(AllAfrica.com, Washington, Sep 12, 2004) -- To stop the killing in the western region of Sudan known as Darfur, a neutral force of 30,000 soldiers is urgently needed, the leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A), John Garang, said during an address to the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation's 34th Annual Legislative Conference on Friday. 
Garang, whose forces in southern Sudan have been fighting against the government in Khartoum, the capital, for more than two decades, said the peacekeeping force for Darfur should be composed 10,000 soldiers each from his own Sudanese People's Liberation Army, from the Sudan army and from member states of the African Union, which already has 300 troops in place in Darfur. This force, which could be funded by the international community and monitored by international observers, would be "sufficiently neutral" to disarm the Janjaweed militia, which is blamed for most of the deaths. 
The idea of a tripartite peacekeeping operation has been endorsed by key members of the U.S. Congress, including Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (Republican-Tennessee) and Rep. Donald Payne (Democrat-New Jersey), who both made recent visits to Darfur. 
In Congressional testimony on Thursday, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the a State Department investigation had concluded "that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government and the Janjaweed bare responsibility." Last month, both houses of the U.S. Congress passed resolutions labeling the killings in Darfur as genocide. 
According to Garang, the actions of the government in Khartoum mean it cannot be given responsibility for restoring peace. "How do you ask the government committing genocide to secure the people against whom it is committing genocide?" he said. 
In an interview, Garang said he raised the combined forces proposal in meetings Tuesday with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and Thursday with Powell. Both seemed interested, he said, although neither made a commitment to support the idea. Following Tuesday's meeting, Annan said the UN Security Council should expand the size of the force from its original "woefully inadequate" number to a size sufficient to protect displaced persons and restore security. On Thursday, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John Danforth, introduced a draft resolution asking the United Nations to establish an international commission to investigate whether acts of genocide have occurred in Darfur. 
"To consider what is happening in Darfur as genocide does not represent the international consensus and sends a negative signal to the other side who are negotiating with the government," says Khartoum's ambassador to Washington, Kadhir Haroun. 
As the situation in Darfur has worsened in recent months, the long-awaited peace accord aimed at ending Sudan's longstanding North-South conflict has been delayed. Signed in May in the Kenyan town of Naivasha, the accord would bring together the SPLM/A and Sudan's ruling National Congress Party as the primary partners in a governing coalition. Sudan's government has blamed recent delays in implementing the accord on the preoccupation with the problems in Darfur. 
Talks between the government and Garang's SPLM/A are scheduled to resume in October, Sudan's deputy parliamentary speaker Angelo Beda said late on Thursday. "I have spoken to mediators in Kenya and it appears we are going to resume talks with SPLM/A some time next month," Beda said in Nairobi on Thursday, according to Agence-France Press. 
The Naivasha process holds the solution to Darfur, Garang said in a CNN interview last week. "A government of national unity in Khartoum which will be better able to solve the problem of Darfur," he said. "It's very urgent indeed." 
Friday's remarks by Garang at the Congressional Black Caucus seemed a more explicit call for regime change although the SPLM/A leader insisted, "I am not talking about the violent overthrow" of the Khartoum government. Instead, he said, a peaceful transition is needed to insure that the government that is formed to run the country represents all of the people of Sudan.
 

Darfur has always been considered a source of cheap labour and army recruits utilized particularly to stem the civil war in the South, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. 

For the last 10 to 15 years the Government of Sudan had never admitted the rebellion in Darfur but through the media propagated the idea that the upheavals in Darfur are caused by ‘ARMED ROBBERY AND HIGHWAY BANDITRY ’.

The situation in Darfur has resulted to terror, rape, torture, murder, and slavery. Already in the last one and half year, about 35,000 people lost their lives and it is predicted that this number will increase in the few days to come due to the obstruction of relief agencies from saving the population. It is also calculated that two million people are internally displaced. Two hundred thousand have fled to neighbouring Chad while others fled to Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and other centres in the North.

The arming and military assistance to the Janjaweed militia is a repetition of the Popular Defence Force (PDF) named also as “Murahellin” in Kordofan that caused destruction in Abyei and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. The Janjaweed could not have purchased sophisticated weapons, and ammunition. In the first place they do not have the funds to pay for themselves and secondly they do not have bomber planes to hurl bombs on the innocent civilians. 

We call upon the United Nations and the International community to exert pressure to bear on the Government of Sudan not only to halt arming the Janjaweed but also to immediately disarm them and bring the perpetrators to justice. We do not believe that any further time be given to the government to take serious measures and action because many innocent people are losing their lives. If the Government of Khartoum is reluctant to assume this responsibility, then we appeal to the international community to intervene immediately. Time factor is crucial in order to save innocent and precious lives.

We also call upon the Government of Sudan to open wide the doors for the humanitarian agencies to deliver food, medicines and shelter to the displaced people of Darfur. Assistance should reach the displaced wherever they are and without further delay tactics.
We appeal to the Government of Sudan to take positive steps as a Government, whose prime interest is the protection of lives and the respect of the dignity of its citizens, to sit and negotiate a just and peaceful settlement to the conflict. A government that violates the rights of its citizens should expect the intervention of the international human family. In fact this is mandatory of the international community.

We also appeal to both belligerent parties to sit at the negotiating table in order to reach a just and peaceful solution to the situation. This is because war is not the best way of addressing grievances. We therefore commend the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on one hand and the government on the other for accepting the invitation of the intermediaries to seek a peaceful settlement. War and killing do not solve problems. 

We also plead with the international community to avoid further discussion and compromise. We ask all concerned authorities to stop politicking. What is at stake are the lives of hundred of thousands of innocent people, particularly the children, the women and the elderly. There is no room for further statements, discussions, or deliberation. This is a time for action to save innocent people.

We further appeal to the United Nations to assume their responsibilities. The holocaust of the African ethnicity in Darfur is ethnic cleansing. There is also need to strongly deter the government of Sudan from arming its militia in Upper Nile where atrocities are being committed against innocent civilians. This means that the international community should interfere and offer all necessary assistance.

We also launch our strong appeal that the case of Darfur should not stall the negotiation of the peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya. We hereby wish to note that it is contradictory to negotiate peace with some while others are being totally eliminated. This should be considered while the leaders of the SPLM/A and GOS resume their peace talks. We reiterate that any peace without justice is no peace.

In conclusion, we the Catholic Bishops of the Sudan pray to Almighty God to rescue his people from the present tribulation, and invite all those who yearn for justice and peace to offer prayers and assistance for the suffering people of Darfur. 
 

Khartoum, Aug 21, Aug 2004 (SUNA) -- Following the Sudan News Agency publishes text of the memorandum of understanding on Darfur signed here Saturday between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the International Organization for Migration:- 

"In order to oversee and assist in the voluntary return of displaced persons in accordance with the 5 Aug. 2004 Darfur Plan of Action agreed between the Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Sudan and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, 

Recalling " the agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the United Nations, concluded on 3 July 2004; " the decision adopted by the summit of the African Union (AU) on 8 July 2004 and the valuable efforts of the AU concerning Darfur, as well as the initiative to establish a forum for negotiation for the parties concerned; " the cease-fire agreement reached under the auspices of the Republic of Chad; and " the cooperation agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) dated 13 October 1998, 

Noting the serious concerns expressed by the international community over the security and humanitarian conditions in Darfur, and the objective to create conditions for the restoration of peace, security, stability and development in Darfur, 

Welcoming the measures taken so far by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan in increasing access to humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the people. 

Recognizing the role of the United Nations RC/HC in coordinating the efforts of the United Nations and its partners to the humanitarian crises in Darfur, and welcoming its support with respect to mobilizing financial and logistical resources necessary for the implementation of the present Memorandum of the Understanding, and Acknowledging the cooperation of the international community in response to the urgent humanitarian needs of the affected population. Therefore 

1. The government of the Republic of the Sudan and the International Organization for Migration: 

1.1 Reiterate the importance of urgently reaching a durable and peaceful solution to the situation prevailing in the Darfur region of the Sudan, 

1.2 Acknowledge the need of ending impunity and securing human rights protection in Darfur, 

1.3 Recognize the importance of adhering to international humanitarian law and international human rights law in all activities related to the implementation of this memorandum of understanding. 

1.4 Call upon the international community to extend full logistical and humanitarian support to the peace process, 

1.5 Agree to the establishment of a Management and Coordination Mechanism (MCM) on the voluntary return of internally displaced persons in Darfur. The MCM shall be initially composed of representatives of the Sudanese Government, IOM and the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, and shall be convened by the second week of September 2004, and 

1.6 Coordinate and agree, within the context of the MCM , upon standard operating procedures and criteria required for the implementation of this memorandum of understanding. 

These shall be harmonized, as appropriate, with policies and practices concerning the voluntary repatriation of refugees to the Sudan 

2. In order to pursue these common goals, the Government of the Republic of Sudan: 

2.1 Confirms its policy of no involuntary return and that the primary responsibility for displaced persons in Sudan is that of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan, 

2.2 Commits itself to spare no efforts in establishing the necessary security and humanitarian conditions for the phased return to their homes or elsewhere of all displaced persons in the most safe, dignified and efficient manner, 

2.3 Agrees to grant to IOM and programme implementing partners full access to internally displaced persons and to the communities to which they are returning in accordance with the provision of the Joint Communique of 3 July 2004, 

2.4 Agrees to provide to IOM adequate advance notice of any internally displaced persons who have indicated to the Government of the Sudan willingness to return to their area of origin and to facilitate IOM's direct assessment and verification of the voluntariness and appropriateness of such returns. 

