International Crisis Group, Excerpts

II. Evolving conflict dynamics

Previously, the main conflict axis was between the government (and its related militia) and the non-Arab tribes of Darfur but new disputes over land and power have resulted in Arab-on-Arab clashes and the seeds for potential Arab insurgencies. Arab tribes have started to create new ties with non-Arabs; some have even joined or created Arab-led rebel groups. The IDP camps, housing over two million Darfurians, are becoming increasingly violent, and IDPs are being manipulated by all parties.

A. The rise in Arab Arab conflict

Many Arab tribes in Darfur, particularly the Abbala, camel herders, feel they have been used in recent years by the NCP and, now that the prospect of a stronger peacekeeping force is real, Khartoum intends to abandon them or sell them out. In the absence of a solution that deals with their grievances, they believe they have only two choices: either continue fighting a proxy war, subjecting themselves to confrontation with the international community, or distance themselves from the NCP and engage with the international community. No matter their choice, all tribes are concerned about cementing their gains from the last years of war before the peacekeepers arrive.

These gains include wealth in the form of expropriated land, military hardware and ammunition, vehicles, and political influence. They want their claims to occupied land legitimised, either through the establishment of new localities, or by being given an independent Native Administration recognised by local laws. 5 They also demand payment: according to a senior Janjaweed militia commander in Nyala, the Arab tribes deserve to be rewarded for all they have done in fighting the rebellion. They believe that if there is a peace deal, development and reconstruction money will be directed only toward the non-Arabs in Darfur , and the nomads, particularly the camel herders, will be sidelined.

1. The Targam and the Abbala Rizeigat

The current fighting between Arab tribes is not neatly divided between those who supported the NCP's policies and those who did not. It occurs among all groups in a grab for land and power and is fuelled and worsened by Khartoum . An example is the fighting between the Targam and the Abbala 6 Rizeigat, two groups that have actively supported the NCP.

2. The Salamat and the Habaniya

Now the Salamat are fighting the Habaniya, possibly to acquire an administrative unit in Dar Habaniya. The Habaniya want the Salamat off the land altogether and, with the Beni Halba tribal militias ( fursan ), have destroyed their villages and wells to ensure that they cannot return.

3 - The NCP attempted to mobilise tribes against a possible international intervention in Darfur. 12 One they singled out was the Beni Halba, one of the largest Baggara tribes and viewed as influential among the Arabs of South Darfur.. The Beni Halba leaders opted to remain distant from the government's strategy. In June 2007, the NCP sent senior leaders to persuade the tribe to join with it. First, they promised that oil exploration would soon start in the area and fixed flags south of the town, marking the area as containing petroleum fields. Secondly, they used scare tactics, telling crowds the internationals would consider all Arab tribes, including the Beni Halba, guilty of crimes against the non-Arabs, who would use international support to rule Darfur again. They tried to recruit for the Popular Defence Forces but met resistance from most communities. After this, they went to Um Labbasa and ordered the construction of a hospital, a further attempt to co-opt the tribes, but none of these ploys were effective. 13

4. The impact on the Arab tribes

Given the internal fighting, it has been difficult for tribal leaders to pursue a pro-Arab agenda for Darfur, particularly one created and controlled from Khartoum. 14 Trust among Arab groups has deteriorated to the point where Arab tribal reconciliation has little standing; many of the tribal reconciliation agreements – after being praised by the government and the media – have collapsed. 15 The Arab Gathering, 16 the secretive steering body for Arab interests in Darfur, has been unable to regulate these growing crises; tribal militias view it as less and less relevant. 17 Many Arab tribal leaders would like to have political control independent of the NCP, which they believe has paid too much attention to the Abbala , but are discouraged by the so-called centre-leaders ( Kiyadat al Markaz ), 18 so remain paralysed. However, competent Arab native leadership and paramount chiefs still exist, who, given opportunity, could productively engage in finding a sustainable solution for the conflict in Darfur .

