International Crisis Group, October 2007

Vigilance Soudan Resume

Maybe the most pressing problem of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is the territorial status of Abyei, at the moment considered part of North Sudan . The region is home to Ngok Dinka, closely connected to the Dinka of the South. The nomadic “Arab” Misseriya, a people of pastoral herdsmen are added during the dry season.. Abyei area was part of the South during the condominium up to 1905.. At the time of Sudan 's first peace agreement in 1972, it was decided that a referendum in Abyei would decide if it were to be part of the North or integrated into the South. The referendum never took place. At the signing of the CPA in 2005, the question of final status was taken up again. As a matter of principle, the referendum issue was one of the first demands of the SPLM leadership, many of whom were Ngok Dinka. The Abyei referendum is scheduled to take place right before the South's referendum on self-determination. The border problem was supposed to be cleared up in a “final and binding” way by the experts of Abyei Border Commission (ABC). However, Khartoum has never accepted the Commission's report. Most of the North's oil revenues came from this area. In addition Abyei was to be granted special administrative status, a temporary administration and the Army there was explicitly to be composed of Goverment of Sudan and SPLA soldiers serving together. in the Joint Units. Although clearly stipulated in the CPA, none of this has ever materialized (VS).

During the negotiations, the definition as to who was a resident was never done. Clarification should have been done by the Referendum Commission delegated by Sudan 's presidency. Members of the NCP also attempted to include the Misseriya within the boundaries of Abyei, persuaded that tribal members would vote in favor of remaining a part of the North. The SPLM leaders refused to countenance this ploy as most of them are nomads and live elsewhere.

When the ABC findings were brought to public attention in July 2005, Khartoum campaigned to mobilize the local Misseriya population by misleading them on the grazing rights stipulations written into the Abyei Protocol. Khartoum also redrew the map incorporating West Kordofan into South Kordofan where Abyei lies, much to the anger of the local tribes, primarily the Misseriya. They took it as an offensive tactic. The international community gave scant lip service to the maneuver thereby showing its lack of resolve toward implementing in full the CPA recommendations.

In May 2006, the NCP and SPLM created a commission to explore and discuss contentious issues. Participants agreed tentatively on four options for Abyei. 1.Arrive at an accord, which failed. 2. Take the dispute to the Constitutional Court ; the SPLM refused : the majority sitting on the court were NCP advocates. 3. Call upon the members of the ABC to explain their positioning full. but the NCP balked. they only came to the South. 4. Find a third party arbitrator. Pagan Amoun, general secretary of the SPLM called on the Americans to intercede ; the NCP did not approve his choice. The Abyei Evaluation Commission (AEC) under international leadership and created for peace implementation, tried in vain to advance the deliberations. Khartoum proposed that the future administrative unity be established on the 1995 border. But the SPLM learned that the Abyei's overall administrative area was significantly larger in 1995 and greatly reduced by 2000 because Khartoum excluded the oil production areas from it. By 2005, the Abyei territory was much greater than what the Commission had stated. An improvement in the negotiations climate took place when a commissions was formed to do field studies on 1974, 1977 and 1996 borders.

To date the Misseriya community remains hostile to the NCP. It feels that South Sudan has a more conciliatory approach than the central government. The capital lords over oil production which destroys the environment while would be advantages such as jobs are no where to be found. Khartoum suppressed West Kordofan from the map a region where Misseriya are dominant. Between 10,000 and 15,000 men from the Shahama Movement ( Misseriya fighters allied with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) whose leader Khalil Ibrahim is vying for power in Khartoum and in doing so is determined to show the strength of a movement able enough to have attacked and laid waste to Wad Banga in Kordofan VS .) encamped at Deebab were waiting for a small delegation from the SPLA to come and discuss future troop integration. Before the delegation arrived, it was trapped and surrounded for several days by a large Sudanese Army contingent. The Sudan Army accused the fighters of transporting weapons to the North. Forces from the UN monitoring team were able to defuse the stand off. The integration of troops has not been successfully carried out according to the CPA guidelines. ALPS , then the Shahama included, ought to remain in the South. Any rotation elsewhere would obviously spark antagonism. The Sudan Army has kept large quantities of troops in Abyei, notably 15,000 men in the oil production capital Heglig. SPLA troops remain positioned south of Abyei and along the frontier, in the oil area.

One of the weaknesses of the Protocol is that the people are represented by politically driven factional Parties. This has visibly played out in the non-starter integration of the joint Sudan Army/SPLM combined force. Furthermore, Khartoum prohibits UN troops from venturing north of Abyei town. Juba retaliates and prohibits them from venturing south of Abyei town.

Oil is a very important factor in the overall political scheme of Sudanese policy. Oil sustains the war in Darfur and finances the divide and rule strategy. Abyei sits in the middle of the GNOPC concession (Chinese owned CNPC at 40%, Malaya's Petronas 30%, Indian ONGC 25%, Sudan 's Sudapet 5%). In 2003, more than a fourth of the Nile blend oil output came from Abyei. However it is in decline. It fell from 82, 874 barrels a day in 2004 to 66,298 b/d in 2006 and is expected to be no more than 48, 787 b/d in 2007 and even lower at 31, 279 in 2009. The production in the Melut basin has increased, but Abyei may have reserves of no more than a 200 million barrels remaining. If the minimal figures are accurate, in 2011 Abyei could become a smaller cause of friction between Khartoum and an eventual independent government in the South. Abyei is crisscrossed by a web of pipelines so will there be a regulatory problem of transit tariffs if it remains in the North?

The agreed upon market share of output from Abyei's oil production due Khartoum is 50%, with 42% going to the South's government and the remaining 25% divided between the State of Bahr el Gazal, West Kordofan, now South Kordofan, and Abyei's Dinka and Misseriya people. As the North is vague on its accounting figures, it is impossible to determine if within the cash flow destined for the South, some of the revenue is slotted for Abyei.

Any effort to create local administration in Abyei will remain a dead letter as long as no accord on final boundaries is reached. International pressure to commit to resolving the issue is sorely lacking and this should change immediately. On the local level, the UN should do much more to foster a space for dialogue between the leaders of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities. At the moment relations are not hostile, yet if impatience, frustration and anger grow amongst the Misseriya, it could lead to a mass exodus flowing outward from the backwaters of Darfur . With rumor and innuendo coming from Khartoum , the Misseriya seem terribly concerned about loosing their grazing rights even though protection of these rights is clearly stated in the CPA final document. The SPLM has demonstrated significant flexibility on petrol income sharing which extends to an unofficial offer to continue the apportionment should the South win the referendum. Expertise on oil related matters shown by the United States and Norway might extend to encompass a long term deal on the sharing of oil revenues. The UN should call for a demilitarized zone in Abyei, one that might include the entire North/South border region.

What happens in Abyei will determine whether or not the Sudan arrives at a consolidated applicable peace or is engulfed in bloodshed and war anew. The NCP needs resolute international pressure in order to carry out the “final and binding” recommendations of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, but also assistance in creative problem solving that will aid in paying out the oil revenue Abyei is due.