2.5 Agrees to accept IOM determination on the voluntariness and appropriateness of returns, before returns take place, 

2.6 Undertakes to protect the security of IOM staff and of the internally displaced persons, and 

2.7 Appoints the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs as the government's counterpart to IOM for the implementation of this memorandum of understanding. 

3 For its part, the International Organization for Migration undertakes, subject to the available of adequate resources, to: 

3.1 Determine voluntariness and appropriateness of the return of the internally displaced persons to their area of origin in accordance with international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international principles which identify the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of displaced persons in all phases of displacement, return or resettlement and reintegration, 

3.2 Oversee and assist in the voluntary return of internally displaced persons to their homes. 
3.3 Bring support to the communities affected by displacement and facilitate the conditions conducive to return, 

3.4 Contribute to the reintegration of displaced families, 

3.5 Carry out other activities that shall be considered appropriate in restoring peace and normal living conditions in the region, 

3.6 Make full reports of the activities of the MCM to be signed by the representatives of the Government of the Sudan, the International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations, available to the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the international community, including parties to the Joint Implementation Mechanism, and 

3.7 Stand ready to provide assistance through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes." 

For the Government of the Republic of the Sudan Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail 

For the International Organization for Migration Brunson McKinlay Director General For the United Nations Manuel Aranda da Silva Deputy Special Representative Of the Secretary General UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan.
 

May 6, 2004

House Committee on International Relations

Thank you, Mr Chairman, for the invitation to testify at this hearing, and for the Committee's unflagging interest in the multi-faceted crisis in Sudan. 

My first opportunity to testify to a Congressional committee occurred nearly fifteen years ago, when I spoke of a government in Khartoum that was using ethnic-based militias to undertake ethnic cleansing in south-western Sudan.  So it is almost surreal to be back again, with many visits here in between, talking about the very same tactics being deployed by the very same government with the very same result of displacement, destruction and death.  This time, though, the victims are Muslim, and from the North.  More than anything else, this should demonstrate to anyone that hasn't paid sufficient attention that Sudan's war never was simply between North and South, or between Muslim and Christian.  Rather, this is a national war, in which a small group from the center of the country maintains power by any means necessary.
Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the world still frets about what it should have or could have done during that 90-day slaughter.  In Sudan, three times as many people have died, spread over a twenty year period.  We are still fretting, still wringing our hands, still wondering if our aid workers will be granted travel permits to clean up after another bout of ethnic cleansing has occurred.  Sudan is Rwanda in slow motion.
At some point, culpability must enter into the equation.  Through its military tactics, the government in Khartoum is responsible for creating the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (Darfur), the second largest death toll since World War II (the conflict with the SPLA), and the world's largest forgotten emergency (northern Uganda, courtesy of the Lord's Resistance Army).  If we keep treating the symptoms without squarely identifying the cause, we will be here again in another fifteen years discussing these very same issues, still wringing our hands.

I. ACTION NEEDED NOW

There are five priorities that must be addressed immediately and simultaneously if we are to have any impact in ameliorating the current emergency and addressing the roots of the crisis.

1. - Prevent Famine in Darfur

The international community acted too slowly to prevent ethnic cleansing from occurring in Darfur.  The policy of constructive engagement that was pursued throughout 2003 in pursuit of an IGAD peace deal compromised the international response to Darfur's killing fields.  The White House did not weigh in publicly until March 2004, after Khartoum's campaign was completed.  Ironically, this was nearly ten years to the day after the Rwandan genocide had begun.  Even UN representatives spoke out publicly before we heard from the President on this issue.
Despite being too late to stop the ethnic cleansing campaign, the international community still has a chance to prevent a major famine from killing hundreds of thousands more Darfurians.  At the middle levels of USAID up through to Roger Winter and Andrew Natsios, with some mid-level State Department support, the U.S. is engaging in this famine prevention effort.  But much more must be done at the highest level to get the Ceasefire Commission stood up, get international monitors into Darfur, open up access to the OTHER half million internally displaced persons through road and rail options, and begin a process leading to the disarmament of the Janjaweed.  Rather than waiting to see if access is granted, much more assertive planning must be done, in cooperation with Secretary General Annan on alternative access modalities, such as cross border operations from Libya, Chad or even southern Sudan, and/or options for Chapter VII armed protection of emergency aid distribution.

2.- Address Darfur's Political Roots

It would be a grave mistake if the international community limited its involvement in Darfur to humanitarian band-aids.  This is exactly what happened for most of the last fifteen years in southern Sudan, while over two million people perished as the aid faucet was turned off and on at the whim of the government in Khartoum.  There must be a corresponding push to get a credible, internationally supported peace process established quickly for Darfur, as soon as the ceasefire is operational.  Venue, structure and substance for the talks all need to become the subject of immediate international interest.  ICG will have a report on these critical questions in the next couple of weeks.
A negotiated political solution between the government and the Darfur rebels is, ultimately, the only option for restoring peace and stability to Darfur. This is also the best way to deal with the devastating humanitarian situation in Darfur and the massive displacement in a manner that can be sustained.

3.- Close the IGAD Deal in Naivasha

The other casualty of the international community's policy of constructive engagement with Khartoum on the IGAD peace process has been the delay in finalizing the deal in Naivasha.  Constructive engagement and quiet diplomacy in the IGAD talks emboldened the Sudan government to continue bombing in Darfur and delaying in Naivasha.  The lesson should not be that engagement is wrong, but rather that engagement needs to be backed up by more serious and multilateral pressure, as outlined below.
I just returned from Naivasha, where all of the major issues have now been ironed out. All that remains is for the parties to take the political decision to sign.  If the government decides to sign the framework deal, we must understand it is only that -- a framework -- and that work will have to continue to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement, which provides yet another opportunity for delay and obfuscation.
A major push is needed to finish this process and begin implementing the deal.  Such closure will lay the groundwork for resolution of the Darfur crisis as well.

4.- Multilateralize the Sudan Crisis

When the international community has been united on Sudan and used pressures and incentives in a coordinated way, we have seen progress on a number of issues.  But unfortunately, that has not usually been the case.  The U.S. must work much more intently through the UN Security Council to convince others to counter the threat to international peace and security that the Sudan crisis represents, given the major spillover effects in Chad, Uganda and elsewhere.
When the UN World Food Programme and UN Human Rights Commission brief the UN Security Council on Friday, the U.S. must be prepared to press forward with a resolution that provides Chapter VII authority for further action in Sudan.  That authority should be used for contingency planning for the protection of emergency aid deliveries as well as for the establishment of a high level panel to investigate the commission of war crimes in Darfur, as a precursor to the possible establishment of further mechanisms of accountability. 
Chapter VII authority remains a pipe dream unless key Security Council members, starting with the U.S., begin to urgently campaign for such authority.  Sources within the Security Council and the UN Secretariat believe that if the U.S. is willing to seriously engage on behalf of Chapter VII authority, the dynamic of debate could change.  Leadership is required.  At present, the U.S. mission remains fixated on getting humanitarian workers into Darfur, a worthy but insufficient objective.

5.- Build Leverage

The Sudan government no longer believes the U.S. will apply significant or meaningful pressure in response to its actions, allowing Khartoum to act with virtual impunity.  This results from three years of a policy of constructive engagement that has witnessed, but not reacted to, a human rights crisis without parallel in Africa.  Not delivering promised incentives related to normalization of relations is the current form of pressure being utilized by the U.S.  This is again insufficient.
It has to be understood that regime survival has been the principal impetus for movement in the IGAD peace process.  Khartoum was forced to recalculate after 9/11 because of concern about possible U.S. action.  Khartoum now believes it has effectively neutralized the post-9/11 threat of U.S. action, and has called the U.S. bluff.  This renewed confidence could lead to non-implementation of any IGAD agreement, and continued intransigence in Darfur.
To alter this damaging calculation, the existing set of sanctions and pressures should be enhanced by the following U.S.-led actions:

- Apply targeted sanctions against specific members of the regime that are most directly responsible for the human rights violations in Darfur.  This would include travel bans and asset freezes.  All efforts should be made to multilateralize these targeted sanctions through engagement with the European Union and the United Nations.  The most important point is to create individual culpability for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
- Impose a UN arms embargo through the UN Security Council, banning the importation of arms by any party to the conflict, including the government.
- Lay the foundation for the possible creation of further mechanisms for accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity by pressing for the establishment and deployment of a UN high level panel to conduct an investigation and report to the Council and the Secretary General.
- Undertake much more concerted and multilateral planning and diplomacy in pursuit of cross border emergency aid operations, looking at Chad, Libya and southern Sudan as possible staging areas.
- Revive discussion of capital market sanctions, with the new caveat that such a provision would only apply if the government of Sudan were found by the UN to be responsible for ethnic cleansing or genocide.  Thus, a high bar would be set which would not open the door to the indiscriminate use of this policy instrument, but would be reserved for only the most heinous of crimes against humanity.
 

