oil reserves are in the South, the NCP has a major interest in delaying the border demarcation which would therefore force it to share the profits of such godsend if it endorsed the borders set by the ABC. According to those borders, Abyei include three major oilfields whose 2005-2007 revenues amounted to roughly $1.8 billion. While settling the October crisis between SPLM and NCP, it is surprising the SPLM leaders agreed to end the crisis in December 2007 without receiving a new commitment to implement the Abyei Protocol or recognise the ABC report: the issue was directly moved to the presidency. However, there was a commitment when the SPLM returned to the government on 27 December 2007 that the issue would be resolved by 9 January 2008. The Abyei issue risks triggering a crisis that could quickly become national. The UN mission (UNMIS) is restricted from moving north of Abyei town and it has faced several clashes between SPLA and SAF as well as between Dinka and Misseriya since December 2007. There seem to be elements among both the Misseriya and the NCP who wish to use violence to force a de facto re-negotiation of the Abyei agreement or even the collapse of the CPA (ICG, Africa Briefing N°50, 13/03/08). However, many Misseriya and Ngok Dinka leaders have been working together to safeguard the peace and prevent a larger conflict. The international community should bring the NCP to understand that the resolution of this major crisis supposes the acceptance of a final demarcation of Abyei. The ABC report must be binding on both sides.

In order to fight insecurity, the GoSS has decided to disarm civilians in Southern Sudan in order to let relevant security services maintain law and order. In a meeting held in Juba from 11 to 13 March to discuss community security and arms control issues, fifty civil society representatives from the ten southern states (youth and women groups, churches, the media, peace organisations) raised concern that the weapons collected in previous disarmament efforts had not been stored in secure places and consequently fell back into civilian hands : they called for all weapons collected from civilians to be effectively stored and destroyed. The meeting welcomed the creation of the Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) Bureau within the office of Riek Machar who outlined the strategies for peaceful disarmament. In Central Equatoria , Riek Machar insisted that the « weapon culture » was detrimental to the welfare of the community. He stressed that only peace and security could give the South access to development by attracting investors. Wau has become a weapon free zone with the efficient contribution of JIUs.

Functionally, the JIUs are intended to fill security vacuums and to provide a unified military capability to meet internal security needs during the six-year interim period prior to the southern referendum in 2011. Moreover, the JIUs are a symbol of national unity to serve both as a key confidence-builder between former enemies and found the future national army, should the 2011 referendum result in a vote for unity. The JIUs provide a gauge of the parties' commitment to the agreement. Currently, the JIUs have achieved very little as many obstacles remain such as serious delays in deployment and ambiguities associated with integration of Other Armed Groups (OAGs), poor command and control, and a desperate shortage of comprehensive, joint, integrated training. JIUs are in charge of security in oil-rich areas of Unity and Blue Nile states which provides an opportunity for the SPLA to keep forces in the disputed areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States . For the NCP, the strategic significance of the JIUs allows it to maintain a SAF presence in the South for the duration of the interim period. However, five major roadblocks have prevented the JIUs from reaching their full potential: their full deployment should have been completed by 9 October 2006 but by 11 March 2008, the JIUs had only achieved 86% deployment. The independent brigade in Khartoum seems to be the only one that operates normally. The second problem has been the slection and screening of JIU troops as many of them are former members of OAGs while the CPA states that the staffing of JIU personnel must consist of individuals directly employed by either the SAF or SPLA prior to their inclusion in a JIU. The two parties blame each other for using the JIUs as dumping grounds for their aligned OAGs without fully integrating them first.The SPLA has frequently complained through UNMIS that South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) militias, notably those in Malakal, have become JIU members without any significant integration into the SAF proper. During a November 2006 incident when fighting erupted in Malakal, JIU members from both forces turned on each other. The UN Secretary General's envoy, Jan Pronk, commented that the « JIUs, instead of functioning as a binding element... tend to become a splitting force »(Reuters, 2007). The JIUs also suffer from ethnic tensions mostly within SPLA JIU components from different ethnic groups to those in their deployment areas. Finally, the absence of a joint training programme is caused by underfunding but also a lack of mutual trust that would help give JIUs a common discipline and ethics. A JIU Support Group was established in November 2007 by donor countries and chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander to act as a vehicle to coordinate international support to train JIUs. To date, the UK government has been the only donor country to make direct contributions to JIU development. Insecurity in Abyei was exacerbated by the sudden arrival of 222 heavily armed northern troops abord seven Toyotas and four lorries filled with arms: they set up barracks in a school in the town centre (Reuters, 02/04/08).

The Southern prison administration which has been severely undermined after decades of war, will be reformed with the support of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and several international organisations in order to train prison staff and respond more effectively to the needs and circumstances of detained children, women and mentally handicapped. One inmate was killed and three others were wounded following a two-day inmates' rebellion at the prison of Rumbek , the capital of Lakes State , as the police tried to restore order. The UN Development Programme has started renovating Rumbek prison, which was built during the colonial period. In order to curb the number of prisoners, the Governor of Lakes States has settled more than 3,000 cases, most of them for theft and murder. Under the Ottawa Treaty ratified by Khartoum in 2003, Juba is about to destroy 5,000 landmines by the end of March 2008.

Development and Oil.