5. The inclusion of Arab tribes in the peace process

...the NCP does not adequately represent all Arab groups in Darfur and cannot be depended upon to find a long-term solution for co-habitation between Arab and non-Arab tribes. Similarly, the Arabs among the rebels have not mustered a large following. ...

A sustainable peace needs not only to hold the Janjaweed accountable but also to find a long-term settlement for land and power issues, including how to handle hawakeer 19 and to reform the Native Administration to mutual satisfaction. It also needs to figure out how to disarm the Arab militias effectively, to compensate for Arab losses that are a direct result of Khartoum 's manipulation and to find long-term solutions for the landless Arab tribes which have fuelled the Janjaweed. Finally, the current dynamics of violence have implications for any future ceasefire negotiations. While a ceasefire between the NCP and the Darfur rebels is a key requirement for the first round of negotiations and would bring a measure of stability, it would only deal with a part of the violence that now exists on the ground.

B. Arab and non-Arab relations

New links are growing between the Arab and non-Arab tribes, particularly between the Arabs and the Fur and Massaleit; much distrust and animosity is still directed by the Arab tribes towards the Zaghawa. The NCP has strongly resisted the attempts at alliances, and aside from the Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces (RDFF) and the splinter United Revolutionary Force Front (URFF), only limited joint action or strategy has developed between the rebel movements and the Arab groups. Since the beginning of the rebellion, countless envoys, emissaries and local initiatives have failed to create a significant alliance between Arabs and rebels. For the most part, the insurgents hope the Arab tribes will realise they have been undermined and betrayed by the NCP and at least remain neutral.

1. The Arabs and the Fur/Massaleit

Given the shift in their relationship with the NCP, particularly after passage of Resolution 1706, many Arab tribes have started to realise that their role as part of the Janjaweed and related militia has damaged the future of their communities. The Arab tribes recognise that, over the long term, their livelihoods are linked socially and economically with sedentary groups such as the Fur, who, despite the counter-insurgency, are not going to go away. Some have initiated agreements with their neighbours, such as the deals between the Saada, Hotiya and Gimer Arabs of the Al Gardud and the Fur of Jebel Marra. 20 One successful agreement opened a main trade route from Jebel Marra to Nyala market. 21

The NCP seeks to dilute these efforts.

2. The Arabs and the Zaghawa

While the Arab and Fur/Massaleit tribes have created a small space locally for reconciliation, the relationship between Arabs and Zaghawa is much more contentious. There is great resentment in Darfur against the Zaghawa, whom some consider driven to gain land and power. Many believe the Abbala and other Arabs who do not have land will continue fighting the Zaghawa over it for years. These sentiments are the product of a highly concerted government propaganda initiative to instil fear of the Zaghawa and their so-called plan for a “greater Zaghawa state”.

The NCP has isolated the Zaghawa – some of whom have acted in ways which have fed the suspicions. This has been an effective counter-insurgency technique, as the Zaghawa elements of the rebellion have been the best funded and supported, including from President Deby of Chad , a fellow Zaghawa. ........

III. The calculations of the parties

For the NCP, as well as for all the aspirants to power, Darfur has become a critical staging ground for the 2009 national elections. 48 After years of trying to produce Arab control in Darfur, the NCP's current strategy is to keep it divided, stimulating the conflict in an attempt either to delay elections it fears it cannot win or to make it impossible for anyone else to win. It has not abandoned its military strategy but rather has regrouped the Janjaweed into its security structures and recently ordered reopening of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) military training camps throughout the country. 49 At the same time, it is using the chaos in Darfur as cover for creating new localities whose political representation it can manipulate.

Minni Minawi and the others who signed the DPA and joined the government are hoping to hold their gains. The rebel non-signatories have found it difficult to unite and are plagued by divisions, some instigated by the NCP, some the result of tribal rivalry and mistrust. In the lead-up to the peace talks, which many boycotted, they increased their military activity and hardened their positions.