II. BACKGROUND

Armed conflict erupted in Darfur in early 2003 when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked military installations. The rebels seek an end to the region's chronic economic and political marginalisation and also took up arms to protect their communities against a twenty-year campaign by government-backed militias recruited among groups of Arab extraction in Darfur and Chad. These "Janjaweed" militias have over the past year received greatly increased support from Khartoum to clear civilians from areas considered disloyal. Militia attacks backed up by a scorched-earth government offensive have targeted Darfurian tribes of African extraction from which most of the rebels hail, namely the Fur, the Massaleit, the Zaghawa and other smaller African groups, in a strategy of collective punishment designed to drain support base of the rebels. 
The attacks led to massive displacement, indiscriminate killings, looting and mass rape --all in contravention of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that prohibits attacks on civilians. These attacks amount to a campaign of ethnic cleansing: they target communities of African decent while sparing villages in their midst inhabited by people of Arab extraction. ICG's own monitoring of the situation corroborates UN estimates that thousands have been killed in a campaign that has uprooted more than a million people from their homes and forced an estimated 130,000 more to flee to neighbouring Chad. 
Darfur's conflict is tearing apart the delicate ethnic balance of seven million people who are uniformly Muslim. The war consists of multiple intertwined conflicts: one is between government-aligned forces and rebels; in a second government militia raid civilians; yet a third involves a struggle among Darfur communities themselves. It is already spilling over beyond Darfur's borders, threatening the regimes in both Sudan and Chad and menacing regional stability. Any peace process must address all three levels of the conflict if sustainable peace and stability are to return to Darfur.
The international community's response has been muted and ineffectual. The priority of the key external actors -- neighbouring governments and their backers in Washington, London, Oslo and Rome -- was to focus on the IGAD peace talks between the SPLA and the government. The policy was one of constructive engagement, marked by quiet diplomacy and a desire to maintain access to perceived hard line government elements. Meanwhile, the government's campaign of ethnic cleansing intensified in Darfur. It was only after evidence of the massive atrocities against the civilian population became impossible to ignore that more muscular diplomacy began in March 2004 with respect both to the IGAD process and attempts at constructing an effective negotiation on Darfur. 

1. The Darfur peace process

Chad's role in negotiations in the last quarter of 2003 between the Khartoum government and the SLA was grossly flawed and counterproductive, as it consistently manipulated the process to satisfy Khartoum's demand of treating the crisis as an internal security problem, devoid of any political significance. Despite warnings by ICG of Chad's lack of credibility as a mediator, the European Union and United Nations insisted on reviving the Chadian mediation, leading to ceasefire negotiations that took place in early April in the Chadian capital Njamena between the government of Sudan and the SLA and JEM. However, the presence at the talks for the first time of international observers representing the African Union (AU), the EU, and the US played only a limited role in mitigating the subversion of the process by the Sudanese and Chadian governments. 
The international observers coordinated little among themselves and as a result sent conflicting signals to rebel delegates who were internally divided and whose lack of exposure and political sophistication placed them at a great disadvantage. The outcome was a ceasefire agreement that failed to explicitly require the government to disarm and hold accountable its proxy Janjaweed militias, the leading perpetrator of continuing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. The agreement was fraught with gross discrepancies between the signed Arabic and English copies that ICG has examined. 
The significant international presence at the early April talks notwithstanding, disturbing discrepancies and mistakes exist in the signed documents that cannot be attributed to translation errors alone. That such omissions and mistakes took place under the passive watch of so many observers is indicative of the international community's lack of focus on the peace process in Darfur and its eagerness to press the parties into agreeing to a desperately needed humanitarian ceasefire without a vision for longer term viability of the agreements reached. 
Confusion reigns as to what constitutes a ceasefire violation. The AU has presented its operational plan for the establishment of the Ceasefire Commission only on 2 May, nearly a month into a 45-day truce, and the parties together with the observers have yet to give their consent to technical and budgetary plans as outlined in the document. The plan provides for the inclusion of representatives of the international community in the monitoring body which is likely to displease Khartoum. There are two major flaws in the current AU proposal that must be addressed if the Ceasefire Commission is to have any chance for success. First, there must be clear sanctions included in the agreement for the violation of the ceasefire.  These sanctions must be defined and agreed to by all parties to ahead of time. The current proposal makes no mention of any repercussions for violating the ceasefire. 
Second, the current proposal would see all the parties to the conflict as well as the international community as equal members of both the Ceasefire Commission, and the overarching Joint Commission that is to be created. Both of these bodies would come to their decisions by consensus.  Yet with the parties to the conflict involved on these bodies, and a consensus required for any decisions or actions to be taken, it would be far too easy for any party to the conflict to hold these commissions hostage to their agendas by refusing to agree with a decision that goes against their will. Thus the bodies must be granted an objective, authoritative veto power over the parties if the Ceasefire Commission is to succeed. The ceasefire is automatically renewable for a further 45 days, when it expires in late May. 
Confusion also reigns in the political front. Because of the absence of long term international commitment to the peace process in Darfur, international community representatives were absent from two sessions of 'political talks' that convened under the auspices of the Chadian mediation in late April in Njamena at which a 'political agreement' was formulated and signed on 25 April by government and SLA and JEM representatives. Reflecting the confusion that continues to surround the Chadian mediation, JEM and SLA rebel fronts issued nearly identical statements on 26 and 27 April respectively in which they repudiated the 25 April agreement on political issues as a fraud while reiterating their commitment to the ceasefire agreement. They explained that their representatives in Njamena were not mandated to negotiate with the government on political issues, but were only there as liaison officers to work with the Chadian mediation, the AU and the international observers on the technical details for the establishment of the ceasefire commission. Both fronts claimed that the Chadian mediation and government delegation have intimidated these liaison officers into signing the 25 April agreement on their behalf and said they were recalling the signatories to account for their bypassing of their mandates. 
The SLA and JEM insist on direct political talks with the government, the aim of which would be to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Darfur. The rebels’ rejection of Chad as mediator and Njamena as venue for such talks is clearly justified in light of the Chadian manipulation of the 2003 Abeche process and subsequent negotiations for the 8 April ceasefire agreement and the 25 April ‘political agreement'.
The rebels are in agreement that only after reaching a directly negotiated political settlement with the government would they accept to attend an all inclusive conference of Darfurians to seek broader consensus around it. They have repeatedly rejected an inclusive conference on Darfur that the government is preparing and charged it was meant to deceive Darfurians and the international community. The government is arguing that the rebels have endorsed and agreed to participate in its all-inclusive "Conference on Peace and Development in Darfur", which it holds as the one and the same as the one provided for under the 25 April agreement. It is forging ahead with the preparation for convening the forum later this May, the preparatory committee for which is 130 strong and anticipated delegates presently stand at 1,700. Sudanese opposition parties are boycotting the process, challenging its legitimacy. With the rebels also characterising the conference as ‘staged’, the event is likely to be a futile public relations exercise were it to take place. The government would ultimately have little manoeuvring room to continue ignoring the rebels’ demand of directly negotiated political talks. 
Having secured the conclusion of a deeply flawed humanitarian ceasefire agreement, although not yet its implementation, the international community is currently at a loss as to its role in the next phases of Darfur's peace process. The U.S. must provide vision and leadership commensurate with the challenge. Equally important is that the U.S. and the EU coordinate their efforts in the future over the Darfur issue. The degree of division amongst the international observers exhibited at the Chadian talks can not be repeated if any progress is to be made towards ending the crisis in Darfur.

2. The current situation

Security, civilian protection, and humanitarian aid for the tens of thousands of internally displaced Darfurians and those forced to flee to Chad remain the most overriding concerns. Before and after the 8 April ceasefire, the Janjaweed continued to attack and harass the IDPs and refugees even into large camps and towns to which they have fled. A typical situation prevails in the town of Kutum, headquarters of the province of the same name in North Darfur State. The original population of 20,000 is hosting about 140,000 villagers displaced in the course of the year from the surrounding areas after their villages were burned to the ground, their livestock was stolen and all their modest social and economic assets—including clinics, schools, irrigation pumps, grinding mills, etc.—were destroyed by the Janjaweed and government forces that back them up. Nearly a thousand villagers were killed in this area alone in the 15-month strife. 
With the international spot increasingly shining on the conduct of the Sudanese government against its own citizens in Darfur, the government is now proclaiming its keenness to return the IDPs to their areas of origin before the approaching rainy season. However, it has failed to produce a convincing strategy to encourage the voluntary return of the IDPs and guarantee their security against further Janjaweed attacks. In the case of Kutum cited above, one of the largest Janjaweed camps in North Darfur State is located not far from the town. The militiamen there continue to receive government support. They have grown extremely wealthy from the war booty the government has allowed them to accumulate with impunity, including the livestock and other valuables of their victims. IDPs who tried to return to their home areas to escape the appalling conditions they are experiencing in Kutum have been subjected to systematic harassment and attacks by the Janjaweed and are now reluctant to return to their villages.
It is a measure of the Khartoum government's cynicism and its contempt of international humanitarian standards that similar plans for the relocation of IDPs from Geneina, the capital of West Darfur State, to their home villages might include the integration of the Janjaweed militiamen in government security forces and their use to escort the IDPs to their villages. Attacks by the government and allied militia against the communities that ended up in camps for the war displaced appeared intent on permanently uprooting them from their home areas. If the government is willing to reverse that course of action, it should immediately and demonstrably provide for the protection of its citizens, first and foremost by disarming the Janjaweed militiamen and holding them accountable for their abuse of civilians that continue to be committed under its eyes and those of the international community. The government plan for "neutralizing" the Janjweed is to formally incorporate them into the official military and police structures. Yet this ignores the problems of accountability for the atrocities already committed, and the government's responsibility for arming and encouraging the Janjaweed in the first place. Rewarding them with jobs in service of the state cannot be considered an effective tool for neutralizing the Janjaweed. 
ICG has in late March recommended to the government of Sudan to negotiate the establishment of a Neutral Resettlement and Claims Commission composed of representatives of the government, the Darfur rebels and civil society representatives known for their integrity, chaired by a UN representative.  The Commission should be charged with a mandate to: (a) record criminal complaints against groups or individuals for injuries, wrongful deaths, and material losses such as stolen livestock, household effects, and commercial goods; (b) create mechanisms for restitution, compensation, and investigation of charges by victims; and (c) collaborate with investigations by responsible third parties such as the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) into violations of international humanitarian law. The US and the international community would fail the displaced if the government of Sudan is held to a lesser standard.
A new crisis is now emerging over the delivery of humanitarian relief in Darfur, following the signing of the ceasefire. In the past two weeks, the SLA has issued several statements to the effect that they will refuse any humanitarian relief to areas under their control that originates in government areas - where most of the UN and international NGOs have their operations. They conveyed their determination to deny the government the opportunity of using humanitarian relief for its benefit, specifically: to bring troops and ammunition into SLA areas; to bring spies and propaganda into SLA areas; to manipulate the situation on the ground to discredit the SLA and have the civilian population reliant on the government. However, if the SLA enforces a ban on humanitarian relief deliveries to their areas from government areas, the government would convincingly argue that the rebels are obstructing humanitarian relief. The government has already accused the SLA of attacking a humanitarian convoy in late April, killing the Zaghawa king Abdel-Rahman Mohamadain who was leading the convoy. The SLA have since stated that the Janjaweed are responsible for the killing of the king, and have alleged that the "humanitarian" convoy was accompanied by government security forces - thus making it a legitimate military target. This issue could very easily emerge as the next obstacle towards gaining humanitarian access to Darfur. In order to resolve it quickly, the government must agree up front to remove any military accompaniment from humanitarian convoys entering into rebel held areas, and the rebels must agree to allow humanitarian assistance from government areas, on the condition that it is not accompanied by government security forces. 

