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English edition -4th quarter 1997
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Sudan peace talks
| After a break of more than two years, peace talks between the Sudanese
government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) resumed at
the end of October, in Nairobi, under the auspices of IGAD. The delegations
present were led on one side by the Sudanese minister of Foreign Affairs
and by the deputy leader of SPLA on the other. The talks begun with each
party circulating a document indicating their desire to attain peace and
hoped that the other party would show its commitment to working towards
the same end.
What was most striking at this occasion and during the publication of the government’s peace proposal, was the restraint demonstrated by the government representatives - a change of style that stands in marked contrast to its past behaviour. Furthermore, even if the government keeps trotting out its proposals, it accepts, without any ambiguity, to participate in discussions under the context of IGAD’s declaration of principle and as such acknowledges South Sudan’s right of self-determination. The government has however remained silent about IGAD’s request for State secularity. This document is also included in this issue. The SPLA has from the start, published various documents and taking for granted that the government has accepted IGAD’s declaration of principle, it has already started manoeuvring its pawns in preparation for the interim period, that is, after the signing of the peace agreement and before the referendum. During this period SPLA is demanding total withdrawal of troops from the North followed by the setting of the Southern region as a federal state. This means that while awaiting the referendum, its ties with the North will be loosened. Further to these demands, SPLA has unilaterally added three regions to what originally constituted the South when Sudan attained independence. These regions are --the Nuba Moutains in Kordofan, a zone around Abyei, South of Darfour and a part of the Blue Nile province. Inhabitants of these regions, all situated in the North and of whom Muslims are a minority, are all openly rebelling against the government, Muslims included and are fighting hand in hand with the SPLA. At this moment, the composition of the central transitional government remains the crucial issue. Nevertheless, it is quite understandable and in order, that the SPLA makes known its desiderata and that it brings up the issue of the internal organisation of Sudan during the interim period, at this particular stage. SPLA has vaguely indicated its wish to delegate power to a team composed of Southerners, opposition from the North and Islamic representatives. Opposition groups form the north were notably absent from the Nairobi talks, having being challenged by the Islamists for not having participated originally in IGAD’s peace conference. It is however evident that in the long run, it will not possible to exclude them from the peace table. The Sudanese government has responded to the Southerners’ demands not only by rejecting the principle of the confederation for the interim period but also by rejecting the proposal of extending the right of self-determination to the Nuba Mountains region and other territories. The relevant document is included in this issue. Just as negotiations were taking off, the United States announced an economic and financial boycott on Sudan. This move is sure to put a burden on Sudan. Although there is almost no exchange between Sudan and the United States, all import and export transactions in Sudan are carried out in dollars. The acceptance of IGAD’s principles by the Islamists and their presence in Nairobi were largely motivated by a desire of not wishing to see themselves alienated from the Americans, who had played a major role on pressing for the peace talks. The boycott decision by the United States greatly influenced the breakdown of the negotiations, furnishing Khartoum’s government with a chance to accuse them of sabotaging its peace efforts. Nobody is taking this accusation seriously but it is somewhat difficult to understand why the boycott has been annouced, at such a critical stage of the peace negotiations. It has been easier to explain it as a blunder owing to an interior political problem -the Whit House not willing to be overruled by Congress which wishes to see the United States take a tougher stand against Sudanese fundamentalists. Despite the postponement of the conference to April 1998, some progress has been achieved with the official declaration of the different desiderata. Until then, emissaries will maintain liaison between the different parties with a view of speeding up negotiations. No cease-fire is anticipated however and the issue of the battles to come will no doubt be a determining factor in the outcome of upcoming negotiations. |
| (V.S. November1997) Fomalhaut |