As part of the December 2007 agreement, the NCP recommitted to « full and transparent management » in the oil sector, as well as to relaunching the National Petroleum Commission. The SPLM, while a member of that body, has felt there was little transparency in the revenue figures it was receiving from the NCP. Because it was blocked from the production and marketing of the oil, it had no way of knowing how much was really sold and at what price, much less what kickbacks the NCP might be receiving. The SPLM had to accept the NCP's accounts and hence the shares due to the GoSS as its primary source of income. The December agreement granted the GoSS a role in management of upstream oil processes, control rooms and terminals as well as at the centre and on the marketing board. The changes should allow the GoSS to confirm production figures, pumping and export numbers and revenue calculations. But despite the repeated commitments, the SPLM has not yet had access to the contracts or oil areas, and the National Petroleum Commission has not met since mid- 2007. In Fbraury 2008, oil revenues reached 397,78 million US$ of which 239,30 million US $ went to the federal government while the Southern Sudan government received 158 million US$. The undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance, Hafiz Atta al Manan, stated the GoSS had received a total amount of 166,78 million US$ in February.

While visiting Cairo in February, GoSS President Salva Kiir invited Egyptian officials to take part in the reconstruction of Southern Sudan and discussed with them the propects of resuming work in the Jonglei canal abandoned in 1983 following the outbreak of the North-South civil war. The purpose of the canal is to ensure the flow of 4,7 billion cubic metres of water annually to be equally distributed between Egypt and Sudan . But this project could spark a great deal of controversy among local southerners who say the canal will cause their displacement.

Corruption

South Sudan's President Salva Kiir lashed out at corruption practices at the Fifth Governors' Conference held in Juba on 11 March. He said there were people who received double or triple salaries and were protected by senior officials because the latter were relatives or friends of those involved in corruption. He made it clear those involved in corruption would be prosecuted and misappropriated salaries and funds would have to be refunded. Talking to Southern Sudan 's Governors, he wondered how some of them managed to have huge bank accounts within such a short period of government. The Governor of Lakes State , Lt.Gen. Daniel Awet Akot, decided to conduct a head count of his employees. He summoned them to the Secretariat General where they had to spend the whole day until 5.30 pm, the main gate was closed and cordoned off by the army. The idea was to know the number of active workforce and weed out ghost workers. As a result of a serious budget cut from the GoSS, each State in South Sudan is required to employ a workforce that should not exceed 5,000: Lakes State is beyond that line with 7,000 employees and must face dismissing a number of them. The Governor is also planning to lay off an additional 3,800 employees by June this year when the Ministry of Finance has released a pension package to be awarded to those who have reached retirement age (ST, 28/03/08).

Lord's Resistance Army

After countless difficulties, the Final Peace Agreement is about to be signed between Uganda and the LRA. It was originally scheduled on 28 March but then delayed until 3 April, then 10 th April on the requirement of LRA leader of Joseph Kony (Reuters, 01/04/08) who refuses to go to Juba so long as the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrants, launched in 2005 against the LRA top leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity, are not lifted. Kony is to sign first the Final Peace Agreement in the bush, on the Congo-Sudan border, at a place called Ri-Kwangba, then the Ugandan officials will sign the Peace deal in Juba under the authority of South Sudan Vice-President Riek Machar, chief mediator in the LRA-Uganda conflict. Ugandan negotiators are frrustrated not to meet Kony at the signing ceremony in Juba but no one has seen him for months. He is currently believed to be hiding in the Central African Republic (ST, 29/03/08).

The scrapping of ICC arrest warrants has been at the core of peace talks over the last few weeks. While he had referred the LRA case to the UN Security Council to investigate atrocities committed in Northern Uganda for over twenty years, Uganda 's President Museveni is backpedalling now declaring his country can set up a Special Court to try the perpetrators of atrocities. Northern Uganda's populations most affected by the conflict also favor a local solution based upon traditional justice, called « mato oput », in common use in the area and aiming at reintegrating the criminal within the community instead of expelling him. For the LRA and its supporters, the ICC is a kind of Western neo-colonial jurisdiction which would obtruct the peace process and the natural reintegration of those « stray » children within their traditional society. The leader of the LRA peace delegation, David Matsanga, went to the Hague with his team of lawyers in mid-March to convince the ICC prosecutors to suspend the arrest warrants so that Kony could go and sign the Final Peace Agreement in Juba without fearing arrest. To no avail. The prosecutors wanted to know how Uganda intends to establish the special courts, which personnel will be appointed, where the funding will come from and how the crime cases will be categorized. In a BBC interview, President Museveni declared that he would not hand over Kony and two other LRA commanders to the ICC since his government's justice mechanisms and traditional mechanisms in Northern Uganda could handle the matter.

Latest news: Joseph Kony did not turn up at the meeting point in Ri-Kwangba as scheduled on 10 april to sign the Peace Agreement. He has just suspended the peace talks with the Ugandan government and dissolved its peace talks team, saying they had « been misled in the solution to resolve the conflict ». In a press statement signed by Joseph Kony, the LRA motivated its rejection by the lack of "credible environment of dialogue". The « unneutral Machar », and his cooperation with the Ugandan government were cited as the first cause for the suspension of the talks. Kony also blamed the "lack of understanding and full commitment by international community." The UN special envoy, Joachim Alberto Chissano, was described as incompetent and criticised for his "lack of expertise and experience in all fields of Conflict Resolution." The ICC's refusal to suspend the arrest warrants against the LRA leaders, Kony and two other commanders — Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen — was also seen as a disturbing element for the success of the peace process.

The LRA slammed the "selective justice" of the ICC which "wants to prosecute the LRA while excusing the Ugandan government." Kony expressed doubts on the validity of a special division of Uganda 's High Court to deal with war crimes as well as the use traditional mechanism in northern Uganda for a heeling and reconciliation process. The LRA said the intimidation, bullying and bribery of LRA delegation by Kampala constitute a reason for the suspension of talks. However the LRA reiterated its commitment for peaceful settlement of the conflict. In addition it announced the appointment of a new LRA negotiation delegation...... the road will be long before a new final peace agreement is reached (ST,11/04/08).