3. Finding a political solution to the Darfur crisis

Creating a working Cease-fire Commission and implementing the cease-fire on the ground, beginning with the disarming of the Janjaweed, remain the immediate priorities for the U.S. government in Darfur. These are also necessary prerequisites for the commencement of the following step on political negotiations that must take place between the government, JEM and the SLA. A negotiated political solution between the government and the Darfur rebels is, ultimately, the only option for restoring peace and stability to Darfur. This is also the best way to deal with the devastating humanitarian situation in Darfur and the massive displacement in a manner that can be sustained. 
The political agendas of the two rebel movements are still poorly understood, and are still evolving. Broadly speaking, their demands and complaints against the government are not dissimilar from those of the SPLA. Both the JEM and SLA are fighting against government marginalisation, under-development, and the history of a lack of responsible government in the region. The two rebel movements worked closely together during the humanitarian negotiations to coordinate their positions, and will try to do the same in the political negotiations. The general demands are the same: 

1) Greater autonomy for Darfur as a region.

2) Re-constituting Darfur as a single region or state, and unrolling the various administrative changes and additions that the government set up in 1994 to favour their political allies and weaken the traditional power structures. This amounts to deconstructing the current administrative system the government has put in place to manipulate local politics - such as the favouring of Arab tribes through the creation of new administrative boundaries - in order to try to restore the traditional balance of power that existed among the tribes in Darfur. 

3) Democratic elections, with democratically elected governors.

4) Greater representation for Darfur in the central government, in a manner representative of Darfur's size and population relative to the rest of the country. 

5) Greater development investment and larger share of national resources for Darfur.

On religion and state, the SLA is a secular movement that has the goal of removing Sharia, while JEM has not taken a position - opting instead to support whatever legal system is chosen democratically by the Sudanese people. 
In short, the political solutions to the problems of Darfur are negotiable - under the right circumstances - and can fit relatively smoothly within the structures of government currently being negotiated between the government and the SPLA in the IGAD process. In particular, the models of state autonomy that are being negotiated in Naivasha for the northern states of Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile are models that could provide the basis -- with modification -- for a resolution in Darfur. The models provide for strong state autonomy and greatly increased state control over decisions effecting local administrations, including in policy areas such as education and legal systems to help protect the state against the application of Sharia at the national level. This model, which has not yet been formally agreed to in Naivasha, could provide a template to begin discussions on a political settlement for Darfur, subject to the necessary adaptations to make it relevant to the Darfur context. These solutions can only last in the context of broader changes to the political system for the country as a whole - such as democratization and decentralization throughout the country. It is hoped that the IGAD peace process can bring these changes to the center.
Use of this model for Darfur can not be interpreted to mean that the political negotiations on Darfur be conditional on an agreement being signed in Naivasha. This wait and see tactic has led to international inaction in Darfur for most of the past year, and plays directly into the delaying tactics of the government. To wit, there are credible allegations of government operations in Darfur to tidy things up ahead of international monitoring - such as the emptying of mass graves and hiding of bodies. 

Once the Darfur ceasefire is implemented, and the situation on the ground can be said to be improving, a number of critical steps must be taken by the US government to give the political negotiations a chance of success. First and foremost, the venue of the Darfur talks must be shifted from Chad - which has proven itself once again to be an impartial and biased mediator in favour of the government - to a more neutral venue, such as Nairobi or the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. Unlike Chad, the AU is a more neutral and capable mediator, provides a direct link to the IGAD countries already involved in the government/SPLA negotiations, and with the strong support of the international community - as in the case of IGAD - AU led mediation could succeed in bringing a political settlement to the war in Darfur.

Secondly, the Darfur political negotiations must go ahead regardless of the outcome of the IGAD talks - be it a comprehensive agreement being signed, or a further string of delays and disappointment from Naivasha. The international community must have a clearer picture of what can be achieved from these talks, such as that laid out above, and must play a more constructive and direct role than in the humanitarian negotiations in Chad in early April, where the Chadian President was largely able to push through his own biased agenda despite the international presence. 
 

By Riad Khawaj, Defense News, Special permission to S.T. 

Dubai, March 29, 2004 -- the Sudanese Air Force has started taking delivery of a dozen MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters purchased from Russia in December 2001, according to official and industry sources in the region. 
"The first pair of MiG 29 jets reached Sudan last December, and two more were delivered in January. The rest are expected to reach Sudan during this year" said a Sudanese military official. 
The exact value of the deal was not revealed but industry and diplomatic sources here have estimated the contract to be worth around $370 million, a lot of money to a nation overwhelmed with poverty and debt. 
"Sudanese leadership cares a lot about national and regional prestige," said Ahmed Qurashi, a Dubai based expert on Sudanese affairs. "The leadership wants to be perceived as strong and capable of facing military threats from inside and outside". 
But Sudan's leaders lack cash and are facing an arms embargo imposed by the United Sates and the European countries after Washington placed it on lists of states supporting terrorism and building weapons of mass destruction, Qurashi said. 
China and Russia have been the two major sources of weapons to Sudan in the past decade. 
"But Sudan is hoping to get promised military aid from the United States if it fulfills a pledge to combat Islamic terrorists and end the civil war," Qurashi said. 
The MiG-29 deal is Sudan's first military jet purchase since 1996, and the largest in recent years. The country also bought tanks and artillery from Russia in 2000. 
The Sudanese Air Force has 51 aging fighters, including nine Northrop Grumman F-5E/F Tigers, 27 Chinese J-5, J-6 and F-7 planes, and three Russian MIG-23s. 
The Sudanese military official said the MIG-29s would be used as a fighter and ground-attack jet. 
Russian Aircraft Building Corp MiG refused to comment on the Sudanese deal. However the MiG-29 is the multipurpose model of the Fulcrum, which was originally built as an interceptor. 
Sudan has been torn apart by the 14-years civil war between the oil-rich and predominantly Christian southern tribes and the predominantly Islamic central government in the north. 
Discussion in the neighboring Kenyan capital of Nairobi between the Sudanese warring factions have yet to yield tangible results, despite extensive mediations by various international parties, including the United States. 
Badly trained and poorly equipped, Sudanese government troops have been incapable of crushing insurgents in southern Sudan, and have lost control over many vital parts of the country. 
"Sudanese rebels have the support of the local community and belong to tribes that dominate vast territory in the south, and get arms from neighboring countries like Eritrean and Uganda, and that's mainly why the Sudanese Armed Forces have failed to defeat the southern insurgents," Qurashi said. 
"Do not believe the MiG-29s would make much difference to the course of the battles with southern rebels," he said "Air power has had little significance in the civil war, due to the fact that the insurgents have anti-aircraft guns and missiles, which proved effective against Sudanese jets that lack standoff weapons". 
But the domestic situation might not be the only motivation for Khartoum to acquire the jets. 
"Sudan has ongoing border disputes with almost all its neighbors, like Egypt, Uganda, Libya, Eritrea and Kenya, and these disputes have occasionally sparked border clashes" Qurashi said. 
Lyubov Pronina contributed to this report from Moscow.

