G reat is our apprehension over the political solutions that have been proposed concerning the new Darfur Peace negotiations dealing with the dual authority of the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN). Their road map emphasizes the initiatives taken by Libya, Tchad and Eritrea. Libya stressed sanctioning the rebels, The role of Chad is questionable at best. The Eritrean government was heavily involved in the creation of the National Redemption Front (NRF) a Darfuri rebel group, today quasi non-existent. Abd el Wahid el Nur, the head of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) refused to enter the NRF which raised up hatred against him from this country. It is shocking that the roadmap gave no consideration to the dissension and splintering within the Sudan Liberation Army Movement (SLA/M) caused mainly by Khartoum's divide and rule strategy. For negotiations, the road map not only calls for representatives of the Sudanese government and the rebel movements to be present, but also the tribal chiefs, for the most part chosen by Khartoum, as well as the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDD-C)), a provision made in the Abuja Agreement. It seems limited tothe designation of its president Sawar el Dahab, an Islamist, non-Darfuri, a Beshir puppet and former leader of a transitional government. Designed as it is now, the road map gives most of the power of drafting proposals to the Sudanese government directly or indirectly. In addition, it emphasizes the sharing of power, resources and security agreements leaving out major concerns voiced by the rebels, which include among other points, the indemnification of victims, the rights of the displaced to own the land they left and/or recover property and the maintenance of an integral Darfur.

On June 12, in Addis Ababa, the Sudanese government accepted “totally and without conditions” the UN/AU hybrid force. But shortly thereafter however, it had the depraved audacity to block the move, stipulating that it must be the AU and the AU alone that commands the peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, it demanded that non-African would be considered only for civilian positions in the UN contingent. Most Darfuris met the proposal angrily, having observed that such advocacy for African integration in no way pertained to Darfur proper where constant efforts to arabize the population go unchallenged. In Paris, on June 25, the international community asked Beshir not to reopen the hybrid force question, and he seems not to have done so. Time is on his side. The Americans and the rebel factions remain skeptical. The hybrid force first phase, with one hundred UN staff, has been operating for some time. Its second phase which includes the deployment of a force of some 3000 UN troops has yet to begin. A UN Security Council Resolution must be drafted authorizing the hybrid force presence in Darfur along with a vigorous mandate to act there. The United Kingdom and Ghana are working diligently to this end as we speak. But will it be approved? As for phase three, it would seem to be in the cards for 2008. In the meantime, Khartoum continues to convey weapons to Darfur, attack civilians and bomb them using planes bearing the United Nations colors and insignia.

The camp for the internally displaced at Ardamata, in the Massalit region of El Geneina is encircled by military bases. Pickup trucks and vehicles filled with Janjaweed crisscross it at will daily. Journalist Jean-Phillipe R é my quoted eye-witness accounts after having interviewed them for his piece in Le Monde published on June 26.” All night long the gunfire is constant. People are murdered. No one ever investigates. ” Four policemen from the AU peacekeeping force, none of whom are carrying weapons, find it too dangerous to remain after nightfall, and flee. “ They are incapable of protecting themselves. How do you expect them to protect us?” Ardamata holds approximately 18,000 people and 110 tribal leaders. The youngsters have been stuck here for years watching the traditional social system slowly crumble, an informant explained. They think, what has my tribal sheik ever done for me? Nothing. Can he even protect me? No way. So the young have drawn together in highly politicized gangs enabling them to contest traditional authority head on. In Geneina, the disgrace of the sheiks was accelerated by the special arrangements they had made with government authorities. Some of the sheiks had come to own taxis, houses, even commercial holdings. A new power structure is slowly taking over. “All of a sudden, I have to deal with five or six interlocutors ”, an NGO leader explained. “ The network is clandestine, but very quick to mobilize. ” Several NGO aid workers have been beaten. Elsewhere arms have been stockpiled and armed patrols formed. The authority of the Sultan had vanished T here in his town office, where portraits of venerable ancestors hung from the walls, the Sultan told him, “ The government continues to arm the criminals (Janjaweed). About 95% of the Massalit villages have been burned to the ground. They would even attack the camps if the international community was not there ” But in fact, the Sultan, who is close to the power structure, is a member of the governor's cabinet. He is obliged to say what he says so as to take back some control of the Massalit. According to one aid worker who returned from the country around Geneina, the Janjaweed have stolen vehicles from NGOs, and remodeled them to carry automatic machine guns while the exterior humanitarian logos remain in place. They have eviscerated men alive, poured fuel into their opened bellies and set them alight; they have pierced the wrists of women with daggers to pin them down before gang-raping them; they crucified a seven year old child when he was the only living soul they found in an evacuated village and left him there nailed to a tree. When found still alive two days later, both arms had to be amputated. In the Ryad camp the sheiks have enlisted the young men to go and fight the Chadians. In numerous articles, journalists are still giving the figure of 200,000 dead in Darfur. However, this figure came from a 2005 UN Report and it has recently been reassessed to be somewhere between 450 and 500,000 victims.

S alva Kiir spends much of his time in Khartoum these days. He gave back their concession to Total and sent back the White Nile thus doing what was said would be done when the CPA was signed. Khartoum should have withdrawn its troops from the north of Southern Sudan by July 9, but as of the 8 th , only 66% of them had been redeployed. The SPLM has reason to contest the demobilization of 9000 armed militia members. It has filed a complaint with the Ceasefire Political Commission. As soon as Riek Machar obtained satisfaction on the third point in the Uganda/ Lord Resistance Army peace agreement Salva came to Juba to reshuffle the cabinet ministry appointments. Although Riek Machar is till a Vice President, he no longer holds a cabinet position neither does M adame Garang who was named adviser to President Salva.

Bételgeuse