An inter-religious committee to foster dialogue between the different religions in Sudan was formed on Thursday, March 25, 2004. 
The committee, constituted in the warring south, has the duty to ensure that the tribal conflict there does not degenerate into a religious one. 
Speaking during the regional Interfaith Peace Summit for Africa, held in Nairobi from March 27-29, 2004, Rev Samuel Ador from Sudan said that the war in Sudan is about identification. 
He said that although the council was still new, it had managed to lay down its objectives. 
"The main objective of this committee is to promote religious freedom and ensure nobody will be victimised for their religion," he said. 
Bishop Daniel Deng, President of the Sudanese Anglican Bishops' Conference, said that the war in his country was about declaring the country an Islamic state. 
"Sudan is ruled by minority north, while the southerners, who make 70 % of the country's population, have nothing to say about the running of their country, hence the reason of the unrest," he said

OP-ED COLUMNIST 
By NICHOLAS D. KR

LONG THE CHAD-SUDAN BORDER — For decades, whenever the topic of genocide has come up, the refrain has been, "Never again."

Yet right now, the government of Sudan is engaging in genocide against three large African tribes in its Darfur region here. Some 1,000 people are being killed a week, tribeswomen are being systematically raped, 700,000 people have been driven from their homes, and Sudan's Army is even bombing the survivors.

And the world yawns.

So what do we tell refugees like Muhammad Yakob Hussein, who lives in the open desert here because his home was burned and his family members killed in Sudan? He now risks being shot whenever he goes to a well to fetch water. Do we advise such refugees that "never again" meant nothing more than that a Führer named Hitler will never again construct death camps in Germany?

Interviews with refugees like Mr. Hussein — as well as with aid workers and U.N. officials — leave no doubt that attacks in Darfur are not simply random atrocities. Rather, as a senior U.N. official, Mukesh Kapila, put it, "It is an organized attempt to do away with a group of people."

"All I have left is this jalabiya," or cloak, said Mr. Hussein, who claimed to be 70 but looked younger (ages here tend to be vague aspirations, and they usually emerge in multiples of 10). Mr. Hussein said he'd fled three days earlier after an attack in which his three brothers were killed and all his livestock stolen: "Everything is lost. They burned everything."

Another man, Khamis Muhammad Issa, a strapping 21-year-old, was left with something more than his clothes — a bullet in the back. He showed me the bulge of the bullet under the skin. The bullet wiggled under my touch.

"They came in the night and burned my village," he said. "I was running away and they fired. I fell, and they thought I was dead."

In my last column, I called these actions "ethnic cleansing." But let's be blunt: Sudan's behavior also easily meets the definition of genocide in Article 2 of the 1948 convention against genocide. That convention not only authorizes but also obligates the nations ratifying it — including the U.S. — to stand up to genocide.

The killings are being orchestrated by the Arab-dominated Sudanese government, partly through the Janjaweed militia, made up of Arab raiders armed by the government. The victims are non-Arabs: blacks in the Zaghawa, Massaliet and Fur tribes. "The Arabs want to get rid of anyone with black skin," Youssef Yakob Abdullah said. In the area of Darfur that he fled, "there are no blacks left," he said.

In Darfur, the fighting is not over religion, for the victims as well as the killers are Muslims. It is more ethnic and racial, reflecting some of the ancient tension between herdsmen (the Arabs in Darfur) and farmers (the black Africans, although they herd as well). The Arabs and non-Arabs compete for water and forage, made scarce by environmental degradation and the spread of the desert.

In her superb book on the history of genocide, "A Problem from Hell," Samantha Power focuses on the astonishing fact that U.S. leaders always denounce massacres in the abstract or after they are over — but, until Kosovo, never intervened in the 20th century to stop genocide and "rarely even made a point of condemning it as it occurred." The U.S. excuses now are the same ones we used when Armenians were killed in 1915 and Bosnians and Rwandans died in the 1990's: the bloodshed is in a remote area; we have other priorities; standing up for the victims may compromise other foreign policy interests.

I'm not arguing that we should invade Sudan. But one of the lessons of history is that very modest efforts can save large numbers of lives. Nothing is so effective in curbing ethnic cleansing as calling attention to it.

President Bush could mention Darfur or meet a refugee. The deputy secretary of state could visit the border areas here in Chad. We could raise the issue before the U.N. And the onus is not just on the U.S.: it's shameful that African and Muslim countries don't offer at least a whisper of protest at the slaughter of fellow Africans and Muslims. 

Are the world's pledges of "never again" really going to ring hollow one more time? 
 

On 20 March, Hassan Haroun Adam was sentenced to "cross-amputation" (amputation of the right hand and left foot) by a Specialized Criminal Court in Nyala, South Darfur, Western Sudan. Such a punishment constitutes torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, in contravention of international human rights standards ratified by Sudan. 

Hassan Haroun Adam pleaded not guilty of armed robbery, but was convicted under Article 168 of the Penal Code. He was convicted on the evidence of two witnesses, who were not cross examined as Hassan Haroun Adam did not have a defence lawyer. The court has appointed a lawyer for him, who is preparing an appeal. 

Hassan Haroun Adam was arrested on 21 November 2003 in Nyala along with Ibrahim Ishag, following the armed robbery of a lorry outside Nyala, in which one person was shot dead and two people injured. Hassan Haroun Adam and Ibrahim Ishag were arrested and taken to South Nyala police station where they were reportedly severely tortured and denied access to their families or to a lawyer. They were then transferred to Nyala prison on 27 November 2003. 

Ibrahim Ishag was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment in March 2004. 

BACKGROUND INFORMATION In the states of North, West and South Darfur, in western Sudan, Special Courts were set up by decrees in 2001 following a declaration of a State of Emergency in the region. The Special Courts are headed by one civilian and two military judges who do not need to have any legal qualifications. Whilst Special Courts still operate in North and West Darfur, Special Courts in South Darfur were replaced by Specialized Criminal Courts in April 2003, with broadly similar jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Special Courts and the Specialized Criminal Courts in Darfur covers a wide range of offences including armed robbery and haraba (banditry). Under Article 5(g) of Decree No. 21, "lawyers have no right to appear before the courts to represent the accused. The friend of a defendant can appear instead to provide help before the court". Sentences over five years' imprisonment can be appealed within seven days to the Darfur Court of Appeal, whose verdict is final, except in cases involving amputation and the death penalty, which may be appealed to the Supreme Court in Khartoum and the Constitutional Court, which has sometimes overturned cases because of unfairness. 

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Please send appeals to arrive as quickly as possible, in Arabic or English or your own language: - expressing grave concern over the imposition of the sentence of cross-amputation on Hassan Haroun Adam; - explaining that this sentence constitutes torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, which contravenes Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Sudan is a party; - calling for the sentence of cross-amputation to be set aside immediately; - expressing grave concern over the allegations of torture of Hassan Haroun Adam and Ibrahim Ishag, which violates Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Sudan is a party, as well as Article 115.2 of the 1991 Sudan Penal Code; 

Recommended action continued overleaf 

- calling on the authorities to launch an immediate investigation into the allegations of torture of Hassan Haroun Adam and Ibrahim Ishag and to ensure that any member of the Nyala police found to have committed torture is brought to justice in accordance with international standards of fair trial; - calling on the Sudan government to amend the 2001 Presidential decrees that led to the creation of the Special Courts and the Specialized Criminal Courts in Darfur to ensure that they operate according to internationally recognised standards of justice and fair trial as outlined in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
 

(New York, February 20, 2004) - In nominating Louise Arbour today as the next U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has chosen a skilled jurist and principled advocate, Human Rights Watch said

Currently a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Arbour served as the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda from 1996 to 1999. Arbour was particularly effective in persuading the international community to execute arrest warrants for war criminals indicted by the tribunals.

"Justice Arbour is the embodiment of what is needed for this job," said Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. "She combines the human rights experience, international standing and moral stature needed to confront the worst and most powerful abusers."

Arbour takes office at a particularly difficult moment for human rights within the United Nations system. Around the world, human rights are being assailed in the name of the international campaign against terrorism. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the highest international body devoted to human rights, has been plagued by a deepening crisis as it now counts some of world's worst human rights abusers among its members. Meanwhile, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights is still recovering from the tragic death of its previous chief, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was killed in the August 19 attack on U.N. headquarters in Baghdad.

"The U.N. human rights system could not hope for a better leader at a time that it is under unprecedented attack," said Roth.

Human Rights Watch called on Arbour to make these challenges to human rights a first priority during her tenure. In particular, she should press for the creation of an independent mechanism-such as a U.N. special rapporteur- to monitor how governments are using the fight against terrorism as an excuse to undermine human rights worldwide.
 

Sudan 

For the first time in years, many dare to hope that the 20-year civil war in Sudan, which has claimed the lives of at least two million people and forced millions of others from their homes, may end soon. Sudan's warring parties have spent the last 18 months discussing how to stop fighting and build peace in their country. After a break of a few weeks, they are to resume their discussions on 17 February, in what analysts say could mark the last stage of peace negotiations and lead to the signing of a comprehensive agreement that should usher in a new era of peace and stability in the East Africa country.
In a series of five in-depth articles, IRIN focuses on the implications of the prospective peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the main rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The series, which will be published over a two-month period, examines the prospects for stability in Sudan once the peace agreement is signed.
The first article provides an overview of the Sudanese situation. Others will  focus on the continuing conflict in Darfur, internal displacement, humanitarian access and the spill-over of refugees into Chad; the perspectives of various sectors in the north, west and south on prospects for lasting peace;  and a regional assessment of what the proposed peace deal would mean for Sudan's neighbours, such as Uganda and Eritrea.
As the Sudanese government and the main rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) prepare to resume their meetings on 17 February for what many hope will mark the final stage of their 18-month peace process, rumblings of discontent in some parts of the country could have far-reaching repercussions on the gains already made during their talks in Kenya.
Bitter foes, the government and the SPLM/A are tentatively reaching agreement on hitherto inadmissible topics, and hopes are high that a comprehensive peace deal will finally put an end to a continuous and devastating 20-year civil war, during which about 2 million people have lost their lives, and millions more their homes, livelihoods and even their country.

At war since 1956

As the Horn of Africa analyst, Dan Connell, notes, Sudan has been at war with itself since the day it emerged from colonial rule in 1956. By then, the stage for conflict had already been set by the British and the Egyptians by way of a scenario of glaring inequalities between the north and the south, with much of the country's resources and the instruments of policy-making concentrated in the Arab north. In such a context, the mostly Christian and animist southerners took up arms to fight against the imbalance. 
There has been almost constant conflict, alleviated only by an 11-year hiatus from 1972 when a peace deal gave southerners limited regional autonomy. But fighting, led by the SPLM/A, resumed in 1983 after the then president, Ja'far Numayri, dissolved the regional government and imposed Islamic shari'ah law nationwide. 
He was overthrown in 1985 in a military coup led by Lt-Gen Siwar al-Dhahab, who dissolved Numayri's ruling Sudanese Socialist Union, then paved the way for a return to civilian rule by way of elections in 1986, which brought to power Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ummah Party, as prime minister. Al-Mahdi was in turn deposed in 1989 in another military coup, this time led by the current president, Lt-Gen Umar Hasan al-Bashir.

The peace deal in a nutshell 

Since 1994, the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had been attempting to broker peace between the SPLM/A and the government, but its efforts failed until a breakthrough was made in 2002, leading to the landmark Machakos Protocol signed in Kenya on 20 July. 
This success is partly due to the stewardship of the process by the chief mediator, Kenya's Gen Lazarus Sumbeiywo, but also because each side acknowledged the other's chief concern - the SPLM/A's demand for a referendum on self-determination after a six-and-a-half-year interim period, and Khartoum's insistence on retaining shari'ah law in areas under its control. The result was a momentum to move forward.
In October 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on a cessation of hostilities for the duration of the talks and, in the course of the negotiations, momentous accords were reached on key issues.
These included security arrangements for the interim period (which provide for the deployment of joint units in some areas) and agreement on wealth-sharing (under which oil revenue will be equally split between the south and the north, and a dual banking system will be in operation).
The talks have been given added weight by face-to-face meetings in the Kenyan Rift Valley town of Naivasha between the SPLM/A leader, John Garang, and Sudanese First Vice-President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha. Both sides have made references to the irreversibility of the process.
Remaining sticking points include the status of three disputed regions: southern Blue Nile, the Nuba mountains and Abyei, which are technically in the north, but whose inhabitants, according to the SPLM/A, identify with the south. Progress has been made on > southern Blue Nile and the Nuba mountains, but observers say Abyei is particularly problematic because of its large oil reserves and rich pasture lands. The issue of power-sharing during the interim period also remains unresolved.

Humanitarian devastation 

A probable peace deal between the government and the SPLM/A does not mean that Sudan's overwhelming humanitarian problems will be at an end. Instead, many of the burdens will be concentrated within the country as millions of displaced people try to regain their homes, and hundreds of thousands of refugees start streaming back. 
They will be returning to a country ripped apart by years of war and neglect. A massive rehabilitation programme will be needed for the south  - an infrastructure will have to be built, services extended to the area, and people will have to learn how to live in peacetime rather than wartime. 
Sudan's vast oil wealth is due to be divided equally between the north and south. With production currently standing at 250,000 barrels a day and set to rise, oil revenue will undoubtedly bring some benefits to the long-suffering people. But observers note that billions more dollars will be needed for the reconstruction of the south.
Sudan already hosts about 320,000 refugees, many of them from Eritrea - Africa's longest-running refugee caseload. But tense relations between the two neighbours and the closure of their common border have posed problems for an ongoing repatriation exercise after the UN High Commissioner for Refugees declared an end to refugee status for Eritreans in Sudan in 2002. Conflict in the Gambella region of western Ethiopia has led to a further 5,000 refugees fleeing into the Pachala area of Sudan's Upper Nile region over the last few weeks.
Meanwhile, it is the outbreak in western Sudan of another civil war that is giving the most serious cause for concern, threatening as it to  torpedo any peace gains. As the Kenya talks made headway, intense fighting between the government and rebels in the Darfur region of western Sudan led to the deaths of several thousand people and the displacement of 670,000 more. Over 100,000 have fled into neighbouring Chad and are living in pitiful conditions. 
Their flight did not lead them to safety. International aid agencies and journalists reported Sudanese government aerial bombardments of the Chadian side of the border, as the authorities attempted to gain control of the situation in Darfur. Incursions by mounted Arab militiamen, known as the Janjawid and believed to enjoy the support of the government, have been a daily fear for most Darfur civilians, who have long complained of neglect by Khartoum.
The Chadian government is attempting to mediate between the rebels and the government, but the rebels - represented by two groups known as the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement - are suspicious of its proximity to the Sudanese authorities.

The East – West threat 

Unless the situation in Darfur is addressed, there is a very real threat that the north-south problem will simply be replaced by an east-west conundrum. Most sides outside the SPLM/A and the government feel marginalised by the peace process. The leaders of the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government both come from powerful circles, but nevertheless represent only a section of their respective regions. And with a full-blown war in the west, and rumblings of disquiet in the east, the chances of conflict on a different axis are strong.
"The lack of meaningful participation of opposition groups can threaten the entire structure," the International Crisis Group (ICG) think-tank has warned. "Unless Chad's mediation on Darfur is first linked to the IGAD process, agreement between the government and SPLA on how to divide the power and wealth 'pie' could exacerbate the conflict in Darfur."
Disgruntled rebel groups in the west and the east have already joined forces to eradicate "marginalisation, poverty, ignorance and backwardness". Darfur's SLA and the Eritrea-based Beja Congress in the east say their grievances are essentially the same and they will confront the government on the same platform. The Beja Congress has even warned of an escalation of fighting in the east unless its concerns are addressed and the government ceases seeking "partial solutions" to Sudan's problems.
Indeed, the ICG has spoken of a "reactivation" of the eastern front under the banner of the opposition umbrella group, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). It notes that indigenous groups such as the Beja Congress, the Rasha'idah Free Lions and the Fatah Forces have a few hundred fighters each, "but more than compensate for numerical weakness by intimate knowledge of the terrain and support from indigenous communities". 
These groups want direct access to the negotiations, rather than simply being "represented" by the SPLM/A, which is the largest group within the NDA. A crucial issue now is the implementation of last December's Jiddah accord, which provides for power-sharing between the government and the NDA, and which some observers see as an indication that the authorities want to involve the Alliance in the political reform process.

Regional concerns 

The Sudan peace process, of course, cannot be conducted in isolation. The largest country on the continent has borders with nine nations, most of which will undoubtedly be affected by the outcome of the process. Many hope the prospect of peace will have a positive impact on a volatile region. But this may not always be the case.
Egypt, jealously protecting its vanguard position on the Nile, opposes a divided Sudan, which would create a new state on the river. Rebels in northern Uganda risk losing support from Khartoum.
Subregional groupings outside the aegis of IGAD are springing up. Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen across the Bab al-Mandab strait have formed a strategic alliance, aimed they say at enhancing regional cooperation and facilitating exchanges. Eritrea - which has had disputes with all three nations and whose borders with Sudan and Ethiopia are closed - calls it an "axis of belligerence". The three deny they are attempting to isolate the tiny Red Sea state and have even called on it to join them.
Eritrea, which hosts Sudanese opposition groups, has accused Khartoum of backing the extremist Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), saying that the EIJM has been carrying out attacks on its territory from eastern Sudan. Khartoum denies the charges.
Analysts note that in the Horn in particular, a settlement of the Sudan issue could lead to a general release of tension and a change in the international community's hitherto detached attitude towards the region.

Prospects

The Sudan peace process has received a tremendous boost from direct US involvement, and independent observers are optimistic that a deal will be reached between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A. They warn, however, that this progress will be minimised if the violence in the west is allowed to continue unchecked. 
"It would be a terrible tragedy if peace in the south were to be achieved just as Sudan enters a new and equally vicious war in Darfur," says Justice Africa, a UK-based think-tank. "As well as humanitarian assistance, the Darfur war needs immediate political attention by the international community."
Many observers agree that both the government and the SPLM/A should commit themselves to a peaceful settlement of the Darfur crisis, and that this should be enshrined in the comprehensive peace agreement.
Noting the international community's support for the IGAD-led process, the ICG urges formally linking the process to the Darfur peace negotiations in Chad "to ensure that an end to conflict in the south does not become the catalyst for a new bloody chapter in the west". 
Other issues also need to be resolved, such as south-south and north-north reconciliation, and human rights questions. The most critical factor will be the actual implementation of the final peace accord.
"It is crucially important that the international community and Sudanese civil society remain closely and constructively engaged with ensuring that the transition to peace is successfully completed, and the parallel transition to democracy is also effectively undertaken," Justice Africa stresses.

UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 
ANALYSIS
February 16, 2004 – IRIN 

A year-old conflict pitting rebels against government forces and militia groups in the Darfur states of western Sudan has created a humanitarian crisis that has spilled over into neighbouring Chad, as well as concerns among some observers about the region's stability. 

These concerns are rooted in the fact that cross-border ethnic solidarity in the region is a more powerful force than nationality. Since July, more than 110,000 Sudanese refugees have crossed the largely unguarded 1,350-km border separating the two countries. 

But Chad is much more than a passive host to the fleeing victims of one of Africa's newest wars, which began in February 2003 when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), rose up to push their political and economic agendas. 

At the same time as playing mediator between Khartoum and the rebels, Chad has openly supplied troops to the Sudanese army in Darfur. But, covertly, it also serves as a conduit for arms that are fuelling the war, as an arena for Sudanese militias pursuing the refugees across the border, and as a refuge or assembly point for rebels and their families, say observers. 

Different ethnic groups in Chad may also be supplying both the SLA and JEM, as well as the militias aligned to the Sudanese government, with manpower. 

These murky and often conflicting roles threaten not only to destabilise the current relative peace in Chad but may also lead to a regional war fought along ethnic lines, say observers. "It's a tribal war that has become a problem between the two countries," commented a former army officer and Zaghawah business man in the Chadian capital, N'Djamena. 

MEDIATING ROLE 

Chad mediated talks between the government of Sudan and the SLA, resulting in a nominal ceasefire from September to December. 

Chadian President Idriss Deby, himself a Zaghawah, was thought to be a good choice as mediator because of his shared ethnicity with many of the rebels, his deep-rooted connections with and knowledge of Darfur, and his support base there which allowed him - with Khartoum's knowledge - to launch a coup from the region in 1990. (His predecessor, Hissene Habre, also launched his takeover from Darfur in 1982).

But a chorus of voices has long questioned his impartiality. 

After the SLA and JEM emerged in February 2003 demanding political and economic rights, Deby committed himself to cooperating militarily with Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir to crush them. He officially sent 500 troops to take part in joint army operations in Sudan, but commentators later suggested that the real figure was close to 2,000, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG) think-tank. 

Sudanese Interior Minister Gen Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn announced to parliament in May that Chad had also contributed three helicopters and 17 vehicles to the same campaign. 

When the time came to extend the 45-day September ceasefire agreement with the SLA, the Chadian government deported 35 Darfurian intellectuals who had arrived in N'Djamena, to advise the politically inexperienced rebels, ICG reported. 

Deby then signed an agreement with Khartoum in November to establish a joint task force to curb cross-border attacks and smuggling, a deal which also allowed for the extradition of armed groups from Chad. 

In fact, the remoteness of the 1,350-km border with Sudan allows not only the militias to regularly attack refugees on Chadian territory but also the rebels to freely cross between the two countries. JEM rebels, whose wives and families are among the refugees, reportedly often cross the border into the Chadian half of the border town of Tine (Tine Chad) to assemble. One local humanitarian source told IRIN he saw a convoy of them leave the town for Sudan in about 20 lorries at the end of January. 

But Deby's perceived bias has led both rebel groups to demand the presence of "international" observers as a precondition to any peace negotiations. 

"They [Chadians] don't have the authority to compel the Sudanese government to act," JEM spokesman Abu Bakr Hamid al-Nur, told IRIN in Tine Chad, adding that observers from the UK, US, France or neighbouring African countries should be involved in future talks. 

"Even the Sudanese don't believe in the Chadian mediating role," said Dobian Assingar, the vice-president of the International Federation for Human Rights in Chad and president of the Chadian League for Human Rights. "Sudan doesn't believe in the mediation efforts started by Chad. Chad knows that Sudan doesn't believe in it, but is trying to continue to give itself a good image." 

ETHNIC TIES ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDER 

According to the last Chadian census in 1993, of the 16 ethnic groups that straddle the border, 78,000 Zaghawah, 50,000 Masalit and over 760,000 members of nomadic Arab tribes live in Chad. The Sudanese counterparts of all these groups are prime movers in the Darfur conflict. 

The groups share common resources, history, culture, family ties, and remain close, with a great degree of toing and froing across the dividing line. In Tine, just a dry river bed separates the Chadian and Sudanese Zaghawah, allowing them to share both water points and marriage ties. 

"Even we can't distinguish between them. A man can have two wives, one in Chad, one in Sudan," a local official with the Chadian Red Cross, Abu Bakr Muhammad Sha'ib, told IRIN. 

The ethnic nature of the devastating attacks in Darfur, in which mainly the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawah - from which the rebels emerged - are systematically being attacked, killed, forced off their land, abducted and raped by Arab militias and the Sudanese army, means that emotions are running high among their Chadian neighbours. 

In both Darfur and Chad, numerous people told IRIN that kin on the Chadian side of the border were helping their "brothers" in Sudan, with Chadian Arabs - travelling from as far away as Biltine and Ati - helping the militias, and the Zaghawah helping the rebels. 

(Many of the Zaghawah refugees who have fled from Darfur are actually Chadians who fled to Sudan to escape Chad's incessant civil wars and insurrections since independence in 1960.) 

The vice-chairman of the exiled political and military movement, the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance, Dr Sharif Harir, who is from Darfur, told IRIN that social systems in the region were built on "kinship and blood" and that there was an obligation to help one other. 

"The Arabs come from Chad and join their brothers in Sudan. Their goal is to form Arab unity," said Abd al-Karim Abbakar Anaw, a Sudanese chief, now a refugee in Kourbileke on the Chadian side of the border. "When the rebels catch the Arabs, they tell them they're from Chad." 

A local aid worker in Tine Chad told IRIN there was no doubt that some Zaghawah from Chad were also helping their neighbours. "The locals are more than angry, because they are relatives. They have relatives in Sudan - fathers, brothers, uncles and they are all coming back wounded." 

"It's a tribal problem. Black with black, Arab with Arab. We are neighbours, one brother is here, one brother is there. Without doubt if the brother is a victim of aggression, the other will come to help," said a Sudanese teacher in Kourbileke, Muhammad Husayn Ali. He said up to 2,000 Zaghawah from Chad were currently helping the rebels in Darfur. 

A local source from the Chadian town of Guereda told IRIN that of 180 Zaghawah from the area had gone to Darfur to fight last December, only 15 had returned alive. 

Proof is hard to come by, rumours are rife, and the various groups involved in the fighting are quick to accuse their enemies of receiving outside help. "It's an open question to what degree the Chadian Zaghawah are helping. Also whether the Arabs are doing the same. The Arabs in Chad don't necessarily want to be used by Khartoum," commented a regional analyst. He warned that significant involvement of Chadian counterparts in Darfur would "lead to a parallel face-off and more cross-border attacks". 

Whether or not they are supplying manpower, at the very least the influential Zaghawah business community in Sudan, Chad and elsewhere is supporting the rebels financially, say observers. 

"There were contributions here [N'Djamena] to help our brothers in Darfur," a Zaghawah businessman who was formerly an army officer told IRIN. "Some of them [the rebels] came here to N'Djamena to procure arms. I don't know how much we collected, but it's true that Chad is supporting Darfur." 

There are also suggestions that the Darfur rebels may enjoy significant support from the Zaghawah - many of them Sudanese - who dominate Chad's top army brass and upper ranks of the presidential guard. 

"Certain elements of the presidential guard of President Deby may be participating in the conflict, because the rebels are their cousins," said a senior army officer. "You have to understand that the Zaghawah officers are the biggest group in the army with arms and men under them," he added. 

DEBY'S PRECARIOUS BALANCING ACT 

According to observers, Deby is caught between his ethic affinity with his minority Zaghawah support base in Sudan and Chad - which put him into power - and his relationship with militarily powerful Khartoum. 

In recent months, his position has become increasingly precarious, not least following the judicial executions in November of four men convicted of the murder in Chad of a Sudanese member of parliament and head of the Chad Petroleum Company, who was also reportedly close to Bashir. 

The man found guilty of masterminding the killing, a prominent Zaghawah, had expected impunity and appealed for a presidential pardon. But Deby, who was involved in mediating in Darfur at the time, decided his interests lay more with Sudan, a regional analyst told IRIN. So the execution was carried out within weeks of the verdict, and for the first time since 1991. 
In a country rife with cronyism among the Zaghawah elite, "it is very rare for a Zaghawah to be prosecuted and punished for anything", said the analyst. "The Zaghawah have come to expect impunity." 

The ruling against his kin alienated many of Deby's supporters, who believe their backing of his 1990 coup obliges him to help them in their struggle against Khartoum. 

But maintaining good relations with Sudan, at least on the surface, has taken precedence, say observers. 

When Sudanese bombs were dropped on the border town of Tine Chad, killing three and injuring 15 Chadian civilians on 29 January, the Chadian government was at pains to play down the "incident". Chad's foreign minister, Nagoum Yamassoum, reportedly said it was "in no way a deliberate act". "We do not want to speak of a deliberate act of provocation to bring the war towards Chad."

Speaking about Darfur a day later on national radio, Deby placed the blame for Darfur's woes on the rebels. "The rebels have to accept the rule of law in order for Darfur to become peaceful," he said. 

"He [Deby] can't afford a falling-out with Sudan," said a regional analyst. "If he supports his clansmen openly, Sudan will come down on him like a tonne of bricks. If he does it covertly, he risks taking the war home with him." 

If a regional war broke out, it is not clear whether Deby - whose health is increasingly bad - would survive politically, he continued. 

Deby is also mindful, according to some analysts, that if he upsets Khartoum, Chadian rebels based in Sudan might enjoy increased support from their hosts. According to Africa Confidential, Sudan is already backing several hundred Chadian fighters based in the Darfur region. 

So the "balancing act" continues. 

"Both countries deal hypocritically with each other. They refuse to say it officially, but each is using rebels [the Darfur rebels and the militias] to attack the other," said Assingar, the Chadian human rights activist. 

"I am scared that the conflict will destabilise the relative peace we have in Chad now, and I call on both countries to stop their hypocrisy and to avoid a war that will cause thousands of deaths for nothing." 

(IRIN, Nairobi, 25 February 2004) - 

1955 - Disorder breaks out in the south on the eve of independence. 

1956 - Sudan becomes independent. 

1958 - Gen Ibrahim Abbud leads military coup against the civilian government elected earlier in the year. 

1962 - Anya Nya movement assumes control of southern revolt. 

1964 - The "October Revolution" overthrows Abbud and a national government is established. 

1969 - Ja'far Numayri leads the "May Revolution" military coup. 

1972 - Under the Addis Ababa peace agreement between the government and the Anya Nya the south becomes a self-governing region. 

1978 - Oil discovered in Bentiu in southern Sudan. 

1983 - Numayri divides the south into three regions. Islamic shari'ah imposed in the north. Civil war breaks out again in the south involving government forces and the newly formed Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by John Garang.

1985 - Numayri is deposed in a bloodless military coup by a group of military officers and a Transitional Military Council set up to rule the country. 

1986 - Coalition government formed after general elections, with Sadiq al-Mahdi as prime minister. 

1988 - Coalition partner the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) reaches ceasefire agreement with the SPLM/A, but it is not implemented. 

1989 - Operation Lifeline Sudan established. Sadiq al-Mahdi accepts DUP-SPLM/A agreement. Sadiq al-Mahdi is deposed in a bloodless military coup led by Brig (later Lt-Gen) Umar Hasan al-Bashir, who rules through Revolution Command Council (RCC). 

1991 - SPLM/A splits into two factions with John Garang supporting a united Sudan and Riek Machar, Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong Chuol, who support southern succession, breaking away to form SPLM/A-Nasir faction.

1992 - Nigerian peace conferences (Abuja I and II) held, but little progress made. 

1993 - RCC dissolved after Umar Hasan al-Bashir is appointed president. 

1994 - Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) starts peace process and establishes a Declaration of Principles (DoP). 

1995 - Egyptian President Husni Mubarak accuses Sudan of being involved in an attempt to assassinate him in Addis Ababa. 

1995 - Asmara Declaration of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) acknowledges right of southern Sudan to self-determination and calls for separation of state and religion and armed struggle to overthrow the ruling National Islamic Front regime. 

1997 - Sudanese government accepts IGAD DoP and agrees to discuss self-determination for the south. Khartoum Peace Agreement signed between the government, the South Sudan Independence Movement of Riek Machar and other rebel factions. 

1998 - Ethiopian-Eritrean war breaks out, reducing conflict with Sudan. USA launches cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, alleging that it was making materials for chemical weapons. 

1999 - Bashir dissolves the National Assembly and declares a state of emergency following a power struggle with parliamentary Speaker Hasan al-Turabi. 

1999 - Sudan begins to export oil. 

2000 October - IGAD Lake Bogoria, Kenya, talks. 

2001 February - Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi arrested and placed under house arrest a day after his party, the Popular National Congress, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the SPLM/A. 

2001 July - Joint Libyan-Egyptian Initiative establishes a DoP calling for an all-party transitional government, but does not deal with the issue of self-determination for the south. Sudanese government accepts DoP without reservation and SPLM/A accepts with conditions. 

2001 September - UN Security Council lifts largely symbolic sanctions against Sudan which involved a ban on diplomatic travel. They were imposed in 1996 over accusations that Sudan harboured suspects in an attempt on the life of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, but US continues its sanctions. 

2001 October - US President George W. Bush names Senator John Danforth as special envoy to try help end Sudanese conflict. 

2001 November - US extends unilateral sanctions against Sudan, citing its record on terrorism and rights violations. 

2002 January - The government and the SPLM/A sign a landmark ceasefire agreement providing for a six-month renewable ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains region of south-central Sudan. 

2002 January - Riek Machar realigns part of his Sudan People's Democratic Forces with SPLM/A.

2002 July - After weeks of talks in Kenya, the government and the SPLM/A sign the Machakos protocol covering self-determination for the south, state and religion and ending the 19-year civil war. Under the agreement, southern Sudan will be able to hold an independence referendum after a six-and-a-half-year power-sharing transition period, while the north is allowed to keep shari'ah law. 

2002 July - President al-Bashir and SPLM/A leader Garang meet face to face for the first time, through the mediation of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. 

2002 September - Government breaks off talks, saying the SPLM/A's seizure of the southern town of Torit spoiled the atmosphere of talks, and that the SPLM/A had reopened the issue of the separation of state and religion by demanding that Khartoum be shari'ah free. 

2002 October - The government and the SPLM/A sign an MoU, agreeing to resume talks, and to implement a cessation of hostilities for the duration of talks. Talks resume. 

2002 November - Cessation of hostilities agreement extended. MoU signed on 'Aspects of Structures of Government'. Talks adjourned until January 2003. 

2003 January - Talks resume in Nairobi suburb of Karen. Plans also made for a separate symposium to be held dealing with the issue of the disputed border territories of southern Blue Nile, Abyei, and the Nuba Mountains. 

2003 January - UN negotiates separate bilateral agreements with the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid into the disputed region of southern Blue Nile for the first time. 

2003 February - Government, rebels sign addendum to MoU on cessation of hostilities. 

2003 February - A new rebel group calling itself the Front for the Liberation of Darfur is launched. Justice and Equality Movement rebels also emerge. Government retaliates and Darfur crisis begins.

2003 March - Darfur rebels adopt new name: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). 

2003 March - Talks held on the three disputed border regions of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and southern Blue Nile. 

2003 April - SPLM/A and government agree to the opening of corridor along River Nile to facilitate humanitarian access.

2003 May - Talks resume with the signing of partnership agreement on administrative arrangements for the transition period, which outlines specific measures necessary for building up the humanitarian, security and development needs of southern Sudan during the first six months of the transitional period. 

2003 June - Crisis in Darfur begins to seriously deteriorate with widespread displacement, refugees fleeing into Chad, killing and burning down of villages by government-allied militias.

2003 August - The worst flooding in 70 years hits Kassala region, eastern Sudan.

2003 September - Government and SPLM/A sign security deal, clearing major stumbling block to peace talks. Government and the SLM/A sign cease fire agreement, brokered by Chad, to pave way for peace talks on Darfur.

2003 October - Government releases Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi. 

2003 October - Lam Akol merges SPLM/A-United faction with SPLM/A.

2003 October - Government and SLM/A agree to extend ceasefire while they pursue negotiations in neighbouring Chad.

2003 November - Concern  mounts over worsening Darfur humanitarian crisis. UN says Sudanese government is hampering humanitarian intervention by reneging on a pledge to process aid workers' travel permits speedily.

2003 December - Government and SPLM/A negotiators agree in principle on sharing oil revenues.

2003 December - Peace talks between government and SLA, brokered by Chad, break down indefinitely amid mutual recriminations. Security situation in Darfur deteriorates significantly as a result.

2003 December - SPLM/A sends the first-ever high-profile "goodwill delegation" to meet government officials in Khartoum.

2004 January - Government and SPLM/A sign accord on sharing the country's wealth during the six-and-a-half-year transitional period to follow signing of a peace deal. 

2004 January - Peace talks with SPLM/A adjourned for three weeks to allow government delegates to perform the Muslim pilgrimage, the hajj.

2004 January - Daily bombing raids on villages in Darfur killing hundreds of civilians and causing thousands more to flee across the border into neighbouring Chad. Sudanese bombs fall on the Chadian border town of Tine, killing three Chadian civilians.

2004 February - UNHCR announces it has begun moving Sudanese refugees on Chadian side of border to safer areas inside Chad. 

2004 February - President Bashir formally declares victory over rebel groups in Darfur, announces an end to the main military operations there, offers amnesty to rebels and promises safe humanitarian passage to the region. Rebel SLM/A and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) dismiss government claims of victory and launch new offensive.

2004 February - UN Special Envoy Tom Eric Vraalsen arrives in Khartoum, to follow up on President Bashir's promise to grant humanitarian access to millions of war-affected civilians in Darfur.

2004 Feb - A possible final round of Sudanese peace talks between the government and the SPLM/A resumes in Naivasha. Remaining issues are the three disputed areas of southern Blue Nile, Nuba mountains and Abyei and power-sharing arrangements during the interim period. 

2004 February - The UN announces the arrival of experts in Sudan to assess the humanitarian needs in Darfur, while UN agencies say they have begun delivering and pre-positioning food and other supplies for internally displaced persons. Humanitarian access still largely denied.

2004 February - Arab League holds its investment forum for southern Sudan to promote unity of the country.

2004 February - JEM and SLM/A say they will not attend peace conference proposed by Sudanese government.

2004 February - UN announces plans to set up a new safety corridor for Sudanese refugees in Chad.